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
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
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















# **CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY.**












*A. M. A. P.*  
of the  
**GENERAL SCENE OF THE MOVEMENTS**  
of the  
**FRENCH AND ALLIED ARMIES;**  
during the  
**CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY,**  
in the Year 1813.



A  
CIRCUMSTANTIAL NARRATIVE  
49 OF THE  
CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY,  
IN  
THE YEAR 1813.

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WRITTEN ORIGINALLY IN GERMAN,  
BY BARON VON ODELEBEN,  
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF ROYAL SAXON CAVALRY,  
ADJUTANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF, KNIGHT OF THE ORDER OF ST. HENRY, AND MEMBER  
OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR.

TO WHICH ARE SUBJOINED  
THE NOTES OF M. AUBERT DE VITRY,  
EDITOR OF THE FRENCH EDITION.

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THE WHOLE TRANSLATED  
BY ALFRED JOHN KEMPE,  
LATE OFFICER OF INFANTRY.

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VOLUME I.

LONDON:

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1820.


general connexion, opinions which the author has not personally formed, and incidents to which he has not been a witness.

The attentive reader will readily distinguish such details by the style of the narrative; and an unqualified respect for truth will amply repay him for the faults he may observe in the form of the work or any other imperfection.

My distance from the press did not allow me to correct many errors, which had crept into the first edition; I believe the present is amended as much as possible, without the entire alteration of the book. May the work, in its present state, deserve the favour of the German Public, who, to my surprise and satisfaction, have already given it so good a reception. I flatter myself to see a little book welcomed, which I offer without any pretensions, and in which will be found collected the events of one of the most productive years in important results, which has arrested the attention of the present generation.

VON ODELEBEN.

## **PART THE FIRST.**



# NARRATIVE,

&c.

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## CHAPTER I.

*Probable Motives for the Invasion of the Russian Dominions in 1812.—Re-organization of the Wreck of the French Army, in the following Year.—Opening of the Campaign.—Battle of Lützen.—The French enter Dresden.—Battle of Bautzen.—Death of Duroc.—Conclusion of the Armistice.*

FRANCE, after the disasters of the Campaign undertaken against Russia, in 1812, had acknowledged the appeal of her chief. She had collected from the remains of a numerous and flourishing youth an army which could hardly have been expected to assemble in so short a space of time. Every effort was exhausted in order to renew an obstinate contest, with a determination to sustain it to the last extremity; the awful conflagration, lighted up from one end of Europe to the other, seemed from its commencement, to the impartial spectator, the work of infuriated madness. If

wretched France had not exhausted the flower of her youth, during some preceding years, in the Peninsular war; if she had not entertained the fallacious hope of seeing a nation replete with energy succumb to a foreign domination, and, wearied at length with war, bend to the yoke of her oppressor; reinforced by the army occupied in Spain, which might have served as a nucleus for her forces, France, under the conduct of an able general, might have contended in the north with more security. Some chasms in a chain of operations might have been filled up, whose extended line resembled a tottering pyramid, rather than the foundation of a solid structure; especially after the conclusion of peace between Russia and the Porte, in 1812. In the mean time the most alarming vengeance was brooding in the hearts of the Spaniards: England made a just return to the elevated sentiments of that people; she was well aware what assistance might be expected from the pride and self-confidence of the Spanish nation towards the execution of her schemes; she employed every mean to foster, as a sacred flame, the dread of French dominion, while the leader of the French, impelled by a rooted design, the ap-

annihilation of English commerce, feared not to hazard a desperate chance.

The war with Russia was at the same time directed by one determined view; to this, in some degree, may be attributed those capital faults into which Napoleon allowed himself afterwards to be drawn. A different opinion may, perhaps, be entertained; many of our cotemporaries treat the project of invading the East Indies, as altogether incredible and ridiculous; but, from the information I received at the French head-quarters, I am confident such an intention was real. The provinces of the Russian Empire, so little favoured by nature, could not, surely, tempt the avidity of Napoleon; but their amicable conjunction with France, was to him of great importance. Neither the conquest, then, of these provinces, nor the desire of vanquishing the Russian army, whose cool and unshaken valour the French had already experienced, determined the victorious chief to undertake this campaign. No—he considered the road to Moscow but as the third part of his march to India.

If, in consequence of that firm confidence in himself, of that ability in his enterprises he had so often exhibited, he should succeed in inclining the



Russian cabinet to peace, after the capture of Moscow, that treaty would become the first instrument of his expedition into Asia. The success of the undertaking would afford him, in the course of two campaigns, an opening to the very centre of the British settlements; three years would be sufficient for these three gigantic strides.

The fiery\* genius of Napoleon might well have indulged in this scheme of mad temerity, in its dreams and waking might endeavour to effect its accomplishment, accustomed as he was to success in the most extraordinary plans. The appalling number of difficulties which must, during the expedition, like a tempest, burst upon his rear; the diminution of his troops in an interval of six years, were esteemed as nothing; all he considered was the prosecution of his favourite plan; the stride to Moscow once accomplished, Russia consenting to conclude a peace with him for several years†,

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\* M. de Narbonne has aptly compared the mind of Napoleon to a volcano.

† It is well known that Napoleon was accustomed to fix a time, or designate the year he had appointed for the accomplishment of such or such a scheme. I consider it useless to recite any instance; his predictions were founded on the geographical chart, and there alone he sometimes played the hero; his obstinacy.

and to second his march by menacing the states which his army would have on its flanks or its rear, he flattered himself to be able, in the interval, to accomplish a scheme which promised him more immortal glory than all his preceding exploits, and France would be elevated to a height, whence she might, in future, defy the pride of the British nation.

Let this project be placed in combination with that of a descent on England, before conceived, but which had fallen to the ground ; a project that would not, certainly, have been prepared at such an expense, if it had not been intended as a mask for another. Let it be compared with the vow afterwards expressed by Napoleon, to live long enough to execute his great design, and it will be acknowledged that my opinion is not to be despised. The erection of the triumphal arch begun in 1811 or 1812, at the farther end of the *Champs Elysées*, over *la Grille de Chaillot*, and opposite the palace of the Tuileries\*, which was to be completed in six or eight years, will be recollected ;

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also, in many instances, was prejudicial to his prescient art, as one passion is frequently seen to defeat the object of another.

\* The author mistakes. The triumphal arch had been begun in the year 1806, to celebrate the victories of 1805.

the idea of this monument might have been suggested by the projected expedition, the execution of which was to elevate its author above all the heroes of former ages. Whatever the diversity of opinion on this point, I am confirmed in mine, by an assertion which escaped from one of the most confidential servants of Napoleon. In a conversation which turned on the disasters of the Russian campaign, the person in question asserted that Napoleon would have accomplished one of the greatest and most splendid designs for the glory of France, and ruin of England, but for the unfortunate events at Moscow. These expressions were not studied; they were indicative rather of that deep regret which is sustained in a hopeless situation, than of the pride of a Frenchman greedy of conquest. I do not recollect the sequel of what passed, word for word; I only know that it impressed on my mind the possibility of the gigantic plan I have mentioned. Napoleon, such as we know him to be, doubtless had sufficient vigour of mind to conceive the project, and follow up its execution as far as practicability could extend.

To return to the year 1813. In the month of March the greater part of the new conscripts in

France was enrolled, and distributed among the different corps. The feeble remains of the French army which Napoleon had sacrificed in Russia, had fallen back on Magdebourg, under the command of Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy. The line of the Elbe could no longer be maintained; and, aware of the insufficiency of the means of defence, Marshal Davoust had executed his resolution of destroying several bridges over that river. The bridge of Meissen was burned on the 12th of March; on the 19th two arches and a pier of the fine bridge of Dresden were blown up. Davoust immediately retreated upon Hamburg, and that city, with the fortress of Magdebourg, became the *only points d'appui* for the wreck of the French army. Some thousands of Saxon recruits, which had assembled at Torgau, as well as the remains of the national army returning from Volhynia, a body not exceeding five thousand men fit for service, had retired into that city. The wreck of the Saxon corps, which, united with the undisciplined bands collected in the isles of Rhé, Belle-isle, and Walcheren, formed the 7th *corps d'armée*, under the orders of the General of division Regnier, and the extremity of the right wing of the grand French

army was quite exhausted by disease, by losses in contending with its enemy, and above all by the last battle near Calisch\*.

Regnier had there exposed himself too much to superior force; and all the troops he had been able to bring off had been consigned to the hospital. The Bavarians, and other allies of the French, were still engaged in raising the masses of reinforcement prescribed by the dictatorial will of Napoleon.

Except Davoust's corps, that of the Viceroy of Italy, and the inconsiderable remains of Regnier's division, which was prosecuting its march in a miserable condition across Saxony, no troops fit for service remained, but those which had been called from the interior of France by a decree of Napoleon, forestalling the levies which were to take place the following year. The flower of the French youth which composed them, the hope of the country, was soon to perish, withered in its bud; for these young persons were taken from

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\* The greater part of the Saxon cavalry fit for service, was separated from the main body of the army after the battle of Calisch, and obliged to withdraw into Austrian Galicia. In the month of May, General Gablentz, an officer of great zeal and activity, brought it back through Bohemia into Saxony.

their homes to perform marches beyond their strength, as if they had been veteran troops. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of some supported the courage of others, and led them to hope they should find in Saxony the same resources as that kingdom, when unexhausted by war, had offered to those who had preceded them: but excessive fatigue, and the bad food which they received, even in their own country, soon subdued their vigour. The greater part of the commissaries and contractors had escaped destruction in Russia, by the care which they took to reserve every thing for themselves, and through the protracted patience of Heaven. They had also escaped punishment in France, favoured by the relaxation of penal laws, and by indemnities. These inhuman beings were, perhaps, spared, because it was thought they might again be necessary. Nevertheless it was proved, in this instance, at the outset, and in their own country, that they might be dispensed with. The conscripts of the new levies were directed towards Mayence, or crossed the Rhine in various places. Mayence was, however, the principal point for assembling the forces, partly on account of the facility of the

route, and of the roads which lead beyond it; partly because from that position gigantic masses might be displayed to the world, about to pour into Germany to restore the repose of the continent. There, at the end of March and beginning of April, was assembled an unfortunate crowd of soldiers, as many of them diseased as in health. Those who came from France were not in better condition than those who had marched from the North. Both were equally destitute of food, and debilitated. That conformity of calamities so frequent in armies, but above which the soldier sometimes rises superior, was soon observed as a sinister presage. The sense of honour, however, awakening in the young conscripts, overcame their hardships; their energy was aroused at the appeal of their leaders, they hastened their march towards those scenes of action which had witnessed at once the triumphs of their brothers and their friends. They supported hunger and fatigue, to prove themselves worthy of the name of Frenchmen.

But neither vanity, nor the love of honour, could influence the poor quadrupeds which were procured and sent onward to battles with equal rapidity. The skeletons of those regiments which

had disappeared, soon obtained a considerable number of horses taken from various dépôts, and collected from every part of France; but precipitate marches, and the weight of their furniture, to which they were not yet accustomed, reduced these unfortunate animals to an almost useless condition. A new detachment of cavalry might be recognized at a hundred paces distant, by the smell proceeding from the sores of the horses, even before their sorry appearance was witnessed.

The French had already obtained the character of bad cavalry soldiers in the Russian campaign, and although their own preservation made it a duty to take better care of their horses, ignorance in their management, or barbarous treatment of them, grew into an inveterate habit.

At the period in question, the rapidity necessary for the march did not allow much care to be bestowed on them; for, in the present instance, a wish to exceed possibility, appeared to prevail. This was also a case in which money, however omnipotent, became useless. Whoever is acquainted with cavalry service, must know there is an essential difference between a man who causes himself to be carried by his horse, and one who is acquainted



with its management on the march : experienced officers, of all ranks, were wanting, capable of initiating a presumptuous multitude in the duty of the cavalry soldier.

The small number of officers in the army, added to the junior officers taken from the dépôts, were incapable of properly organizing a body of cavalry ; but the pressure of circumstances, and the urgent necessity of contending with an enemy superior in number and experience, rendered the expedient indispensable.

In the course of the campaign, the army had also to suffer the consequences of an infinite number of faults and gross omissions in the various details of service, especially with respect to the cavalry, rendering the ignorance of its officers but too palpable. As long as the French had to contend with great masses, or under the direction of an experienced general, success might be obtained by superiority of force, or an able attack ; but these advantages failing, they had the worst of it in engagements of cavalry and every rencounter.

Yet the cavalry arm had not been neglected with regard to its essential necessities, or exterior splendour. The men were well clothed, the fur-

niture of the horses in good condition, but it had been hastily prepared, and was unseasoned ; by these causes many horses were disabled.

During the following months the guards of honour, scattered through all the departments, were organized ; forming, indeed, many regiments, but presenting a small number of men. Pleasure horses in the capital were taken to supply them, as a liberal sacrifice made on the altar of the endangered state. Large sums were employed to re-establish the trains which had been abandoned on account of the frost, or accidents. Numerous columns of carriages had been prepared in haste ; and it must be allowed that much had been done, and great efforts were still making, for the branch of service to which they belonged : at the head of the renovated train of the French army, the equipage belonging to the guard was seen, defiling in state and exact order. The sad consequences had been experienced in Russia, of separating on the march, and of the slow progression of columns in the rear. This disorder caused every thing to fall in to the hands of the Cossacks ; consequently, when the brigades, or soldiers belonging to the train, were now observed lagging on

the march, the cry was heard "*Serrez ! Serrez !*" Lock up ! Lock up ! and the distance but of two paces being lost, perhaps a hundred carriages in the rear were obliged to advance at a trot ; these perpetual and sudden closings to the front, and prompt obedience to the command, wearied the draught horses to an incredible degree. It was, nevertheless, essentially necessary exactly to observe the order of march, and doubtless it was proper that each commandant should take care that his column preserved itself in as close order as possible ; but, at the same time, such an extreme anxiety and promptitude in closing up, unnecessarily exhausted the horses of the train : this excessive particularity was probably the effect of strict orders founded upon preceding events. The front of the column of march was too often doubled or trebled whenever the ground would permit ; nay, it would have been formed ten columns deep if there had been room ; cavalry, infantry, artillery, staff, train, all the corps, and often all together, unnecessarily committed this fault.

The result was a confusion, a crowding together of the columns, which induced the most dis-

astrous results. So long as the army was advancing, all these masses were able to deploy without great inconvenience, but into what disorder must an army so accustomed to march have fallen in its retreat; the sad consequences of it were more than once experienced. A great body of the French infantry was composed of conscripts, but, to repair the great losses experienced by the "old guard," which had made so splendid a figure in its march towards Russia, a new corps had been formed under the name of the "young guard." As far as I have been able to ascertain, a plan had been formed for fourteen regiments, comprehending the voltigeurs and flankers. It is not known whether this corps was completed, but it was necessary that Napoleon (who united it with the old guard, to have it under his command, and make it act immediately under his orders) should render it sufficiently strong to make use of it, either wholly or in part, in order to strike a decisive blow, on whatever point might present itself. The best disciplined conscripts, of whose conduct the most satisfactory experience had been obtained, and who afforded the

best hopes, were placed in this corps. Picked men were also enlisted in it, selected from the skeletons of old regiments, and the officers were partly chosen from the old guard. All the losses which the latter corps sustained, were supplied by the young guard, which thus became a nursery for the old. Its numbers would have exceeded all reasonable bounds, if the scythe of death had not increased its vacancies. Combined with the most determined courage it shewed the greatest devotion for Napoleon, and even after the most fatiguing marches, and bloody sacrifices of men, it saluted him with redoubled cries and the accustomed *vivats*: but man will be man. The strength of spirit cannot stifle his physical wants; the stomach claimed its rights. Although all possible care was taken of these two guards, although the commissaries were obliged to distribute provisions to them while the troops of the line supported themselves by pillage or were dying with hunger, the frequency of forced marches and counter marches lost these two *corps d'élite*, in the end, the preference they had enjoyed.

The French officers calculated greatly on the

artillery attached to the young guard; it consisted, as nearly as I could learn, of fifty-six pieces, with one or two batteries of twelve pounders; constantly kept in reserve, it had always operated *en masse*, and had achieved some fortunate enterprises. At the opening of the campaign, the artillery of the French was not indeed numerous, and the various moveable corps could not enumerate more than three hundred and fifty pieces. Latterly the artillery became immense, and at the rupture of the armistice, there were reckoned altogether, from the left flank of Davoust, to the frontiers of Bohemia, or, rather, to the right bank of the Rhine, thirteen hundred pieces of cannon.

On the 17th of April, at two o'clock, Napoleon arrived at Mayence. The distance from St. Cloud to that city, about sixty-four French posts or German miles, he had accomplished in forty-eight hours, accompanied only by an orderly officer\*. The remainder of his suite, even the grand Marshal Duroc, was yet in the rear. Indeed he had no time to lose, for, on the 31st

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\* The French papers say in forty hours. This is not true. Napoleon loved to travel with great celerity.

of March, the manifesto of the King of Prussia against France had been published, and the same day, on account of the Russian army having passed the Elbe, it was asserted in the "*Journal de l'Empire*," that if the Russians should be even encamped at Montmartre, France would not yield an inch of the provinces she had incorporated with her possessions. On the first of April, war with Prussia was declared in the Senate\*.

Many persons would not at first believe that Napoleon would repair in person to the army, which had been so hastily re-established, and was composed chiefly of raw recruits. Could he hazard his military glory with unexperienced legions, and on which he could not repose confidence? Ought he not to make the first attempt with these cohorts, through his generals and marshals; and when these inexperienced levies should be more familiarized with the destructive art of war, was it not then that he might put

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\* These two days are very remarkable, for it was exactly one year after, on the 31st of March, 1814, that the Russians and Prussians entered the French capital; and, on the 1st of April, the Senate pronounced Napoleon's forfeiture of the empire.

himself at their head, to augment their enthusiasm, and employ their lately-acquired experience in more decisive and important enterprises ?

Such was the opinion of persons who thought themselves politic ; but the French nation, which, in spite of the lamentations of the Nineteenth Bulletin, was not yet acquainted with the extent of the evils suffered in Russia, and the terrible reverse which had been sustained, was yet capable of some vigorous exertion when Napoleon should be at the head of the army, and every thing depended on the happy opening of the campaign. Napoleon, therefore, remained faithful to his character, which inclined him to risque every thing to retrieve public opinion by success at the first onset ; the guards were in the neighbourhood of Frankfort ; the old guard consisted only of veteran soldiers. The other corps which had come from Mayence were composed but of new levies. To give then this army a *point d'appui*, and a certain degree of strength, Napoleon had ordered thirty thousand men to come from Toulon, (at least, that was the estimated number of this reinforcement.) It was composed of the marine forces, which



served as infantry and artillery. Besides this, General Bertrand received orders to march from Italy towards Nuremberg, to join Marshal Ney, with forty thousand men; who was at Erfurt with a very inconsiderable force, amounting, as was jocosely said, to seventy men. The regular cavalry, which had arrived there from Mayence, was not estimated at more than four thousand. The separate detachments, which set out from thence to reinforce the regiments of cavalry farther distant, were not yet fit for service. The number of troops could hardly be computed from those which came in and marched out, and many persons pretended that in order to create an appearance, they went out at one gate, and returned by the other. It is certainly true that the old regular cavalry was extremely weak, and that the first divisions of it did not arrive at Manheim before the 9th of April; while, on the 1st, the most advanced of the cossacks shewed themselves at Chemnitz and Erzgebürg, and the Russians, after passing the Elbe in twenty places, occupied the towns of Naumbourg, Leipsic, &c. &c. This was known at Mayence; it was also known that the head-quarters of the

viceroy of Italy, were at the same time at Stasfurt, near Halberstadt, and that he was thus surrounded on all sides by enemies. The light troops of the Russians made incursions as far as Nordhausen, and had carried off a French resident from Gotha.

All these circumstances left no doubt but unfortunate Saxony would become the bloody theatre, wherein was to be decided the great question, if France should still continue to exercise her dictatorial interference in the affairs of Germany, and the rest of the continent. The prophecy of the celebrated Bulow, in his presages of future events, was about to be accomplished. As far back as 1800 and 1806, he had declared that the Elbe would be the point of meeting between the Russians and the French; and then the countries bordering on that river, more especially towards the east, would be exceedingly miserable.

During Napoleon's stay of several days at Mayence, the preparations were accelerated with incredible activity. It was to these extraordinary efforts which deprived France of all her young men, that one ought to attribute the success with

which that country found herself enabled to make head against her adversaries, and to display a vigour superior to expectation. While artillerymen and cavalry were yet to be raised ; while cannon were being cast ; while the men were being sized and clothed ; while they were receiving horses, which they intended to use on the field of battle, perhaps at the end of a month ; Napoleon caused to march, without delay, in large or small divisions, to reinforce the infantry, every man who could carry a musket.

On these great masses of infantry he was to place his reliance. Every day, every hour, was of the greatest importance ; and it was necessary to risque one great stroke, with the united force of the nation, to prevent it from discovering an odious system of juggling deception in the details published concerning the Russian campaign, and to preserve the credit of the author of so many disasters from utter subversion. The last bulletins had attributed all the misfortunes to the weather ; this was the time to prove that they were not to be assigned to want of foresight, or of moral and physical strength.

It became requisite to exhaust every effort to demonstrate to the people that if the enemy menaced to approach the frontiers of the empire, it could only be ascribed to the most unexpected reverses, and not to the imprudent schemes of a chief, whom they had considered infallible. The nation was still ready to make a great sacrifice. The people of the north but lately so despised, if they were not now repulsed by a victory, were about to insult the Gallic soil as conquerors; and the French had the sad prospect of seeing all that military glory vanish, which had been so dearly purchased, and the great nation receive imposed laws, or be divided.

All the vanity natural to Frenchmen, all their national pride, was excited by that reflection, in so critical a juncture. It appeared necessary promptly to gain a battle, not, indeed, to vanquish and pursue the discomfited to the borders of their own country, but to remove them from the theatre of war. If she gained the victory, France would shew what inexhaustible resources of strength and resistance she internally possessed: it would then be the time for concluding a peace on moderate terms, and to heal, during a period of prudential

repose, the wounds under which she was suffering. Then the national honour would be safe, and France might esteem herself happy in having acquired, by conquest, the esteem of Europe.

But the wrongs before accumulated, still increased by all the irregular proceedings into which the French army was impelled, by necessity, in the course of the campaign, with respect to the neighbouring states, and even towards its allies; and the nation acting with as much violence as bad policy, drew on herself the most inveterate hatred from all those capable of resenting the outrage. It must not be supposed that the French, by the sensibility and vivacity of their disposition, are insusceptible of a certain elevation of mind, or incapable of a sentiment of honour and justice; but these qualities are often stifled by interest and violent prejudices against other people. A deplorable egotism had, during the last campaign, suppressed all benevolence in the French, even towards their fellow-countrymen. With such a disposition, how little regard could be expected from them towards strangers. They had been accustomed to see villages in flames and destroyed, women and children in misery, estates laid waste,

the inhabitants flying; and they sometimes excused these horrors with an affected sensibility by the exclamation—" *C'est la guerre!*" This is war! but they did not remember that wars had often before been waged exempted from this unbridled disorder, from these cruelties, when an exact attention to the resources of the countries occupied, and to the welfare of the inhabitants, by maintaining discipline, softened the calamities inseparable from that scourge: it might then have been more justly said, This is confusion! In fine, the opinion expressed by the officers who surrounded Napoleon was, that a campaign in Russia must no longer be contemplated, even in case of a return of fortune in favour of the French; and that if they should be lucky enough to drive the Russians beyond the Oder or the Vistula, he would still make a great sacrifice to procure peace. But it is already known what was Napoleon and his followers' idea of a great sacrifice.

In the month of April, the labour on the fortifications of Mayence proceeded with great activity. The inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine, luckily, were paid. But those of the right, on whom Napoleon was about to confer the pri-

vilege of his protection, could obtain nothing. Probably the tribute for a succour, ever in expectancy, was lost in the pockets of commissioners and inspectors. Thus the necessity of protecting Mayence against the attack of an enemy was felt, but there was nothing in the situation of the inhabitants which could encourage them. The idea of a siege, a chance they had to run, the devastation of their country, resembling a beautiful garden, and the smiling environs of their city, was a prospect continually before their eyes; and it was with the greatest anxiety they listened to every report from the banks of the Elbe.

It cannot be denied that in the months of March and April, when the French army, newly re-organized, presented the image of a mere chaos, and the Viceroy of Italy was reduced to defend the Elbe alone, with about thirty thousand veteran troops, the combined Russian and Prussian armies might easily have penetrated to the Rhine. The French appeared to expect it, but the countries which, in the following months, had still so much to suffer from oppression, dared not complain of the delay which had taken place in their enfranchisement from the yoke of the French. It must be considered

as a particular disposition of Providence, that the march of events in the order which ensued, was precisely that, alone calculated for the destruction of the military strength of the French empire. Even the issue of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen concurred in producing this great result. If the French had already been beaten near Lutzen, so as to have been forced to retreat upon the Rhine, they would have approached their reinforcements and resources: that protecting river might have been defended with more energy than it was at a later period, and the troops which were hastening to come up from Italy and Spain, might have rendered important services on the frontier.

At all events the Rhine would have stopped for some time the progress of the allies, who had not yet assembled all their force; and in the interval the numerous French artillery, and the supplies which were taken up after the armistice in the month of August, would have been fit for service. How easy would it have been to create powerful diversions in Switzerland, and several other points, on the flank of the allies, and thus to concentrate the theatre of war in unhappy Germany. I am, therefore, well grounded in the conclusion that



the first advantages of the French, their advance into Silesia, the checks received by separate corps under different marshals, and finally, the great battle of the nations near Leipsic, were so many circumstances necessary to force the rapacious eagle back to his nest, after having stripped him of his plumes; and to prepare in this manner for wearied Europe a long and lasting repose. The artillery, an arm on which Napoleon placed the greatest dependance, could only be lost in battles, or by the destruction of whole corps, or, lastly, by operations in his rear. It was necessary at first that he should make some progress, and this being made, that he should, in the sequel, experience heavy losses. The French nation, whom many illusions still blinded, would have declared with difficulty against Napoleon, who had yet but a small number in opposition to him, as friends of peace.

He was disliked principally because he imposed great sacrifices on the people, but they still congratulated themselves on the possession of an unique character, whose genius alone was capable to protect the empire against the calamity of a foreign invasion. Indeed this last extraordinary

effort was sustained without many murmurs, and public attention was turned aside from the unheard-of calamities with which the invasions of the French armies, and the exactions of their generals, had overwhelmed other countries. Through the prejudice of national egotism they were satisfied with considering that a similar misfortune neither affected the French territory, nor the countries which resolved to remain incorporated with the great nation.

Up to the 24th of April, Napoleon remained at Mayence, passed in review some regiments of cavalry, and some troops brought from Toulon ; several columns of the train defiled before him, and he visited the fortifications. For some days past the guard had been at Frankfort ready to march. A complete uncertainty existed concerning the time intended for the breaking up of the headquarters. But it was conjectured that Napoleon, on quitting Mayence, would proceed without stopping to Frankfort, which really happened\*. He was as early as the 25th of April at Erfurt,

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\* " He will hurry us off suddenly, as in other campaigns," said the officers of his household, who often were totally ignorant if they might send forward their equipages, and at what time.

and already he displayed symptoms of uneasiness. The difference of opinion concerning that great operation, the opening the campaign, absorbed his mind. He was often seen mounting his horse to review the troops newly arrived, and to inspect the fortifications of Erfurt, where ditches were to be dug, and filled with the waters of the Gera. The rest of his time was busily occupied in his cabinet, and he only shewed himself by stealth at the window when the cavalry of the guard, the dragoons, the chasseurs, the Polish lancers, and the horse grenadiers, were defiling. His old guard always testified the greatest devotion for him, because he knew how to flatter them on all occasions\*. At Erfurt the people had been advertised of the march of a large body of French infantry by the road to Kranichfeld, formerly scarcely practicable. He apparently took

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\* It is a well known fact that Napoleon was exceedingly conversant with the art of conciliating the affection of his guard, and of the soldiers who had long served under him, by flattering their vanity with distinctions ; many of these were not of an ordinary nature, but consisted of something more valuable than the reward of a cross. A complete copy of Denon's large work on Egypt, was given to all the colonels who had accompanied him in the expedition to that country. This work was, indeed, the only useful result Europe derived from that perilous enterprise. The officers thus distinguished were very proud of the present.

this mode to effect his junction with the corps of General Bertrand, which, coming from Nuremberg, approached the frontiers. He wished, at the same time, to scour the mountains and forests of Thuringia of those light Russian and Prussian troops, who made incursions in that direction. The marines who belonged to Marmont's corps, marched at the same time by way of Erfurt.

On the 28th of April, Napoleon, with his own and Berthier's staff, removed from Erfurt to Eckhartsberg. The heavy baggage of the head-quarters was yet in the rear, between Fulde and Erfurt, under the orders of General Guilleminot. The greater part of the persons of his suite had hardly a horse with them, to enable them to begin the march. The led horses and domestics were still at the late head-quarters, not being able to follow so quickly, nor to proceed first, on account of the swarms of the enemy's light troops which infested the road.

Napoleon continued his march as far as Weimar. There he mounted his horse, arrived in the dusk of the evening at Eckhartsberg, and was busily engaged during the night. Berthier, although his staff always occupied a house to them-

selves, when there were sufficient lodgings to be found, resided at the palace, for so the dwelling of Napoleon was styled, though it were but a cottage. He wished always to have Berthier at hand. He took his meals *tête-à-tête* with Napoleon, when there were no persons at the head-quarters more eminent in rank; for example, in the absence of the King of Naples. The whole of the domestics waited in the ante-room, or, for want of space, stood upon the staircase. I shall speak in the second chapter of the manner in which Napoleon and his courtiers lived, or concerning his household. At Eckhartsberg one might early be convinced of the indifference with which the officers at head-quarters regarded the brutal acts and excesses in which the troops indulged for want of care and superintendence. Under the very windows of Napoleon bodies of them were collected, and animated each other with cries and frightful clamours. Those who bivouacked in the city were throwing, during the whole night, into their fires, all the doors, sashes, and other goods of the most necessary description, without paying the least attention that at some paces farther they might have found effects to burn of a less useful nature; and all this outrage

was committed in consequence of the custom of the French to destroy, without bounds or restraint, every thing which the stranger, who afforded them an asylum, had so laboriously acquired ; but at the same time exhibiting the most disgraceful parsimony, even in insignificant expenses, when payment on their side was in question. The officers, corrupted by necessity, which in the last campaign had been an excuse for so many excesses, contemplated this disorder with a stoical indifference, or even encouraged it. The impulse once given, and the chiefs shutting their eyes, woe to the country into which these undisciplined soldiers poured. To set fire to a house, or a village, through negligence or want of foresight, was an act entirely unnoticed ; to ruin in an instant the welfare of a family, or a whole district, when the destruction might have been averted by its careless author removing a few paces farther off, was a trifle. Never have I seen a general, or any other officer, bring these ruffians to trial, denounce and prosecute such barbarities. The cursed, *c'est la guerre* was an excuse for every thing ; and one hardly met from time to time a single person, with an appearance of feeling, who deplored

poor Saxony. The habit of witnessing human misery had effaced every touch of compassion.

Who, in such circumstances, could oppose the breach of discipline? Sometimes a determined inhabitant successfully disputed with one or two of these scoundrels, the wreck of his door, or drove them away. Those who abandoned their houses were in a worse condition.

Reckoning from the 29th of April following, Buonaparte made all his marches on horseback, and did not enter his carriage until the conclusion of the armistice. When he made use of a carriage, it was commonly a sign of very unusual leisure or of vexation. He is reported to have said at the beginning of the operations, "I will perform this campaign like General Buonaparte, and not as Emperor."—As soon as Napoleon was on horseback, he had some military object in view. Generally the business was to reconnoitre the country, to inspect fortresses or other works, or perhaps to review troops. Then he was accompanied by Berthier, (the Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram,) Marshal Bessières, (duke of Istria,) as commandant-general of the guard; Soult, (Duke of Dalmatia,) to whom no command was

then assigned ; Duroc, (Duke of Frioul,) as marshal of the palace, all mounted : then followed the grand equerry Caulincourt, (Duke of Vicenza,) General Guyot, commandant of the chasseurs of the guard, to whom the care of the escorts and relays, had been confided ; the adjutants, General Mouton, (Count Lobau,) Corbineau, Duromel, Drouot, Flahault, and Colonel Bernard. Latterly, were also seen, Colonel Deschamps, General Hogendorp, and after the armistice, General Narbonne, the Polish General Pac, and afterwards, Korsakowsky ; the last performed on many occasions the office of an adjutant, and wore indeed the French uniform, but was without any allowance, as were most of the Polish officers not comprehended in the guard.

Maret, (the Duke of Bassano,) minister for foreign affairs, was sometimes on horseback, in the suite of Napoleon, who had always two secretaries with him. Near Nuremberg, was a fine brigade of Marshal Ney's corps, which saluted him unanimously with the accustomed "*Vivat*," and seemed animated with the most lively enthusiasm. In all circumstances, the most experienced troops were placed under the com-



mand of Marshal Ney, because to him Napoleon always confided the most important and decisive attacks; but the greater part of his corps consisted at that time of conscripts,—at headquarters they spoke with enthusiasm of the courage with which it had fought in the first affair. Ney, after the action which took place at Weissenfels, wrote to Napoleon in the following manner:

“ Your majesty need entertain no uneasiness  
“ with respect to the new levies ; those young  
“ people have fought with an intrepidity which  
“ allows us to expect every thing from them.”

It is, however, certain that Napoleon himself might well entertain some uneasiness at the opening of the campaign concerning the conscripts; and that he had soon reason to be convinced of the danger there was in risking a bold stroke by opposing masses of inexperienced troops against tried and approved warriors. The able mixture of officers with soldiers, as well as the strong reserve which had been formed by the blending of the old and young guard, were alone able to give consistency to those parts of the army which were not ripened by experience.

Napoleon before he alighted at his palace

made the circuit of the city, and inquired with much eagerness for the road to Siss \* (Zeitz,) and concerning the population of that place. Often, if his dumb show and the signs he made with his fingers had not indicated what he wished to say, it would have been very difficult to guess the purport of his questions, and to answer him immediately; for his majesty loved brevity, and wished to ascertain every thing without circumlocution, and those *ifs* and *buts*, which an emperor formerly forbade an abbot of St. Gall to use. When the head of Napoleon was not preoccupied by his schemes, he amused himself with objects which had no relation to his essential business. He would ask, for instance, at the sight of the door of a school, the appropriation of the building, and the number of scholars it contained.

Siss or Zeitz might indeed be a place regarded as dangerous by him. The sequel proved that this anxiety was well founded; in the mean time he was vexed by the statement of a deputation of the magistracy of Naumbourg, who represented themselves to be incapable of procuring

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\* Siss was Napoleon's erroneous mode of pronouncing the word.—See Chap. II. Ed.

provisions for so many troops, whilst the whole country, and the magazine of Weissenfels, were blockaded by the enemy. His imperial mandate, that bread, meat, and provisions, should be procured, could have no effect on the actual state of things. The millers had been deprived of all their supplies of meal, the mills had been partly destroyed, and the French troops who were isolated, pillaged the convoys that might still have been brought up in spite of the scarcity of beasts of burthen.

Marshal Duroc, under the orders of Napoleon, repaired to the town-hall to hasten the preparations for supplies. But the disorder resulting from over-grown masses was too great, and the wants too pressing to make a regular distribution possible. The officers, shrugging up their shoulders, said, "They will pillage;" and this regularly happened in every case when they could not provide for the wants of these hungry vultures. Napoleon put to the deputation many questions concerning the population of the province, the Prussian and Russian army, the disposition of the inhabitants of Leipsic, the state of Torgau, Wittenberg, Mersbourg, the distance of Zeitz and Lutzen, (that recalled to his

recollection Gustavus Adolphus,) to which they replied with truth and in a proper manner; among the rest this was to be noticed :—" Did they think I should arrive so soon ?" It delighted him to appear like a god on his obedient clouds, "*ut Deus ex machinâ*," and to strike the people with astonishment by his rapidity and power. He often spoke of himself in the third person, to those to whom his questions were interpreted : it was asked, for instance, " Is it said that the Emperor has won a battle ?" at another time, " Is it said that the Emperor has many cannon ?" Herein may be traced the excess of human vanity; a confidence like that of Xerxes in his army, which in Napoleon's latter days always seemed to rest on the vast number of his guns.

When a great battle was about to be fought, this superiority in artillery, of which he always made a parade at the commencement of a campaign, must, in his opinion, make on the people and inhabitants a wonderful impression, and give a high idea of his forces. One might read in his face the triumph of ambition, when he thought he remarked in the voice of the people astonishment at his omnipotence. Could it then be

surprising, that a man elevated so high by fortune, and who believed he could extricate himself by his intelligence from the most difficult steps, should undertake boldly what appeared impossible to other mortals?

By means of the forces at his disposal, he undertook every thing on a grand scale, and a look or glance thrown upon the extraordinary resources which he knew how to appreciate, inspired him with boldness and security. He did not recognise in his adversaries the faculty of ably employing the forces which they had at their command, thinking himself alone capable of directing such great machines. By his severity, his will, and the execution of it, were, to use the expression, consequent on each other; and in such a manner, during the latter part of his government, that the progress of affairs was very simple and without mystery. The orders which emanated from him were exceedingly brief, conceived in a grand style, having one general view. The execution of the details was abandoned to generals and subordinate officers, who, since the Revolution, had acquired much practice, and learned the art of extracting themselves from embarrassing situa-

tions. The science of Napoleon consisted above all in this,—that for the execution of a plan which he had conceived on an extensive scale and which he had weighed, he chose, with a firm and inflexible will, the means which should conduct him in the quickest and most vigorous manner to his aim. His fearful authority dissipated as chimerical every objection, every representation, every plea of impossibility, concerning even the most insignificant things. If, for instance, it had been represented that a certain mode was impracticable; this appeared to him but a jest, which excited the ironical exclamation, “*Ah ! on ne peut pas,*” Ah ! it cannot be done : And he never gave up his prepossession till impossibility, as it might be said, stared him in the face; to such a degree had he been spoiled by Fortune !

While he was at table with Berthier, the conversation had turned upon the magistracy of the place. An officer belonging to the viceroy of Italy, brought him the information that the corps of that prince had arrived at Querfurt, and the prince himself had established his head-quarters at Schraplau : he appeared very well pleased with this news, and employed himself all day

in his cabinet. When he was informed that an engagement had already taken place with the advanced guard of his grand army under Ney, at Weissenfels, he had no longer any rest.

On the 30th of April he galloped on horseback through a heavy rain, from Naumbourg to Weissenfels, and reconnoitred a hill beyond the town, where the attack of the preceding day had taken place. No traces of it were to be observed, except some dead soldiers and horses, and an ammunition waggon which had blown up, for the Russian and Prussian cavalry were still at hand, and had removed the wounded. Napoleon caused his troops to encamp on the heights above the town; a swarm of infantry, bivouacked, crowded together in the market-place. From the arrival and departure of the different corps, nothing could be comprehended relative to their composition. One brigade abstracted from another, and the defects of discipline continually increased.

No one could remain in the suburbs; a slight degree of control scarcely existed in the city, and under the eye of head-quarters.

Those who conducted themselves in the most

horrible manner in this march of the French army, were the troops of the advanced guard, chiefly Italians, who robbed and pillaged openly.

After some hours' employment on the first of May, the cry of "*à cheval*,"—To horse! was suddenly heard at the head-quarters of Napoleon. It was thought that he was merely about to make some "*reconnaissance*," for no one was acquainted with the motive which induced him so rapidly to change his head-quarters. But from the hill in front of Weissenfels, the signal announcing the appearance of a line of enemy's cavalry, and strong posts of Cossacks, had been made. They had probably alarmed the bivouac, and thus occasioned the assembling of the troops. Napoleon instantly presented a mass of infantry, the cavalry marched upon Leisau and Rippach. The corps of Ney was in advance, and at the head of the advanced guard were Generals Souham and Kellerman. The other corps, near which was Buonaparte in person, made a more forward movement by the right, on the heights towards Poserna, to wait till the defile of Rippach should be occupied. The road passes obliquely, by a gentle descent, through the village situated in a bottom; on the



other side it rises by an equal ascent towards the heights, which are of very easy defence, whilst above and below the villages of Rippach and Portsen, the banks of the Rippach are a little steeper.

Marshal Bessieres, Duke of Istria, colonel-general of the guard, and who, in that situation, was not necessary to the attack of the defile, marched in haste at the head of the tirailleurs, who advanced by way of Rippach. The duke had scarcely gained the side of a height occupied by the artillery of the allies, when he fell, struck in the abdomen by a cannon-ball. The fall of this important character was concealed from the troops as much as possible, his body was immediately covered with a white sheet, and no mention was made of the accident. It was by a mere chance that the loss of a general or person of note could be learned at head-quarters. After every battle the most profound silence prevailed respecting the fate of those who had fallen, and the French feared to own at what a price they bought their pretended victories.

When the shaft of death had stricken any one the grass soon grew upon his tomb, and even two

friends in their private conversation seldom mentioned the deceased. So accustomed had the soldiers become during a long war to perpetual sacrifices. Their hearts being blunted, and indifferent to the loss of so many distinguished men, they regarded the death of their brothers in arms with the same *sang froid* as the fall of the leaves in autumn, expecting the deficiencies to be replaced the following year; misery did not affect their feelings so long as it spared themselves.

The line of the Allies extended from the road leading to Lutzen and Leipsic, towards Starsiedel; their cannon, planted between those two places, enfiladed the high-way, and greatly annoyed the French infantry formed in the fields by its side.

The French had lost some hundreds of men; the want of simultaneous combination in the movements of the troops newly raised was clearly perceived. The French generals themselves complained that there was no *ensemble* in the attack; but the principal cause which rendered their movements difficult, or at least retarded them, was the deficiency of cavalry. The infantry, wearied by the labour of the preceding

days, was obliged to make head against the enemy's cavalry, for the small number of cavalry the French had was insufficient for that purpose ; it consisted for the major part only of regiments of the guard, which was always kept in reserve. This campaign confirmed the opinion, that infantry, but not cavalry soldiers, may be easily made of raw recruits : and Napoleon, who thought he could accomplish every thing by his power, shewed by this miscalculation, occasioned by his pride, that an imperial order could not create a good body of cavalry, as readily as it might a fortress. The infantry of the Allies at first took the direction of Pegau ; the French had nothing to oppose their great masses, consequently they drove back the troops before them, and their bivouacs occupied the right and left of Lutzen. Napoleon, after having rapidly reconnoitred the environs, established his head-quarters in the town-hall of the place.

The battle of Lutzen, in which Gustavus Adolphus had terminated his heroic career, seemed too much to occupy the attention of Napoleon.— With an intention perhaps of finding some coincidence of time and position, on the day following, the second of May, he inquired with much

eagerness the day of that battle, the position of the armies, and for the spot where Gustavus Adolphus had fallen\*. Napoleon did not expect to be attacked on the day mentioned, nor in that position; consequently, the battle of Gross-Görschen, even if its result should be considered of a doubtful nature, ought to be ranked among the number of the ablest and most successful military operations of Napoleon. His different *corps d'armée* were on the march to unite in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. The viceroy was moving towards Querfurt, and advanced by way of Mersebourg in the night of the first and second of May; his head quarters were at Etsch. Marshal Ney was at Kaia, a short league distant from Lutzen near Pegau. General Bertrand

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\* I here take occasion to observe, for the reader who may require the information, that the celebrated battle near Lutzen, in which the Swedes, notwithstanding the death of their king, defeated the army of Wallenstein, was fought the 6th of November, 1632. The two armies, in presence of each other, had approached so near, that they were separated only by the road from Lutzen to Leipsic. The fields of Pegau were in the rear of the Swedes, and the environs of Mersebourg in that of the Austrians. Thus between this and the second battle of Lutzen, as the French denominated it, there was no similarity, neither in the day or the position, for the field of battle extended on the side of Lutzen towards Zeitz and Pegau.

coming from Nuremberg, was crossing the mountains, and a division of his army took a share in the battle at the extremity of the right wing of the French. Napoleon in person was with the main body of the army on the road to Leipsic, and had sent forward General Lauriston who was already between Schœnau and Lindenau in the midst of the fire. The troops were marching in close order, in the rear of each other, and Napoleon had already advanced at the head of his army towards Markranstadt, when the cannon near Lindenau announced the beginning of this memorable day; then Buonaparte, whose attention had perhaps been engaged by some report, halted and remained in meditation by the side of the road for half an hour. The troops advanced without stopping, and the fire of the artillery continued near Lindenau. Suddenly between ten and eleven o'clock, a brisk cannonade commenced in the rear of the right flank, in the direction of great and little Goerschen. Marshal Ney was at Kaia, and its environs had been attacked with fury by the Prussians. Napoleon remained silent, observed for some minutes the smoke and distant cannonade, instantly changed his plan,

counter-marched all the troops advancing on the road and caused them to retreat towards Lutzen. It may well be conceived that so rapid a change in the direction of these masses, with the artillery and baggage, could not be effected without considerable embarrassment. During these movements, Ney, although briskly pushed, maintained himself vigorously at his post; Napoleon repaired without delay to the point of attack upon Kaia, and the wounded retired in great numbers before him, between that village and Lutzen. His presence inspired the troops with enthusiasm, although Ney's corps was composed but of young conscripts, who perhaps were then for the first time in their lives under fire. Scarcely a single wounded man passed before Buonaparte without saluting him with the accustomed *vivat*. Even those who had lost a limb, and in a few hours were to become the prey of death, paid him that homage. Not from one dying enthusiast alone did I hear this gratulatory exclamation, but perhaps from fifty. All these men, blinded by the illusions of national vanity, voluntarily suffered themselves to be conducted to slaughter. Napoleon himself perceived

the vast importance of this engagement in its fullest extent ; he was aware that he had but inexperienced young soldiers to oppose to practised troops, and wearied infantry to superior cavalry. The enthusiasm his presence inspired had to supply the place of experience and strength : he was particularly weak in artillery, an arm on which he greatly, nay, almost solely, depended, for he had, at that time, hardly two hundred and fifty guns with the corps assembled on the spot. At the moment of his arrival at Kaia the chance of battle appeared turned against him ; Ney was obliged to yield to the courage of the Prussians. The loss was already very great on the French side, and was still increasing in the quarter mentioned, by reason of the efforts made to take and retake the villages of Kaia and Rana, which are situated at a quarter of an hour's march from each other, in a plain interspersed with trees and ditches full of water ; they had been carried by assault, according to the French account, six or seven times. Kaia might be considered as the key of the position. The village did not, indeed, in point of situation, command the environs. The inequalities of ground about it were insignificant,

and the most considerable heights were in the neighbourhood of Statsiedel. The latter position having in its front a canal which was difficult to cross, offered notwithstanding an excellent *point d'appui* for the two armies, and if that of the viceroy of Italy had not threatened the right flank of the Prussians, the vigorous defence of this very point would have changed the issue of the battle in a manner much less favourable to the French. The name of the village of Kaia might have been, with greater reason conferred, on the battle of the 2d of May than that of Lutzen or Gross-Görschen; for on the site of Kaia the military success of Napoleon began to change. If the Prussians had succeeded in penetrating for half an hour longer, the whole line of the French army on its march between Weissenfels and Leipsic would have been broken, and their cavalry might have acted with great success on its rear, in the direction of Weissenfels. Napoleon was fully aware of this; he remained almost the whole of the day behind Kaia, in the direction of Lutzen, where his infantry, in echellons, and his old guard, had been placed in reserve near the cavalry. He exposed himself in this, more



perhaps than in any of the subsequent engagements fought in Saxony, because he perceived how much the courage of the army, the opinion of the people, and the preservation of his character, (staked at a short distance from the French empire,) depended on gaining it. I never perceived more apparent signs of embarrassment in his countenance than on that day, at the moment when perhaps the third attack on Kaia and Rana had been repulsed ; and when one of his brigades, driven from the first of these villages, had betaken itself to a downright flight, Napoleon received a report from one of his orderly officers with a dreadful “ *Ha ! \**” He ordered it to be repeated to him, throwing at the same time a long, doubtful, and apprehensive look on Berthier, and Caulincourt, as if he would have said, “ Do you think my star is setting ?”

The right wing of the French army was rested with difficulty upon Starsiedel, which the day

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\* This interjection “ *Ha !*” as pronounced by Napoleon, had so many meanings, and he understood how to modulate it in such an astonishing manner, that it might be discovered at some distance if the news he received were good or bad : and when he apprehended the sense of a discourse, he expressed in the most significant manner, by that monosyllable, his satisfaction or displeasure.

before had been occupied by General Girard. This village, as well as those of Klein Gørschen and Kaia, became a prey to the flames. I cannot give any opinion concerning the movements of the French left wing, because it was both out of the reach of a distinct view, and hidden by a thicket on the edge of the canal\*. Napoleon remained, it is true, chiefly with his guard; but he often shewed himself, and at the head of every corps which had newly come up. Accustomed on the day of battle to operate on the minds of his soldiers before the engagement, by some action calculated to inspire enthusiasm, he did not neglect this occasion of animating their ardour, and exciting their devotion. It is true, in this instance, the attack had been so sudden, that he had no leisure to distribute eagles, to promise crosses of

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\* I here repeat, that far from aspiring to the honour of becoming an historian, I adhere simply to the relation of what I personally saw and heard. One who is not attached to the staff, cannot, of course, be acquainted with the relation of the different corps to each other, consequently can give no opinion on the detail of their manœuvres; with respect to the *ensemble* of the operations, printed official reports which one has read, form the only authority. Where I to make use of these, my memoirs would assume the character of a treatise on tactical manœuvre, which is foreign to my plan.

honour, or promotion, unnecessary means with his guard ; but he shewed himself to the troops, according to his custom, when they attacked ; and, as he galloped down the lines, he was saluted with *vivats*, re-echoed from column to column. A short time before, Napoleon, for some fault, had deprived a battalion of its commander. He knew that this officer, otherwise a very brave man, was exceedingly beloved by his soldiers. He rode up to the front of the corps, at the head of which he replaced him, after addressing him in a short speech. The acclamations of joy from that body resounded afar off ; it immediately formed the head of a column which advanced to attack a height in the rear of Starsiedel. All the other regiments greeted him with acclamations, even amid the fire of artillery. The battle still continued, and was kept up in the neighbourhood of Kaia, until half past six in the evening. Each side fought with a fury worthy of admiration, and the brave Prussians found plenty of employment for the French. Their batteries near Goerschen and Rana, played on the imperial guard, and several balls and grenades fell near Napoleon : an *inspecteur des postes* lost a leg close by him.

and even bullets were whistling around him. A visible embarrassment might be observed in the persons of his suite, as the fire drew nearer, and Kaia, the pivot of the engagement, became endangered : the moment arrived when all appeared lost on that point, and the reserve of the old guard was expected to attack : then Count Lobau, an adjutant of Napoleon, and one of the most intrepid of his generals, placed himself, by his order, at the head of a division of the young guard, to retake the position. As soon as this attack had succeeded, Napoleon directed another of his adjutants, Drouot, general of the artillery, " to collect a battery of sixty pieces of cannon : " he briefly pointed out to him the corps from which they were to be taken, and where they were to be posted. A movement of such importance, by a dozen words, was made the work of the twinkling of an eye, so well had his officers learnt to comprehend him. This battery, planted on the heights near Starsiedel, made a considerable impression in advance, during its fire, and Napoleon followed at the head of the second column of attack ; this was a moment when he shewed himself in person, impelled by the ardent desire of victory. He flew from one

point to another, continually urging his troops onward to obtain some advantage of ground, that the enemy, annoyed by the brisk fire of the artillery, might neither be able to maintain their position, nor persevere in their resistance. His columns were already marching over the carcasses of the enemy's advanced guard, which had occupied the position; already he had caused the small eminences at the back of Starsiedel to be occupied, and he wished to pursue his advantages in the direction of Pegau. From sixty to eighty pieces of cannon continued their fire on the centre of the opposing army; Gross-Goerschen became a prey to the flames, and was carried; but the combined army remained firm on every point which it chose vigorously to maintain, however incapable it might be of defence, and sustained the battle till night had completely closed upon them.

Napoleon called a Polish general of his suite, and said to him very briefly, "Go to Cracow, and say I have won a battle." This was the only despatch forwarded from the field of battle. The general immediately departed. Nothing more was now to be seen than the flashes of the guns, which were about to cease firing; the position of the pieces

could not be discovered. The villages on fire lighted up the horizon in three places, when a body of cavalry advanced with as little noise as possible, in close order, up to the battalions formed in squares, behind which was Napoleon. I believe, if it had approached rapidly, two hundred paces nearer, he would have been taken prisoner, with all his suite; for the attack, and the fire of the French musketry, were so close together, and the darkness so great, that friend could not be distinguished from foe. At that moment the suite of Napoleon suddenly dispersed. Napoleon himself disappeared for some minutes, and every one anxiously inquired, "Where is the Emperor?" Such was the scene that terminated this gigantic engagement. The attack of cavalry, which indicated on the enemy's side an energy inspired by a calm confidence in his means, was, in fact, repulsed by the French infantry; but Napoleon was unable to ascertain whether there might not be some numerous masses on his flanks or rear, ready to create a diversion.

I shall not inquire whether it might not have been advantageous for the Allies to continue the attack on the line of junction of the French at

Weissenfels, with bodies of light troops, and above all with cavalry; for, in the most disastrous event, there would still have remained, for a column so composed, an open retreat to Torgau, by crossing the Elbe; and these troops would have, at all events, caused infinite damage to the French army, while the latter, for want of cavalry, could have occasioned them very little.

The uneasiness entertained from the expectation of a similar attack, obliged the troops to remain formed in squares of battalions, during the night of the 2d and 3d of May. When Napoleon, who had returned to his head-quarters at Lutzen, after ten at night, quitted them the following morning at break of day, to view the field of battle, the troops preserved the same order.

Then the loss of men, experienced by the French army, might be estimated; the field-hospitals were in a dreadful state of activity, and near the villages of Kain and Rana, almost the entire surface of the ground was strewn with the dead. There might be reckoned on this spot, where indeed the battle had been most murderous, from two to three thousand killed; the greater part on the French side. The young assailants had encountered for-

midable adversaries in the Prussian guard, and the ditches were filled with the dead bodies of the former. At a rough guess, the French loss might be calculated at six or eight thousand men, and double the number of wounded; the loss of the Russian and Prussian combined armies, could hardly be esteemed so great. I estimate the strength of the French army on that day at about a hundred and twenty, or a hundred and thirty, thousand men, as the corps of the Viceroy, Ney, Macdonald, Mortier, Marmont, and Bertrand, were all united\*.

The observer of historical events may remark a wonderful difference between former battles, and those of the present day, when he recollects that in the first battle of Lutzen, although the two contending parties did not, together, amount to more than forty thousand men, their aggregate loss was computed at nine thousand killed; at least one fourth of the combatants.

Of all the reports of military events, which the French papers contained, that of the battle of

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\* There was, as has been observed, but the advanced guard, or a part of the latter corps engaged, and Lauriston kept aloof near Lindenau.



Lutzen was distinguished as being the most faithful: the progress of the action was fairly represented, but, as usual, the Prussian loss was exaggerated, and the French diminished. No mention was made of the general officers who were killed or wounded. Nevertheless, General Grumer, one of those who were most dangerously hurt, died on the night of the battle, at Lutzen. The allied armies lost but few men as prisoners, and, as far as I could learn, none of their cannon were captured. They carried off all their wounded. Under cover of their excellent and numerous cavalry, they made a fine retreat, similar to those we had so often occasion to admire in the Russian campaign. The want of cavalry prevented the French army from deriving any great advantage from the retreat of the enemy. The principal fruit of the battle for the French, was thus reduced to the possession of that part of unfortunate Saxony situated on the right bank of the Elbe.

On the morrow of the engagement which had been so warmly contested, Napoleon was saluted by the lively acclamations of his troops, formed in squares of battalions. He passed several brigades

in review, and minutely examined the position of the preceding day.

The fine military appearance which prevailed in the new army, that had sprung, as it were, out of the ground, by the touch of a magic wand, was truly admirable. Although the excesses of the French soldiery could not be contemplated without disgust, the military spirit, the activity on the march, and the courage of the young troops, so hastily raised, and suddenly opposed to experienced soldiers, excited astonishment.

Napoleon remained for several hours by the great fire of the bivouac, which was burning near a strong battalion of the old guard formed into a square, not far from Gross Goerschen. He there awaited a new attack, upon the left wing near Leipsic, which was to be made under the direction of the Viceroy of Italy; he remained in a state of inaction, until about half-past nine, when the roaring of cannon was heard: the rear-guard of the enemy still occupied the hills in the direction of Pegau, about two leagues from Lutzen, although the main body of their army had passed through the village. Strong columns of cavalry were still observed near Hohen-Mölsen and Zeitz; they retired towards Alten-

berg and Chemnitz, to take the direction of Dresden.

Napoleon gave orders for the subsequent march of his army, from a small hill near the road, a point which had perhaps been chosen the day before, by the allied monarchs for their observations. He might probably be desirous of throwing the enemy's rear-guard into disorder; and he wished a division to press it on the march between Pegau and Zwenkau. The delay of a general who did not approach him as fast as he desired, greatly enraged him. *Vous rampez f——e*, "You creep ——," he exclaimed. The attempt to pursue was notwithstanding fruitless; for the allied army, as I have remarked, had so well disposed its retreat, that only a few skirmishes took place between its rear-guard and the advanced guard of the French, under the Viceroy of Italy, near Harta, Nossen, and Wilsdruf, on the following days, before the occupation of Dresden.

The imperial head-quarters were removed on the 3d of May to Pegau, on the 4th to Borna, and on the 5th to Colditz. The King of Saxony was at that time at Prague. The Emperor sent

him intelligence of the result of the battle at Lutzen, and also informed him, that he hoped in a few days to enter Dresden. It appeared however to be his intention, to pass the Elbe near Koenigstein, in case the Allies should undertake to defend the capital\*. He sensibly experienced the want of cavalry, for he frequently pressed the King of Saxony, to send him two regiments of cuirassiers, still in Franconia. Uncertain as to the state of Torgau, Napoleon embraced every opportunity of inquiring the fate of that fortress, and of Dresden. He even

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\* He asked a peasant who had lately returned from Dresden, if the Emperor would be a welcome guest in that capital: the latter frankly answered him, "The Emperor would, but not his soldiers." The Russians were better liked than the French, because they were not so lavish of blows. Buonaparte then inquired of the peasant, if the inhabitants of Dresden, were much incensed by the blowing up of their bridge? "Tis of no consequence; twill be rebuilt," he replied with a smile, shrugging up his shoulders. Napoleon, however, never said a word about paying for the repairs. We shall speak by and by of those traits of generosity, towards which he sometimes felt an inclination. A generosity amounting to very little, because expenses of that description, could seldom be taken from his privy-purse; and the embarrassment and urgent nature of his affairs rarely permitted his return to complete such objects. This was the case with the sorry indemnity, he granted to the inhabitants of Bischofs-Werda, whose town he at one time announced his intention to rebuild.

sent General Thielmann to the governor of Torgau, to inform him of the victory he had gained at Lutzen, and that he had placed a Saxon corps under the command of Marshal Ney, who was at Leipsic; he recommended him to open a communication with the marshal, to send into the field all the troops of his garrison fit for service, leaving but two thousand men in the citadel. At Woldheim, the bridge had been burnt by the Russians; the march of the army was stopped till it could be repaired. However, the cavalry and light infantry were able to cross by a ford, and Buonaparte himself was constrained to do the same.

It may here be observed, that although he was a bad horseman, he often abandoned himself entirely to the direction of his horses, which were generally small and poor in appearance; he frequently risked his person in narrow swampy ways, in dreadful and dangerous roads, and in crossing rivers. The grand equerry, who, by the nature of his office, went immediately before him, was commonly engaged in finding the most practicable places.

Napoleon himself remarked at one time with

much *naïveté*, that he had learned a great many things, but had never been able to make himself a complete horseman. His make was not indeed calculated for equitation. When he galloped he sat carelessly in the saddle, generally holding the reins in his right hand, while the upper part of his body was jumbled, as the horse went on, forward, or on one side, and his left hand hung negligently down. If the horse made a false step, he immediately lost his balance. On the 7th of May, Napoleon proceeded from Waldheim to Nossen; the Viceroy of Italy, with the advanced guard, as far as the vicinity of Wilsdruf; the fifth *corps d'armée*, under General Lauriston approached near Meissen; the fourth, under General Bertrand, remained between Mitweida and Freyburg. The following day Buonaparte's head-quarters were to have remained at Wilsdruf. But as he approached that small town, as usual, at the head of his staff, he received intelligence, that the advanced guard of the viceroy had arrived at Dresden; Napoleon immediately said to an officer of his suite, "Go to Dresden, bring the deputation of the city to me; I have appointed General Durosnel commandant of Dresden,—

Gallop all the way." It was of much importance to him in this, as in similar cases, to secure a good reception.

Dresden, although filled with sad and anxious inhabitants, appeared in all the lustre of approaching spring. Her circling hills bedecked with opening flowers, were covered with French warriors.—With pain the Saxon patriot saw in his imagination that beautiful abode, abandoned by the father of his country, become the theatre of crime, the prey of bands, whom want and suffering inspired with brutal passions. Already on either side of the city arose black clouds of smoke; the Russians in their retreat had abandoned to the flames two bridges, one of timber-work near Ubigau, the other, at the upper part of Dresden, formed of well-pitched boats. The latter floated, burnt and smoking to the water's edge, and, impelled by the wind, fixed itself across the front of the great bridge over the Elbe at Dresden; this was no longer passable, since Davoust had caused two of its arches to be blown up, and the temporary wooden bridge which the Russians had erected was broken down. The most profound tranquillity existed in the city, and was only inter-

rupted by some reports of cannon from the right bank of the Elbe. Towards noon, not a soldier of the Allies was to be seen. The last of the Cossacks crossed the river on their horses, by swimming, the citizens had taken charge of the gates. The other inhabitants, in expectation of what might happen, assembled near their houses, full of anxiety concerning the issue of the pending movements of the armies. The Emperor Alexander had quitted the city at one o'clock the preceding night, and the King of Prussia in the morning; the allied army had fallen back upon Bautzen; it still, however, occupied Neustadt and the heights on the right bank of the Elbe. The deputies of the council met Napoleon about half a league from Dresden, on the road to Freyberg, not far from the office for the receipt of imposts belonging to the highways.

After a compliment, in which they recommended the city to his protection, he asked them in a brisk and harsh tone of voice, "Who are you?" "Members of the municipality." "Have you supplies of bread?" The magistrates of a city, exhausted by supplies afforded to all the troops which had already occupied Saxony, were hardly



able to afford him a satisfactory reply ; and if indeed the most necessary wants of the new comers could have been supplied, the shortest stay of these enormous masses would have threatened to reduce to the worst extremities a city worthy of compassion. The abominable principle, that every thing was possible, (a maxim which sets aside all inquiry whether the resources of a state are exhausted or not, or if millions of inhabitants may not be consigned to misery,) dictated to him the reply, " Let bread, meat, and wine be furnished." He then turned his horse's head towards the suburb of Pirna, traversed the ramparts of the city, as far as the road leading to Pilnitz, where he alighted, and proceeded on foot, with his grand equerry and a page, in the open country to the spot where the Russians had established their bridge of boats. The viceroy went before, and conducted him alone near the bank of the Elbe, whence the enemy's posts might be descried on the other side. Several balls were discharged from the heights on the opposite shore ; afterwards the firing ceased ; it would indeed have been ridiculous to fire on two single men, for the led horses and the suite always remained in small

clusters at a proper distance in the rear. But if the enemy could have divined that the blood-thirsty chief was in sight, the shower of balls certainly would not so soon have ceased. As the passage of the Elbe could not be effected in that quarter, Buonaparte resolved to attempt it lower down, at Priesnitz or Ubigau. Therefore, after having made some observations from the left bank of the river at the suburb of Pirna, and inquired the means of procuring boats, planks, and workmen, in a short time, he galloped in person beyond Fredericstadt, towards the place already mentioned near Ubigau. The bridge of rafts which remained at that place was indeed separated from the left bank of the Elbe, but two thirds of it were still left, slowly burning, adhering to the other side of the river, and no troops were posted by the enemy to watch that point.

Not even a Cossack was to be seen. Some of the body-guard immediately got on board the small boats they had procured, and with the assistance of several workmen, the fire, which burned but weakly, was extinguished, and the bridge towed to the left bank of the river. Buona-

partegave directions instantly to collect carpenters and materials to establish on the spot a bridge of rafts. But, in the first place, troops were assembled, who entrenched themselves the following night on the right bank of the river, to cover the workmen occupied in the re-construction of the bridge. The Allies observed this project. They might well be surprised at so prompt an expedient to facilitate the passage of an army so considerable as the French. On the morning, therefore, of the 9th of May, they despatched a strong body of troops on the road which leads to Meissen, through the villages of Wachau and Pischen, and the inhabitants of Dresden were awakened by a fire of cannon and musketry proceeding from the direction of Neustadt. Buona- parte, accompanied by a single adjutant, had repaired at three o'clock in the morning to the rampart near the Faussebraye, and had given directions for placing some pieces of cannon, which about noon silenced the enemy's fire: that of the tirailleurs was prolonged, during the whole day, on the opposite sides of the Elbe, and no one dared appear on the bridge: two guns, covered by entrenchments, fired from Neustadt upon the square of the castle,

and catholic church of St. Nicholas. Many of the inhabitants were killed and wounded in the morning: towards noon the cannonade began in the plains of Ubigau. The Russians wished to prevent the construction of the bridge, and had brought a great number of guns to bear upon that point. The woody hills near Ubigau were favourable to the establishment of the batteries; the killed and wounded became numerous.

Buonaparte placed himself at a short distance, near a powder magazine, that had been abandoned, and the wood of which was converting to the construction of the bridge; he personally directed the measures for repulsing the enemy. The Russians brought up about fifty or sixty pieces, which they planted along the banks of the Elbe. Before any other person could have observed their number, Buonaparte had arranged the necessary dispositions. "A hundred pieces of cannon!" he exclaimed, in a voice like thunder, to General Drouot, who hastened to bring them up, and placed a part upon the heights of Priesnitz, an advantageous position, a part near

the spot called "the shoemaker's house," and some at the end of the avenue of Ostra\*.

The cannonade was very serious. The Russian batteries swept the entire surface of the fields, between Fredericstadt and Preisnitz. But the position of the French was much more advantageous than that of the Russians, as far as the hill already mentioned, clothed with wood or vines extended, and which covered the Russians near Ubigau. Several bullets and grenades fell near Buonaparte; one of the latter tore a piece of plank from the partition of the powder magazine, and projected a splinter near his head. "If it had touched my body it would have been all over," said he, taking up the splinter and examining it. A few minutes after, a grenade fell

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\* When Drouot returned from Priesnitz, and gave Buonaparte an account of the execution of his orders, the latter was not very well pleased with the disposition of the guns; and in the first transport of his displeasure, he shook the general by the ears: Drouot was not abashed, but assured him in a modest but determined manner that they could not be better placed. Then Napoleon's discontented air gave way to a friendly smile. He appeared to pass it off as a joke, and became tranquil. Similar emotions of anger were not singular with him, as I shall have occasion to observe in the sequel.

between him and an Italian regiment, which had halted twenty paces in his rear. The Italians shrunk a little to avoid the effect of the explosion. He observed it; and turning towards them, exclaimed with a contemptuous smile! *Ah! cujoni, non fa male\**. At last the situation became rather disagreeable, and he directed his steps beyond Cotta, and behind an elevated road near Leute-witz, towards Priesnitz. The Russians remarking on a sudden his numerous suite, which until then had remained behind in a hollow, sent a shower of balls whistling in their rear. In the mean time about two battalions had passed the river, which, posted at the head of the bridge that was begun, were to clear the other side of the shore. The tirailleurs, under cover of the batteries, drove from point to point the Russian infantry. The enemy's cavalry, from sixteen to eighteen squadrons strong, lay near Trachau and Caditz, and were no longer engaged. Probably the rear-guard of the Allies, which was to oppose the passage of the French army at this point, had been reinforced by them, while the

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\* Ah! rascals, it will do you no harm.

main body of the allied army retreated on Bischofswerda, Pulsnitz and Radeberg.

In this engagement some hundreds of men were lost on both sides : the head of the bridge remained in possession of the French, and the Russians abandoned Ubigau, of which the former possessed themselves. But the works of the bridge became, notwithstanding, very difficult ; the stream in that place was deep, and somewhat rapid, and cables, anchors, with other apparatus, were wanting. After two days' labour, these obstacles interrupted the construction of this bridge, and it was judged more useful to set about the restoration of that of Dresden, over the Elbe. This undertaking was favoured by the retreat of the Allies, which continued the following night. The troops at Neustadt, and its neighbourhood, moved off by degrees, and on the morning of the 10th of May, some bands of Cossacks were alone discoverable. The Russian generals, Ulanow, St. Priest, and Miloradowitsch, did not leave Neustadt till night.

Buonaparte hastened with the greatest activity to restore the passage over the Elbe ; he passed a

part of the day upon the bridge, the re-construction of which he intrusted to his Adjutant-colonel Bernard. By the help of long fire-ladders the light infantry crept over that part which had been blown up, and having passed it, secured the environs of Neustadt. Buonaparte himself, with all his staff, took a part in this escalade, in order to acquaint himself with the state of the bridge. Some cannon were put on board the old ferry-boats which the French had found. He promised a gold Napoleon to pay the passage of each vessel. The whole of that day, and the following night, were employed in the reparation of the bridge; and in the course of twenty hours, seven piles of wood were secured, and covered in such a manner, that on the morning of the 11th of May, about ten o'clock, the whole army of the viceroy, and even its artillery, were enabled to cross. The celerity of this operation put Buonaparte in good humour, and he hardly quitted the bridge during the whole day, over which he saw the troops of the viceroy, of General Bertrand, and a part of Marmont's corps, pass. He placed himself at his ease on a stone seat, casting his eyes towards his dear cannon, and his undisciplined children of the



war, who rent the air with their acclamations, and were about to carry in their train misery and despair from the left to the right bank of the Elbe.

The King of Saxony, who still remained at Prague, was directly informed of all that passed, after the arrival of Buonaparte at Dresden, by the government in immediate commission. Buonaparte had pressed him, both by word of mouth and by letter, to quit Prague, and return to his capital: the miserable situation of the country, and even the place of his own residence, both consigned a prey to the arbitrary acts and extortions of the French army, made a profound impression on the mind of the kind father of his people. He at length resolved to console and cheer his subjects with his presence, by yielding to their wishes, and returning to Dresden. There were at the same time strong symptoms that the court of Austria was about to declare for the cause of the Allies. But its army was not in a state immediately to take an active part in the war, and until that moment should arrive, Saxony would be a country altogether ruined, if, as had already happened, by the sad effects of existing relations, she continued to be ravaged by the French, she might,

in secret, accuse her chief of having neglected an expedient for her welfare.

It must be believed that considerations such as these, determined the paternal spirit of the king to return to Dresden. Any delay on his part would have irritated the despot, and exposed the unfortunate country to all his fury. The king's real intention was, therefore, to make a sacrifice to his people, although the submitting of his troops to the orders of the French, gave his resolution the appearance of personal ambition. Indeed he was treated as a friend by him\*, who, of all the men of our age, has made the greatest sacrifices to that passion: the whole world, however, knows how repugnant it was to the heart of Frederic Augustus, and posterity will at once pity him, and judge of his conduct with impartiality.

The return of the king proceeded but slowly. Whether he were really retarded by the infirmities of age, or by indisposition, or that he already reckoned on some steps to be taken by the court of Austria capable of protecting his kingdom; persons were despatched unsuccessfully, during two following days to meet him. At last, on the

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\* Meaning Napoleon. ED.

12th of May, he entered Dresden, in the midst of a solemnity, arranged by Napoleon. Nothing was more flattering to the pride of that monarch than to decide the fate of Princes. He wished, therefore, to appear that day in the character of the victorious restorer of a German sovereign, whom he protected; and he collected with this view, around him, all which could render, in the present circumstances, the appearance of his army imposing, and contribute to his own splendour. The guards lined the way from the castle to the front of the city. The cavalry, drawn up on the outside of the camp at Pirna, by the side of the road, was put in motion. They trampled under foot the growing crops, so promising in appearance, and which would have been of so much service in the year of scarcity that followed. The cavalry consisted of chasseurs, grenadiers, dragoons, Polish lancers, (the best troops of that arm,) with the *gendarmerie d'élite*. The flying artillery of the guard was posted at the extremity of the wing, opposite Grunau.

Napoleon himself regulated the arrangement of the troops, and when all were in order, he sent an officer to the King of Saxony, who was waiting on

horse-back, with a slender retinue, at the gate of the great garden, to invite him to repair to one of the small bridges on the road from Pirna, where he intended to embrace him, and where he actually did receive him. The King experienced an emotion of joy at the sight of his capital; but that feeling could not allay the grief caused by the rigorous calamities which afflicted his kingdom. Having alighted a few paces before he came to the place of rendezvous, he was welcomed by Napoleon, who conducted him into the city with the roaring of cannon, the ringing of bells, and the acclamations of the troops. Napoleon told the deputation of the council who came to receive the monarchs at the entrance of the city, that they were under an obligation for the sentiments and return of the king, and for the moderation with which they were treated. The joy of seeing again, as a protector, within the walls of Dresden, a beloved sovereign, stifled, for a moment, the grief occasioned by present calamity, and the sad prospect of the future. It was thought that the sufferings endured, that the extraordinary influx of innumerable troops, which had oppressed the country from the commencement of the spring,

would soon be at an end ; and would terminate by some event or other, perhaps by a peace on the banks of the Oder and Vistula. Saxony had no power to protect the property of its inhabitants, by the exertion of their own strength. They abandoned themselves, by degrees, to that sort of insensibility which seizes on the possessor of a peaceful cottage, when he sees his little all destroyed by the flames he cannot arrest. This was particularly the case with the villages situated on the route of the army, where this inundation of troops had long appeared to annihilate every hope of relief for that year.

The patriotic Saxons attributed, with justice, the misfortunes which extended over the whole of Saxony, to the premature incursion of the French into the north. It was a calamitous spectacle for them to behold, not only a large portion of their country consumed by undisciplined bands, but their respected king, (whose pacific inclinations were repugnant to such an extraordinary state of things, so fatal to authority,) in the hands of a man, who, attached to his detestable plans by an immutable tenacity, cared not if entire provinces, with millions of their inhabitants, became the victim

of his folly. No part of this situation could, however, be altered. We beheld, then, the king recalled to his capital, by the spoiled child of fortune, from that moment his imperious friend; at the same time the protection granted to the prince, served to manifest the power of the protector, who endeavoured to shew him more distinguished attention, than he had ever testified to any German prince, his ally. The former proofs of esteem he had given the king during his stay at Paris, and in many subsequent instances, did not a little contribute to give an air of sincerity to an amicable connexion, founded rather upon policy, at the time on which we treat, than on the real sentiments of the heart. Napoleon, who never lost sight of his ultimate aim, hastened thenceforth to inform the king of every thing which could be agreeable to him, console him, or procure him some tranquillity of mind, respecting the fate of his kingdom.

No Sunday, no festival passed, without Napoleon gravely hearing mass. If the army made the smallest progress, the King of Saxony was immediately informed of it. In every departure or return of Buonaparte, during the progress of the campaign, he never omitted seeing the king in per-

son, or conveying him his greeting. To this amiability, which Napoleon knew how to display, in the most fascinating manner, when he chose, was added the deep impression he produced on the king, his family, and the inhabitants, the day of the battle before Dresden, when hastening from Silesia by a precipitate march, after having viewed the formidable army of his enemies, he attacked it with his almost exhausted troops, but whose courage was still proof, and put it to the rout. This last favour (which may be compared to the note of the dying swan) of that fortune whose decline might well have been divined, but hardly with certainty, while the armies of his marshals were not annihilated, had, in a manner, forged anew the fetters of the king. The result was, that when at length fortune punished temerity, the King of Saxony, faithful to his promises, was the last to burst his ties to Napoleon; and he only determined on that step, when his duty towards his subjects, obliging him to remain in his kingdom, dictated to him at the same time, to have recourse to the magnanimity and equity of the victorious Allies.

Napoleon remained until the 18th of May at

Dresden; he had several conversations with the king. He examined attentively the environs of the city, more especially Ubigau, in which direction a cannonade was heard. He passed in review various divisions of troops on their arrival; he obtained two regiments of cuirassiers from the King of Saxony, to replace those he had exposed to destruction since his retreat from Moscow. He then began duly to appreciate the value of each cavalry soldier fit for service\*.

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\* It was the custom of Napoleon to consider, minutely, the field of battle after the engagement, whenever time would permit. He appeared, by examining the positions which the enemy had occupied, to wish to inform himself of his strength, and penetrate his plans. He stopped, with apparent interest, at certain spots of ground which seemed to strike his attention, or near the dead and wounded of the enemy. I have seen him make his own surgeon alight by the side of the Russians who still exhibited some signs of life, to see if it were possible to save them.

In Silesia, he one day exclaimed, on a similar occasion, "If he can be saved, there will at least be one less of them:" his meaning was, of those who will personally hate me, or, of whose death I have been the cause: and he gave orders to one of the officers who accompanied him to remain, and direct the wounded man to be carried into the village. By these feigned demonstrations of sensibility, he wished to make it understood, that necessity alone constrained him to sacrifice the lives of so many men. Indeed it might be thought that some evil genius urged him on, in spite of himself. How could he else have remained insensible to the numerous other evils he occasioned. When Napoleon went over the field of battle, the French who were



On the 12th of May the Russians had taken Bischofswerda by assault, and the French had set it on fire in several places. Marshal Ney with his corps had passed the Elbe near Torgau. He advanced towards Berlin, and received orders in following the right bank of the river, to direct himself upon Spremberg and Hoyerswerda. It was not till the 15th, at night, that an aide-de-camp of this marshal arrived, bringing information to Buonaparte. Immediately after his arrival, preparations were made for breaking up the headquarters. In the mean time, on the 16th at night, the Austrian general, Count Bubna, had once more an audience with Napoleon, which lasted until two o'clock in the morning. It is probable that the substance of the general's communications was, that the court of Austria found itself less disposed than ever to make a common cause with Buonaparte; but the latter constantly flattered

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killed, had generally been interred, and the wounded of that nation removed. It was well known that the sight of his losses was disagreeable to him. I have seen the Prince of Wagram, (Berthier,) frequently evince marks of compassion at the sight of the wounded, and charge the officers of his staff to see them taken care of; notwithstanding which, on other occasions, he would speak with the most disgusting indifference of the horrors of war as inevitable misfortunes.

self he should be able to win over that power his dazzling promises, and he did not abandon hope till after the termination of the armistice. When on the 18th Buonaparte quitted Dresden, was, according to custom, on horseback, attended by his marshals, aides-de-camp, and a numerous retinue. The king accompanied him to a spot called the Bath, on the way to Baczew. The heat was excessive, and the dust stifling. Napoleon was alone in the van, absorbed in deep reflection. After some time, he called the grand equerry Caulincourt, and conversed with him only, during that day's march of three German miles, (or six leagues.) This accomplished diplomatist, appeared frequently to possess more of his confidence than the Duke of Bassano, (Maret.) His great devotion and attention to every part of the personal service of Napoleon, an attention which extended to the most minute detail, had obtained for him the privilege of speaking to his master with a degree of freedom; and, I believe, in consequence of the cool and sound judgment for which he was distinguished, he did not neglect to represent to Buonaparte all that he had to apprehend, as well from the disposition of Austria, as from the plan

adopted by the enemy, to employ their light troops in annoying the flanks and rear of the French army. But it is well known that Napoleon, trusting to his ruling planet and his genius, never listened to advice or remonstrances, and hazarded every thing, in the persuasion that his enemies would commit great faults. This was particularly the case during the second part of the campaign, when the Austrians had declared themselves. "You will see," said the confidants of Buonaparte, who re-echoed his opinions, "You will see them commit errors; we shall fall upon them and crush them." I have even heard it said, "They have no systematic plan." How much were these men deceived, spoiled as they were by the favours which had been lavished on them by fortune.

Early in the morning of the 19th of May, the head-quarters broke up from Hartha, where Buonaparte had passed the night, and came to Klein-Forstgen, a league on this side of Bautzen, on the road to Dresden. When Napoleon saw but a heap of ashes and ruins, on the spot where Bischofs-werda had stood, he was deeply affected with the sight of the unfortunate inhabitants bewailing over the smoking rubbish of their dwellings. He

made particular inquiries, by which he learnt that the town had been set on fire by the French. Caulincourt, who did not conceal from him any of the excesses of his troops, proved to him that the calamity could in no way be imputed to the Russians.

From a spontaneous emotion of generosity, Buonaparte promised to repair the losses of the inhabitants, and gave directions that the same night deputies should repair to head-quarters, to present him with a statement of the damage. The deputies presented themselves, but the events of the two subsequent days prevented him from receiving them, or communicating any resolution on the subject. At a later period, when Napoleon passed through Bischofs-werda, on his return from Silesia, he remembered his promise, but it appears his purse was not in a condition to furnish the necessary funds to rebuild a town consisting of some hundred houses; reckoning on the generosity of the King of Saxony, and perhaps on the institutions established in the country, he contented himself with granting the inhabitants an indemnity of 100,000 livres\*. As they had preserved in Bohemia a great portion of their effects,

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\* About 4,000*l.* sterling. ED.

and received much assistance from the Saxon people, the greater part of them were enabled to extricate themselves from the misery into which the fire had plunged them. But one cannot think without shuddering on the dreadful sight which these consumed dwellings presented amidst their pitiless destroyers.

Napoleon repaired to the most advanced of the posts, to reconnoitre the position of the enemy's army. The first point which he visited was a gravelly hill, distant a musket-shot from a post of Cossacks. All his retinue remained behind, and Napoleon advanced, accompanied only by some of his generals and *aides-de-camp*, while the Cossacks, who had alighted, were grazing their horses, according to their mode. Buonaparte, at that short distance from the enemy, formed his plan for attacking the intrenched camp of the main army, which occupied the fields, lying in form of a terrace, between Bautzen and Hochkirch, having the Spree in front, on its left wing the woody hills near Kunewald, and on its right wing the heights near Klein-Bautzen; it occupied the town of Bautzen and all the right bank of the Spree, from the heights near Ober-

gurig as far as the neighbourhood of Malswitz and Klix. The intention of Napoleon appeared at first to be, to direct his principal attack against the left wing of the Allies, because the infantry he intended at the same time to throw into the woods and on the heights, might be of great assistance to him; but he was diverted from that idea when he reflected on the hollows which there are in the mountains near Kunewald, and which, extending towards the plain, divide the roads over which it was necessary to pass to arrive at the point of attack. It appears, that after having examined the ground more carefully, he formed the plan of turning the right wing of the Allies, who had also on that day detachments beyond the Spree, near Klix, and were in communication with the corps directed upon Koenigswartha, under the orders of Generals Barclay de Tolly and d'Yorck. After having continued his *reconnoissance* upon three other points, (on the height near Salzforstgen on the hill of Schmochtitz, and at the mill of Lobsau near Klein-welke,) Napoleon, returned to his head-quarters, where he arrived about seven o'clock. In the mean time, the cannonade, which had already been heard after

dinner in the direction of Koenigswartha, became every moment more serious; at eight o'clock he hastily mounted his horse, and advanced as far as Klein-welke. According to custom, a large fire for the bivouac, composed of entire trunks of trees, was lighted on the spot. Napoleon was soon convinced, not only by the cannonade, but by a fire which was visible, that Lauriston and Ney were engaged in a serious affair. The firing continued to an advanced period of the night, and Barclay de Tolly and d'Yorck had occasioned the French considerable loss on those points: even at the head-quarters of their army it was estimated the next day at two thousand men, and eleven pieces of cannon. Buonaparte caused the King of Saxony afterwards to be informed that the Italian division, under the command of Ney, which had been given up for lost, had preserved itself. The fact is, that if the greater part of the Italians did really save themselves it was by flying into Bohemia\*. Napoleon

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\* After the 18th, at night, this corps being on the retreat, wished to form a junction with Marshal Ney, who was advancing from Hoyerswerda upon Weisseberg, by Koenigswartha. On the 19th this junction was to be effected by a division of Italians, reported to be seven thousand strong, and which was to favour the move-

retired at midnight to recruit his strength with a few hours sleep, preparing for the sanguinary day which was to follow.

The events of the 20th of May formed, in some sort, a prelude to the battle of Wurchsen or Bautzen, since the passage of the Spree, the banks of which are very steep, and the concentrating movement of Marshal Ney, brought on the attack of the following day. After nine o'clock Napoleon mounted his horse, and repaired again to the height of Schmochtitz: a situation whence he could, as general, enjoy the imposing spectacle displayed by the columns in advancing and forming themselves on the ground.

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ments of Marshal Ney. The Italians arrived at noon, without cavalry, at Koenigswartha; it appears that they had neglected their advanced posts, and that, as their manner is, they thought more of resting and refreshing themselves, than of guarding against an attack. They were surprised by a considerable corps of Barclay de Tolly's, (which advanced from the direction of Radibor,) and entirely routed. A great part of those who were not either killed or taken, traversed the forests and took refuge in Bohemia. The artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the enemy. Some hours later, Ney debouched a little lower down, coming from Scerigia, and advanced upon Steinitz and Weissig where General d'Yorck vigorously received him. The Prussians fought like Spartans and thrice repulsed the French; but at length after having killed several hundreds of men, they fell back upon their main army. If Ney had arrived a few hours sooner, perhaps the Italians would have been saved.



The cavalry division of Latour Maubourg passed at eleven o'clock, with a formidable train of artillery to reinforce, at Dubrau, the right wing which was obliged to pass the Spree at Malchwitz. A second column was formed near Maelsitz and Oehna. Marshal Oudinot made a false attack near Grubschitz on the extremity of the right wing, and afterwards crossed the Spree. The troops sustained a very smart engagement near Sonnenberg; but after dinner they advanced by Wilthen on Postwitz, by Sinkwitz, towards Mehltheuer and Traumberg. A village on fire, near Lomske, pointed out the march of Marshal Ney's and General Lauriston's corps, who were advancing from the side of Königswartha, following Generals Barclay de Tolly and d'Yorck. The two latter not being able to prevent the French from advancing, rejoined the grand army of the Allies. Napoleon appeared very well satisfied when Marshal Ney's junction was effected, and saw with pleasure, about three o'clock in the afternoon, that the army was crossing the river. But his aim was not yet attained, for the Allies were still in possession of the heights upon the right bank, and they occupied between Bautzen

and Hochkirch, positions fortified by several intrenchments, upon which they rested their *appui* very advantageously on either side. They appeared at first to wish to defend Bautzen, for they had barricadoed its gates and avenues; but as that town, which may be turned on all sides, was not capable of a long resistance, they abandoned it, and the French took possession of it towards night. At the same time, the army of the French advanced but very slowly; the Russians retired in the greatest order, and kept their left wing resting with precision on the mountains near Kunewalde and the heights of Mehltheuer and Dölen. The battle lasted till night-fall.

Napoleon, to protect his infantry from the attacks of the allied cavalry, formed them into squares, and the army bivouacked beyond Bautzen, in the rear of Aritz, Nadewitz, and Burk. Nieder Kaina, and Nieder Gurig, and the villages situated lower down upon the Spree, were not yet occupied by the French; but on their right wing, they were masters of the heights near Mehltheuer and Ebendœrfel, (according to some maps Beikowitz.) The headquarters were established at Bautzen itself.

The 21st of May at sun-rise, the French army was seen in presence of the Allies, on a line of several leagues, and which passed by Ebendœrfel and Strehla, towards Basankwitz, or Nieder Gurig, in the same direction as the line which they occupied the evening before.—The latter covered the great road of Zittau and that of Gœrlitz: their right wing, formed of Prussians, was protected by the heights of Klein, Klein Bautzen, and passed beyond Burschewitz and Preititz; their left wing, formed of Russians, rested on the mountains. The attack of the centre of this position, would have been too murderous for the French. Napoleon, was therefore obliged to wait till Marshal Ney had succeeded in turning the left wing. He caused a somewhat smart cannonade to be kept up on the centre till noon, and both parties were contented with disputing some villages, the possession of which decided nothing, because the allied army still rested on the hills covered with woods. The Allies were aware of the necessity of protecting their extreme left against the troops which might debouch by the valley leading from Postwitz to Hochkirch, by Pilitz, Dœlen, and

Rachlau. Marshal Oudinot kept them in that apprehension. He took advantage of the under-wood, to attack several times, by his light infantry, the heights near Mehltheuer; but a considerable body of Russians, detached early in the morning as a reinforcement, had occupied the valley near Pilitz, and the heights of Dölen and Mehltheuer; after having repulsed with the bayonet the French squares, nearly as far as Fraumberg, in such a manner that from eight in the morning, until night, the Russians remained masters of that defile, and of the heights of Kœnitz, Mehltheuer, Pilitz, and Dölen. If the Allies had known the intention of Napoleon, they would not perhaps have concentrated such a considerable force upon that point; it is true the the French army was out-flanked by the manœuvre, but at the same time several regiments of the allied cavalry remained inactive on that hilly ground.

Some regiments of Russian cavalry, which were in the plain of Jenkwitz, in front of the hollow way near which Napoleon had visited the advanced posts in the morning, retired under their batteries, as soon as the French artillery

had occupied the heights of Nadelwitz, and there no decisive attack took place. In the space of an hour, were heard the first reports of Marshal Ney's cannon who was advancing towards Baruth. Napoleon, awaiting the issue of Ney's movement, which was to decide the fate of the day, was reclining on the ground, taking his breakfast, during which time the shell of a howitzer burst over his head. He felt confident, beforehand, of gaining the battle. He then repaired with much haste to the left to a height before Nieder Kaina\*, whence he might discover the tops of the different hills near Klein Bautzen, which formed the key of the enemy's position. Marshal Soult, who on that day commanded the corps of General Bertrand, and had received instructions beforehand from Dresden, was to carry these heights, they were obliged to be taken one after the other, at the point of the bayonet: within the space of three hours and a half, they were several times taken and retaken; at last, the French after having experienced a very considerable loss, remained masters of them.

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\* At that moment it is said, he despatched an orderly officer to Maria Louisa, to inform her he had gained a victory.

As the greater part of these hills are very narrow at their tops, but little artillery could be placed on them, and its transportation thither was very laborious.

This bloody engagement, the most obstinate of the day, consisted therefore almost solely of charges with the bayonet; the infantry advanced to the charge, with furious shouts, the Wurtemberg troops took a considerable share in the affair. This advantage, and the arrival, by way of Baruth, of Ney's corps, in which were the Saxons, under the command of General Regnier, decided the fate of the day. The allied army was turned on the left wing, and partly even in the rear; its intrenchments, formed only on its front towards Bautzen, were threatened and rendered useless: it made a retreat, which may be considered as a *chef-d'œuvre* of tactics, and took every advantage, although retreating, afforded by the mountains on its left. In spite of ways almost impracticable in an intersected country, although the lines of the Allies had been, as it were, thrown on the centre, the French could not succeed, either in cutting off a part of their army, or capturing their artillery. All the ad-

vantage they gained, was to have driven the enemy from the roads leading to Silesia, an advantage which they purchased by a loss, perhaps double that of their enemy. No considerable convoys of prisoners, nor captured artillery, were to be seen. For two hours and a half, the battle was general all along the line; and Napoleon, according to his custom, when the advantage became decided, caused his troops to advance with impetuosity.

Seated in a chair, on the top of a hillock, near Nieder-Kaina, at the moment when the last hill near Klein Bautzen had been carried, about five o'clock in the afternoon, he directed the young guard, and the division of Latour-Maubourg, upon Krekwitz, and other columns of infantry towards Klein-Burschwitz, and hastened every manœuvre to obtain a great result; but the enemy preserved the utmost composure, and Buonaparte was too weak in cavalry to pursue his advantages. It was a dreadful, but, at the same time, an imposing spectacle, to behold these columns rushing into the valley of Nieder-Kaina, to increase the disasters of the enemy; to see several villages in flames, and the numerous artillery covering an

extent of three leagues, from the lofty hills on the right wing, as far as the left wing, near Preititz and Baruth. At six in the evening, the cavalry of the reserve again advanced to cut off a division of the enemy near Rischen, but this movement was not attended with success; the French could gain no splendid trophies from that day. The light cavalry, perfectly well acquainted with the ground they had occupied for some days before, scoured the whole field, and secured the retreat of the grand army. As the right advanced farther, there were cavalry and artillery of the Allies on the heights of the road to Lobau; and it was not until the next morning that the last of the Cossacks filed off towards Lobau, following the heights near Kœnitz, by Kunewalde, where a Russian corps of observation was posted.

If Napoleon had not been superior in strength to the Allies, the movement of Marshal Ney could not have been effected; and it would have taken a great deal more time, and cost a much greater number of men, to force their excellent position. Buonaparte had, perhaps, 180,000 men present in the battle, while, according to several accounts, the enemy at most had but 150,000. The loss on



either side was less considerable than at Lutzen, for the action was sanguinary only at the attack and defence of the heights of Klein Bautzen, and near Meltheuer and Pilitz, where the Bavarians among the rest fought with great intrepidity. I think it may be admitted that the French had 5 or 6,000 killed in the two last days; their reports specify 4 or 5,000 wounded; but few of these survived their wounds, or were fit for service, on coming out of the hospital.

It is reported that more than 20,000 wounded French were lodged in Bautzen itself or its environs; this loss was more than double that of the Allies, who, under cover of their fine positions, opposed the attack of the French by a most murderous fire. I have not heard that any general or officer of note was killed\*.

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\* It was at this time the practice began of transporting the wounded French on wheel-barrows. In October following, when Napoleon abandoned the right bank of the Elbe, these means of conveyance were again brought into use. The complete exhaustion of the countries occupied by either army prevented a sufficient number of carriages from being procured for that duty, the horses were often taken away on their arrival, for the battalions of the train. Every day might be seen more than a thousand wheel-barrows regularly arranged in files, and escorted by the Saxon gendarmerie going towards Dresden, laden with the wounded. The soldiers who were but slightly hurt, not

Marshal Ney established his quarters the following night at Wurschen, where the headquarters of the Allied Sovereigns had been the evening before, and Napoleon caused his tent to be pitched near the inn of Klein Burchswitz; his suite and his guard bivouacked in the environs. The mist was not dispelled the following morning at break of day, when he set forward to accelerate the march of his army. The Allies continued their retreat in the greatest order; they neglected no advantages presented by the ground, which they disputed, inch by inch, with admirable coolness. When the French succeeded in driving them from a post, it was not until they themselves had lost many men from the enemy's fire, and after the allies had placed their artillery and baggage in safety. The heights along the road to Goerlitz afforded them many resources. At dawn of day they were still in possession of the heights

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being able to remain at Bautzen, on account of the multitude which daily flowed thither, were abused, and refused admittance by the persons in charge of the hospitals at Dresden. They were obliged to go as far as Wilsdruf, Nossen, &c., to endeavour to find more charitable directors. It is confidently affirmed that many Italians of the division dispersed at Koenigswartha, fired their muskets into their hands, in order to render themselves unfit for service.

of Rolitz and Weisseberg. The Saxons, who had joined Marshal Ney, as they passed through Baruth, were at Nechern, the advanced guard of the French had in the first instance to dislodge the enemy from the heights near Kotitz, and from those bordering upon Roth-Kretscham. The engagement became more and more serious. The heights of Schœps, and especially those of Reichenbach, appeared formed by nature for covering a retreat. The French cavalry turned the first mentioned, in advancing by way of Nostitz and Wasser-Kretscham; but the Allies had chosen very prudently, as an essential point for covering their retreat, the eminence which rises at an angle of eight or ten degrees immediately behind Reichenbach. The numerous artillery with which they had furnished it, hurled death and destruction among the ranks of the French, and swept all the approaches to the town and its environs. Their light infantry, under cover of these pieces, occupied Reichenbach and the ground about the city, nor did they retire until they saw themselves turned upon the left wing. The numerous cavalry, posted in battle array to the right of the Russian batteries, for some time prevented the French cavalry

from advancing; but Buonaparte sent upon this point almost the whole of the cavalry of the guard, under command of General Walther, which, after several charges, succeeded in driving back the Russians. In the mean time, the cannon had occasioned considerable loss to the French, and the ground was covered with dead and wounded. The French and Saxon cavalry suffered most on this occasion; the Mamelukes and lancers of the guard had participated in the different charges. The dispositions made for the defence of the height in question, confer the highest honour on the commander of the Russian rear-guard. The road to Reichenbach, which comes out opposite the hill, turns it where it leaves the town. The Russian general took advantage of the position until the last moment, and his troops did not withdraw until the French came up in such strong masses, that resistance became totally impossible. Directly after, he was seen defending another height, between Reichenbach and Markersdorf, where he again arrested the march of the French. At half-past four, Napoleon was with the advanced guard, at the very moment when the hill in rear of Rei-

chenbach was carried in spite of the fire which protected it. If the avenging Fates spared him at that moment, he had to thank his good fortune. Several balls buried themselves in the ground close by him, one of which swept off, but ten paces farther on, a number of men belonging to the Saxon light infantry.

In the mean time, the Russians abandoned the woods and heights in front of Markersdorf. Buonaparte urged his troops onward, and caused two columns of infantry and one of cavalry, in all about fifty thousand men, to advance, by the light of the setting sun, over a space about half a league in breadth. All these great efforts, directed by the warlike genius of Napoleon in person, and continued during a long and beautiful spring-day, had failed of producing any important result. Every step was dearly bought, and the evening was destined to bring him a most grievous loss, however invulnerable he might be to feeling. After the Russians had evacuated Markersdorf, they again took up a position on an eminence situated in the rear of that village, and not far distant from Rausche: it forms the highest ground of the country in front of Gœr-

litz. There was a pause, and for the space of three quarters of an hour not a single gun was heard. Buonaparte, accompanied by his suite, entered the village of Markersdorf by the high road, while the troops turned it on either side. From the entrance to this village, which forms a sort of ravine, obliquely dividing a valley of little depth, the road directs its course to the left, forming a very obtuse angle. Buonaparte had scarcely turned this elbow, when the first shot which had been fired, after a long interval, passed close by him, and fell about fifty paces in the rear. A few minutes after, one of the aides-de-camp reported, that the very same ball had struck the Grand-marshal Duroc, and General Kirchner, commander of the engineers. These two general officers were on horseback, almost side by side; the latter was killed upon the spot, but Duroc, who was mortally wounded in the abdomen, survived four and twenty hours. He was immediately taken to the nearest house: another, close by it, was consumed by the flames the same night. Buonaparte, who could not conceal how much the loss of one of his most faithful subjects affected him, struck off to the left; and, absorbed within

himself, he traversed a small farm, alighted amidst the corn, and considered for some time the spot whence the ball had been fired which had deprived him of his favourite.

He returned back, following the outskirts of the village gardens, and came to a height on this side Markersdorf, where the whole of the infantry of his guard had formed an oblong square, in the midst of which were pitched, as usual, his five household tents, and the fires of the bivouac were soon alight. That night afforded ample scope for reflection. Conceive Napoleon on the evening of a battle, indeed won, but in which he had lavished, without obtaining any decisive result, the immense force with which he had been intrusted. Let him be imagined about to enter on an uncertain career, big with such important consequences. Contemplate him, in other respects so callous to feeling, deprived of the dearest confidential friend he possessed, who perhaps addressed him with the freedom of a schoolfellow. Picture him covered with his grey capote\*, seated on a camp

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\* The capote is a sort of great coat, to which a hood is attached, commonly worn by the French military when on night-duty. ED.

stool, in the midst of his brave soldiers, his arms hanging down, his head reclined ; apart from his splendid suite, who, at a respectful distance, formed themselves into groupes, hardly daring to whisper that the friend of Napoleon was at the point of breathing his last sigh. The mournful silence which reigned near the sovereign chief was contrasted with the bustle of the soldiers preparing their suppers and resting-places. Two bands of musicians, belonging to the grenadiers and chasseurs of the guard, at either end of the square, sometimes called to mind in mournful strains the events of the day, or endeavoured, by the selection of their best pieces, to divert the grief of their chieftain. A thousand fires of the bivouac\* seemed wandering through the plain ; the moon was slowly rising in the horizon, and the flames of two villages on fire ascended to the skies†. This picture, combined with the recollec-

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\* This is a term of such frequent recurrence in the course of the work, that it may be well briefly to observe, that to *bivouac* (generally pronounced biv'ack,) is a term borrowed from the German, and is generally employed to imply that the troops passed the night on their arms, in the open air. See *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française*, under the word "*Bivouaquer*."—Ed.

† From the 20th to the 22d of May were reckoned in the country between Königswartha and Görlitz, twenty fires, more



tion of a sanguinary engagement, followed by a murderous battle, in which the lives of each individual of that immense body of men had been suspended only by a hair,—the idea that thousands of human beings were anxiously imploring that death which alone could terminate their sufferings; and that all these calamities were not able to disarm relentless fate, forcibly arrested the mind of the spectator. By this grand spectacle a lively image was at once presented to him of the power and weakness of man; of the gigantic nature of his enterprises, and the futility of his endeavours. There he might consider the motion of that grand machine of fate, which may be contemplated with wonder, but neither directed nor arrested in its course.

Two moments of this memorable day would have been highly interesting to the historical painter. The first is that I have just spoken of; the other, when, on the evening of the 21st, the

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or less considerable, occasioned either by wanton mischief, the fire of the artillery, or carelessness. On the 19th, Kamina was burned; on the 20th, Kamina, near Königswartha, Lomske, Förstgen, Burk, Reinschitz, Gösnitz, near Bautzen and Malschitz; on the 21st, Auritz, Rabitz, Darentz, Basankwitz, Klein-Bautzen, and Kreckwitz; on the 22d, Markersdorf, Pfaffendorf; on the 23d, three or four villages, in the environs of Görlitz.

battle having been decided by the occupation of the heights of Klein-Bautzen, all the masses of troops threw themselves into the plain towards Burchswitz; and Napoleon, seated on a chest, his glass in his hand, was observing the movements of the army, and awaiting, with the composure of satisfaction, the effect of the manœuvres he had just directed.

The same night Napoleon paid a visit to his favourite, a prey to the most cruel sufferings. He had been wounded in the abdomen, and his intestines were mortally injured. Duroc himself desired death. The conversation between him and Buonapartè, as it is related in the *Moniteur*, is too sentimental not to be considered as of questionable authority. It may, notwithstanding, be doubted whether the sufferings of a friend, whose inevitable death must occasion him an irreparable loss, might not make, even on the heart of a despot so callous to feeling, a very deep impression; and whether the favourite might not, as well as others, be so blinded by enthusiasm for his patron as to render the truth of what has been published credible\*.

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\* The most striking passages of this dialogue are these words of Napoleon :—" Duroc, there is another world; there we shall

The heights beyond Markersdorf had been occupied the same night ; and the fourth corps, commanded the preceding day by Soult, and then under the orders of Bertrand, had been completely thrown back upon the right wing, towards the circle of Queis. The main army followed the route of Gœrlitz, and the next day took possession of that town and the passages over the Neisse. At eight o'clock in the morning, the flames which arose from the wooden bridge of Gœrlitz were seen from the bivouac of Napoleon, established near Markersdorf; the whole left bank of the Neisse was now abandoned by the Allies. Nevertheless they defended the passages over that little river as far as the ground would permit ; but the French established five bridges near the town itself (not to mention others,) by means of which a sufficient number of troops was passed over, promptly to pursue the Russian rear-guard. The Saxons, under the command of Regnier, were at the head of the French army. The troops bivouacked along the roads of Buntzlau and Breslau, and

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meet again." And those of Duroc, " I have nothing to reproach myself with." These expressions, doubtless, were inserted to make an impression on the army and nation.

towards noon Napoleon arrived at Gœrlitz, where he remained. After having examined all the roads and passes, he shut himself up in his cabinet, and there passed the remainder of that and the following days in constant occupation. The advanced guard still continued to march forward, and as early as the 24th of May, was at Buntzlau. Although the retreat of the Allies was general, the Cossacks still annoyed the flanks and rear of the French army in the neighbourhood of Rothembourg, Kœnigshain, and even Reichenbach. It is acknowledged that these active troops of the north were scarcely ever overtaken by the French light cavalry sent in pursuit of them, the latter being too slow or too much exhausted; besides the French cavalry were not numerous enough, and sufficient forage for them was no where to be found.

The greatest scarcity already reigned in Upper Lusatia. Although Silesia had also suffered extremely, the troops found more resources there for support than in Saxony, which was completely drained, and particularly, as observed, in Upper Lusatia. Buonaparte set out from Gœrlitz on the 25th of May, at noon, and established his

head-quarters at Buntzlau, where his troops had entered before him: he remained there on the 26th; Marshal Ney advanced that day as far as Hainau, where he lost some battalions the same evening. The enemy's cannon had completely broken some squares of conscripts, one of which was sabred by the Prussian cavalry. Early the next morning Napoleon mounted on horseback, and joined Marshal Ney at Hainau; urging forward his horse with a celerity of which no similar example had been seen since the action at Naumbourg. As soon as he arrived, he visited the field where the battle had taken place the day before. When he was out of humour, on receiving any check, his generals commonly endeavoured to laugh him out of it, by making the most of the enemy's loss. Indeed, when he arrived at Hainau, all the killed on the French side were buried, and some Prussians only were to be seen on the field of battle; one of the carcasses was pointed out to him as that of Lieutenant-colonel Bucholtz, who had commanded the attack of the preceding day. The French lost in this affair six pieces of cannon, and nearly eight hundred men, killed and wounded. It has been proved, that up to that

day inclusively, the last before the armistice, in which any action worthy of the least notice occurred, the Allies had invariably lost less artillery and men than the French; they had besides obtained the advantage in some little affairs, by turning the French, with the assistance of their cavalry; and had intercepted their couriers and orders. At Rippach, Lutzen, Kœnigswartha, Bautzen, Reichenbach, in fine, every where, Napoleon lost more men than the Allies, nor could he boast of captured artillery, or other trophies, nor of the death of general officers belonging to the enemy. On the other hand, Marshal Bessières, the Grand-Marshal Duroc, Generals Delzons, Gruner, Bruyère, and Kirchner, had been killed\*. I am besides persuaded that the death of more than one officer of note has been passed over in silence.

At that period the army was composed of twelve corps, commanded as follows:—

The 1st corps (on the extreme left of the army upon the Lower Elbe) under the command of Marshal Davoust, Prince of Eckmuhl.

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\* Delzons and Gruner, at Lutzen; Bruyère and Kirchner, at Reichenbach.

The 2nd corps (near Sprottau, towards Glogau) under the command of Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno.

The 3rd corps (near Hainau) under the command of Marshal Ney, Prince of Moskowa.

The 4th corps (towards Goldberg) under the command of General Bertrand.

The 5th corps (near Marshal Ney) under the command of General Count Lauriston.

The 6th corps (near Goldberg) under the command of Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa.

The 7th corps (near Marshal Ney) under the command of General Count Regnier.

The last corps (which had not yet joined the army) under the orders of Prince Poniatowsky.

The 9th and 10th corps were not yet in existence; they were about to be formed.

The 11th corps, commanded by Marshal MacDonald, Duke of Tarentum.

The 12th, by Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio.

The old guard, under the command of Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, which was always near Buonaparte.

The young guard, commanded by Marshal Mor-

tier, Duke of Treviso, which also generally marched near Napoleon.

The cavalry of the guard, under command of General Count Walther.

The artillery of the Guard, commanded by General Dulauloy.

The 1st corps of cavalry, by general Latour Maubourg.

The 2nd, by General Sebastiani.

The corps of artillery attached to the army, under General Sorbier.

The engineer corps, under the command of General Rogniat.

All these corps in general were weaker than in the preceding campaigns, when each commonly consisted of thirty thousand men. Marshal Ney commanded three of these corps in Silesia (the 3rd, 5th, and 7th) blended into one. The young guard, on which Napoleon reckoned a great deal, was despatched sometimes to one point, and sometimes to another, to reinforce a corps or decide a battle. The old guard always remained near Buonaparte. The major part of the cavalry corps was composed of cuirassiers



and carabineers; they were commanded only *en masse*. The remainder of the cavalry was divided among the corps of different marshals; this force was weak in numbers.

The two regiments of Saxon cuirassiers constantly formed a part of Latour Maubourg's division. The French carabineers, who wore brass cuirasses, with red crests to their helmets, were under the orders of General Sebastiani; the Polish lancers were always with the cavalry of the guard, which was composed of every species of that force, with the exception of cuirassiers and carabineers\*.

Napoleon had exhibited considerable composure during the preceding days; his vanity was flattered with the spectacle of the allied army flying before his own, and with the idea of seeing himself shortly master of a large portion of Silesia, where the facility of obtaining supplies would favour his designs. He often inquired the distance between Leignitz and Breslau; he conversed much, and frequently amused himself, on

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\* I mention this merely to distinguish, in some manner, the different divisions; without giving a list of the numbers of regiments, names of brigades, &c.

the road, by humming fragments of Italian and French songs, observing every object that struck him, as a man free from any care might have done; he examined the hills, noticed public establishments, soldiers who committed disorders, or who straggled on the march, &c. After having inspected the field of the battle which had taken place the day before, accompanied by Ney, he advanced on the road to the back of Michelsdorf, where he found it blockaded by some regiments of the enemy's cavalry. The infantry were still in the rear, and the Russians approached in superior numbers, within some hundred paces of the posts of the French cavalry. They sent a flag of truce, under pretence of preventing the French from advancing, but rather, in fact, to learn if Ney had received any reinforcement the day before, or, perhaps, to ascertain if Buonaparte were arrived. The flag of truce was not received, but was sent back as soon as it presented itself at the out-posts.

The enemy's cavalry was already close to Napoleon, when he remained coolly on foot, upon the highway, with his back turned to the Russians; he caused about a dozen pieces of cannon to advance, and said jokingly to Berthier, who pointed

out to him that the enemy approached very near, "If they advance, we will also advance;" and afterwards, in allusion to the former battles of Hochkirch and Leignitz, "We will renew old recollections at Leignitz."

In the mean time, the columns of French infantry came up; the Russian cavalry prepared to retreat, and after having sustained some discharges, it abandoned, by degrees, all the country as far as the rear of Leignitz.

Napoleon manœuvred that day with great precision and admirable prudence. Directing in person the movement of the troops which advanced, he went from one eminence to another, made the tour of every town and village, to ascertain the different positions, and let no advantage afforded by the ground escape him. If one had discontinued, but for a moment, to follow up the movements with attention, the scene became changed: a column had debouched by a hollow way, a village, or a wood, and was taking possession of a height, for the defence of which a battery was already completely prepared. He executed all these different movements with the most certain perception. He issued his orders only on

a grand scale, communicating them personally, or through his orderly officers, to the commandants of corps and divisions, by whom, in their turn, they were transmitted to the officers commanding battalions. All his orders were short and precise, and, whether at court or with the army, they were always given in that style.

No one ever asked him for an explanation. If the very recent re-organization of the French army had not rendered more attention to detail necessary, this expeditious method would have been always employed, which had been as much as possible applied to immense masses of troops, before the destruction of the army in Russia.

Napoleon, after having reconnoitred with the greatest attention all the environs of Leignitz, and carefully examined all the outlets of the town, alighted from his horse, about nine o'clock, in the market-place. Placed so near the enemy, in a country with whose inhabitants he had no acquaintance, ignorant of the nature of the ground, knowing the population to be strongly attached to their sovereign and their native soil, he perhaps judged that he ought to neglect no precaution which prudence might dictate. The

Allies were said to have taken the direction of Schweidnitz and Breslau.

Marshal Marmont received orders to advance from Goldberg, upon Jauer. On the 28th, in the afternoon, Napoleon proceeded forward on the Jauer road, to form a judgment, from the cannonade and dust, of the result produced by the execution of his order. The corps were at that time, indeed, concentrated on a narrow space of ground, but the retreat of the Allies upon Schweidnitz, where they could supply themselves from upper Silesia, rendered operations in the heart of the country more difficult for the French; for it was necessary, either to expose the left wing, or to pursue their enemy into mountainous districts, which afforded him great advantages. It appeared, also, impossible to maintain such considerable masses long upon the same point: the whole of the provinces in the rear of the army were so exhausted, that no hope could be entertained of supplies from that quarter.

On the day following, the 29th of May, a great bustle was observed at the imperial headquarters. By eight o'clock, every thing was prepared for setting out. The guard was under

arms, yet the hours elapsed, and no departure took place. At length, about one o'clock in the afternoon, M. de Caulincourt took the road to Jauer on horseback, accompanied by his aide-de-camp. According to reports, a flag of truce had arrived in the morning at the advanced posts of Regnier's corps, and Caulincourt had been despatched to open the negotiations. I will not pretend to decide whether the French or the Russians made the first overtures; I do not place sufficient reliance on what was said at headquarters, with respect to that point. I shall confine myself to relating what was asserted by the persons about Buonaparte: they affirmed that the negotiations were opened by a Russian flag of truce, which came to the French outposts. Doubtless both the belligerent powers might wish for an interval of repose, in order to assemble forces to continue the contest. If the Russians did really make the first proposals, they must have been doubly agreeable to Napoleon, who expected very considerable reinforcements from France. His operations were of a nature to require many troops, and when the reinforcements arrived he might act with great

masses, which, unluckily for him, still wanted the necessary discipline. One proof of the need he had of repose, is the narrow space in which he suffered himself and his army to be pent, as we shall see in the sequel. If the Allies, though already reinforced by General Sacken, testified the first desire to conclude an armistice, they were determined by motives of the same nature ; they might be able to bring up the troops lately organized, and might hope to see Austria, who was already under arms, take an active part in the war, which could not fail of becoming eventually fatal to the French, by the geographical position alone of the theatre of operations.

After a very visible degree of indecision, Napoleon at length quitted Leignitz at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and alighted near the office of the receiver of the tolls near Jauer; he appeared much agitated. He was waiting for intelligence from Caulincourt; at length he desired to be conducted to Wahlstadt, the very same place which three months after rendered the name of Prince Blucher illustrious. I believe that Buonaparte did not then reckon on the success of his envoy's negotiations. He had left Leignitz as

much to be prepared for all events, as to give the enemy no suspicion how greatly he wished for the armistice. Not knowing at present how far it might be prudent to advance on the road to Breslau, he took up his quarters at Rosnig, a very small farm-house, that had already been pillaged; in which he had for his own use only one room and a closet, and Berthier was obliged to put up with a sort of servant's apartment in an opposite building. When it was observed to Napoleon, that he would be very badly accommodated, he replied "Well; we may fancy ourselves in Poland." The aides-de-camp and suite were lodged in cottages or barns, or were obliged even to bivouack in the adjacent gardens. M. de Caulincourt returned the following night, but he immediately set out again, with a port-folio; the negotiations, therefore, appeared to have taken a serious turn. It was ascertained that the grand equerry had had a conference at Wahlstadt, with Count Schuwaloff, a Russian general, and with M. de Kleist (now Count Kleist de Nollendorf) a general in the Prussian service. These conferences were afterwards renewed at Göbersdorf, three miles from Leignitz,



also at Pleiswig, while the Duke of Bassano, on his side at Leignitz, had interviews with the Austrian general Count Bubna. Aides-de-camp and orderly officers were every moment despatched to these different points, and every one at headquarters testified a desire of seeing peace concluded.

The condition proposed by Napoleon, to make the Oder the line of demarcation, to which the Prussians could not adhere, appeared a great obstacle; indeed, at one time, the negotiations were considered as almost broken off; however, at length Buonaparte yielded, doubtless from important considerations. Before he quitted, on the 30th of the month, this miserable farm of Rosnig, a very provoking accident occurred. A fire happened at a farm, in the court-yard of which were fourteen or fifteen waggons, laden with the most necessary provisions and valuable articles. Notwithstanding the greatest exertions, all that could be done was to save the servants and draught mules. The court formed a square surrounded by cottages, to which, by means of a very high wind, the fire had probably been communicated from the bivouacs. Besides various articles

intended for the use of Napoleon, such as clothes, linen, provisions, wine, oil, snuff, &c., the wag-gons contained a great number of jewels of a considerable value, as rings, snuff-boxes, and a great deal of ready cash. Some of Napoleon's aides-de-camp lost their clothes and money in the fire; and on the following day many pieces of gold were seen lying about discoloured, or half melted by the element. As soon as the violence of the flames permitted, sentinels from the guard and *gendarmerie* were posted, and confidential persons were commissioned to search in the rubbish; it was affirmed that the most valuable articles were saved, but I doubt not that more than one brilliant escaped the vigilance of those in charge, and that if the proprietor passed the heap of ashes through the sieve he was amply compensated for his losses.

Napoleon remained at Neumarck during the negotiation: he employed himself all day in his cabinet, and, contrary to his practice, in the evening diverted himself by an airing on horseback. He was seen in the bivouacs established near the town: he acquainted himself with the environs, conversed with the lowest order of persons, whom he

interrogated respecting their condition and all the minutiae of their occupations. His temper daily became more agreeable, and he appeared free from anxiety. One day, as he was waiting for the arrival of an officer who was to bring him despatches from Caulincourt, he hummed—" *Ah! page, mon beau page!*" presently after, resolving to mount his horse, "*Andiam a cavallo!*" All this betokened how well pleased he was with the expectation of seeing the armistice shortly concluded. In the mean time, the French, under the orders of General Lauriston, had the good fortune to enter Breslau without resistance, on the 1st of June, at six o'clock in the morning. General Hogendorp, aide-de-camp of the general-in-chief, was appointed commandant of the place. The burgesses sent a deputation to Buonaparte, at the head of which was M. de Kospoth, the chief burgomaster. It was received with extreme affability, for Napoleon was much interested in gaining over the inhabitants of Silesia; indeed he said to them, "I am well aware that the king has been misled." A prince who exhibits firmness in misfortune, and is resolved to conquer or die in defending the honour of his country, cannot be justly represented as misled when he

takes steps tending to her emancipation. This expression had no other end than to alienate the Silesians from the Prussian monarch.

Hostilities ceased on the line of the advanced posts on the first of June, and all indulged the flattering hope that a peace, so much desired, would conclude the armistice. Napoleon led during eight days a very uniform life at Neumarck; he laboured assiduously in his cabinet, and in the evening, oppressed with fatigue, he rode on horseback round the town. The prolonged stay of the French troops had changed its environs into a desert; the houses of the suburbs were unroofed, the hedges destroyed, the cemeteries laid waste. The situation and country about Neumarck are very pleasant, but the inhabitants had abandoned their former peaceful dwellings to the satellites of despotism, and every living thing sought an asylum far from tumult. A single nightingale alone remained in the desolate church-yard, and seemed nightly to deplore in her melancholy strains the calamities of the country.

On the 4th of June, after dinner, Napoleon communicated to the King of Saxony, that he had just concluded an armistice for two months, and that

Saxony was about to be delivered from the enemy's troops. This apparent consolation was in fact but the presage of all the misfortunes that were about to fall on a country, already ruined by war, and of all the calamities it was to sustain by the march of the French army, or by the reverses which the latter was about there to experience. Conformably with the terms of the armistice, the French, who were to occupy but a small portion of Silesia, were almost entirely confined to Saxony; the line of demarcation, dividing the mountains of Silesia, passed through Kamnitz, Löhn, Goldwitz, Leignitz, and Parchwitz, crossed the Oder, ran along the left bank of that river as far as Crossen, whence it struck off towards the Saxon territory. As a line for the Russian and Prussian combined armies had been drawn, which, passing through Striegau and Kaut, united with the Oder in rear of Breslau, that city remained at liberty between the two armies; consequently, there were left to the French but the poorest part of Silesia, and Saxony threatened by a famine\*.

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\* The armistice was not to begin for the most distant corps till the 8th of June, and much exultation was shewn at Napoleon's head-quarters, on hearing that the French had taken pos-

An armistice so little advantageous, and which left Napoleon no other hope than that of gaining over his enemies by negotiation, or of breaking a coalition to him so formidable, is a certain proof how much he wanted time to recruit the strength of his army.

French officers were immediately despatched to the garrisons of Dantzic and Modlin ; the young guard was sent back to Glogau, and the troops dispersed in cantonments.

Buonaparte had resolved to remain at Dresden until the expiration of the armistice. But, in order to be more at liberty, and to impose no constraint on the royal family, he chose to take up his residence in the midst of a garden in the suburbs. As soon as he had made all the dispositions relative to the army, he hastened to leave Neumarck, where his residence had perhaps become rather disagreeable to him. He set out on the 5th of June at night, arrived the same night

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session of Hamburg on the 30th of May, and that by the 8th of June they would probably reach Lubeck. It was also reported that in consequence of some misunderstanding arising between the allies and the Crown-Prince of Sweden, the negotiations with the latter were broken off; that he would confine himself to covering his German dominions, and had returned into Pomerania. It was added that 10,000 Danes were about to join the French.

at Leignitz, where Caulincourt joined him the following morning. He made Hainau, Buntzlau, Görlitz, and Bautzen, his other resting-places. During this journey he visited all the points which had been of importance in the battle of Wurschen, (or Bautzen;) he did not neglect any fortification, any eminence; he paid particular attention to the hills which incline from Kunewald towards Bautzen: perhaps he was examining how far the attack might have been rendered more easy on that side.

On the 10th of June Napoleon arrived at Dresden; he alighted in the gardens of Count Marcolini, a retired spot in Frederickstadt, which had been prepared for him. These gardens, although not so extensive and beautiful as *l'Elysée Napoleon* (now *l'Elysée Bourbon*,) which formed his ordinary summer residence, resemble it in some respects; as they are sequestered, and appear calculated for pursuits free from care.

In the suburb before-mentioned houses had been prepared for the greater part of Buonaparte's retinue. But Berthier took up his quarters at the palace of Bruhl; as for Caulincourt, a cabinet had been contrived for him in a wing of the house occupied by Napoleon himself.

## CHAPTER II.

*Interval during the Armistice.—Some Account and Observations concerning Napoleon's mode of Living and Acting.*

SUCH a ruler as Napoleon can never conciliate affection; he can but excite admiration. However, the observer of human nature will doubtless feel interested to know that man's mode of life, who, for his abilities and good fortune, has excited the wonder of his cotemporaries, and will fill an indelible record in the page of history.

The private life of such a man becomes more interesting, because in the great political world which formed his proper element, he was seen only in a false light. Where is he, who was able to dive into the heart of Napoleon, and form an opinion of that enigmatical being, hurried away by the most extraordinary events and singular combinations?

How could that man be fathomed, who was obliged to employ all the strength and resources



of his mind to make head against an infinite number of enemies and envious persons; to restrain the most artful, and awe the most untractable? How is it possible to judge of a favourite of fortune, who, spoiled by his unparalleled good luck, vainly conceived himself a prodigy; the wonder of the world; the highly meritorious and intelligent ruler of a great nation, born to eclipse all that had been seen, and every thing his predecessors had ventured to perform.

To judge of the qualities of such an extraordinary man, particular attention must be paid to minute circumstances. These can then be weighed by all who have not enjoyed a near view of him. His numerous enemies have exhausted themselves in reviling and stigmatizing him in their writings and conversation. His favourites, and some exalted minds, dazzled by his glory, have deified him; and now, he is loaded with maledictions. Let a just medium be adopted. Let us duly appreciate the influence of passion, the feeling of restraint, the charm of fortune and success, and the effects of that restlessness which exists in the very nature of the inhabitants of southern countries; let us, finally, consider the unlimited power

conferred on him by fortune, and then we may judge with moderation.

There is no greatness, without firmness of character; undecided characters, least of all others, can hope to distinguish themselves. To become a man of letters, an artist, a skilful mechanist, or an able general, a certain degree of perseverance is necessary to attain the end proposed. The military man, by the rigorous and barbarous nature of his occupation, is too often liable to exchange his perseverance for obstinacy. The soldier cares but little for the sufferings of others; he forms an excuse for every thing, by attributing it to the tyrant Necessity, and is eager to reach the goal to which fortune and power conduct him. Such were the sentiments that the events of the Revolution dictated to Napoleon. His ambition, of which the seeds are said to have been perceived from his earliest years, soon became an ever-increasing and passionate inclination for despotic power; an inclination which became stronger through the resistance opposed to it by his implacable enemy, England. The greatest faults committed by Buonaparte had their source in the hatred he bore to the government of that

country, joined with the idea that France should never allow England to dictate laws to her; and, that by rendering himself master of all the continental relations, he could present a powerful barrier to that island, until the downfall of her factitious credit brought on her ruin. England, as constant but more circumspect in the execution of her projects, succeeded at length by her prudence and intrepid perseverance in gaining the esteem of Napoleon, while other governments, bewildered by a long succession of misfortunes, favoured his ambition by their errors. Napoleon rightly apprehended that by taking advantage of these faults, and dividing the interests of different countries, he should open for himself a way to boundless glory.

This conviction suggested to him several politic manœuvres, until that period when the union of different powers, and, above all, perseverance and good harmony, concerted and consummated his ruin.

How much is it to be lamented that Napoleon did not employ his great talents, his truly surprising powers, which so well seconded the vast resources of France, to the exclusive care of the

happiness of his vast empire. But his temperament was too ardent, his mind too turbulent, to allow him to confine himself within the limits of a reform and amelioration of the interior: to seize an idea, assign to the adopted plan the necessary funds, fix the time and mode of execution, were for him but the business of a moment; he had afterwards time enough left for a thousand other schemes, which he followed up with the same activity. He passed from one to the other without intermission. He could appoint the means as well as persons, with the same facility: repose was incompatible with his impetuous character.

After so close an alliance with the powerful house of Austria, this man, hitherto invincible, placed on the pinnacle of good fortune, had nothing farther to desire. After the struggle of a year, many of his enterprises proved abortive, and he has confirmed, by his example, the truth, that the highest sublunary fortune speedily declines, when arrogance is permitted to blind its possessor. Although it may be denied that Napoleon was endowed with a great degree of circumspection, it must however be allowed, that the confidence he reposed in his good for-

tune, by which he had attained the summit of human grandeur, carried him through every difficulty which presented itself to the view of the unimpassioned and distant observer. Napoleon, encouraged by the issue of several schemes, skilfully combined, by negotiations which rendered the projects of his enemies abortive, sowed dissensions among them, and gave birth to half measures; imagined he should be still able to follow the same course, without exposing himself to disagreeable results, and reckoned too much upon the faults of his enemies, as well as on the consequences of his accustomed wiles, and, in fine, on the resources of his genius.

The first enterprises of Napoleon, as a general, mathematically considered, according to the principles of Carnot, were executed in a happy manner: he allowed himself to make some deviations from the rules which form the basis of lines of operation.

In spite of his errors, he succeeded in getting the better, either by the superiority of his strength, or the concurrence of circumstances. His success rendered him bolder and bolder: his system of attack became more and more irregular,

till his Moscow campaign at length discovered that he confided more in his stars than the fixed principles of the art of war. Abandoned entirely to mathematical calculations, in which he was engaged for a year before the war against Russia\*: he neglected to provide for the physical wants of his troops, and that neglect became the source of all the misfortunes which overwhelmed his army, till its entire expulsion from the German territory. Napoleon was continually occupied in geographical calculations; at an experienced glance he apprehended the distances of place and time, on which the tactical combination of the march of his armies depended.

But the precision with which marches were performed, under the direction of his generals, accustomed him to see every order executed, and made him think he could as easily satisfy all the necessities of his army. He thought his dictatorial mandate should suffice to procure bread and meat, as well as to unite his troops on a de-

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\* This idea is founded on the fact, that a compilation and correction of the map of Russia were ordered to be executed two years before the last war with that country. A copy was delivered to each of his marshals. The map comprised exactly that part of the country where he afterwards appeared in person with his grand army, and his marshals and generals with their corps.

terminated point. Indeed, it is probable that the administrative authorities of the army were negligent, and the subordinate officers dishonest: the fact is, that Napoleon, not being aware of the tricks of that sort of persons, became their dupe, and thus an important branch of the war department remained exclusively in the hands of comptrollers and commissioners.

Caulincourt, perhaps, was the only one who pointed out these abuses to him; at least, he was employed, during the armistice, in paying unexpected visits to the hospitals, the state of which had perhaps excited some suspicions in Napoleon. Notwithstanding, Caulincourt's mission produced no considerable alteration.

Napoleon, as we have remarked, was too much taken up with his mathematical and geographical arrangements, intended to secure victory, to turn his attention to the most tiresome of the details belonging to the art of war. He detested that part, as one which imposed the greatest clog upon his schemes. D——\*, fearing to irritate him, had not the courage to represent the magnitude of the danger. Napoleon thought he had done

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\* Probably the Count Daru. See p. 220. Ed.

enough, by giving orders that a large supply of provisions should be forwarded from France. Every body knows the criminal abuse which was made of his orders, and the small quantity of supplies which reached the army, sacrificed to the dishonesty of treacherous commissioners intrusted with that important operation. Perhaps the French departments of administration thought it necessary to act in such a manner as to bring the distress of the army to its height, in order that Napoleon, diverted by a multitude of obstacles, might at length renounce his system of perpetual warfare. The private soldier had for a long time become a commodity of little worth.

One of the best calculated and most successful manœuvres of Napoleon, was the march of General Bertrand, who came from Italy to Saxony, by way of Nuremberg. Doubtless, this march contributed to the brilliant success which crowned the opening of the campaign. The march of Marshal Ney, after the battle of Bautzen, was grounded upon a disposition equally prudent and well calculated. After the termination of the armistice, these brilliant and admirable marches became less frequent, because Napoleon, reduced



to remain upon the defensive, and confined within a smaller space of ground, was obliged to direct himself from one point to another. The uncertainty of his situation was but too visible; and when he flattered himself he should be able to strike some great blow, he attempted it with such a body of forces, as would hardly allow him to pretend to those efforts of genius which distinguish an experienced general. The latter part of the campaign does him no credit, because he blindly reckoned on the errors which the enemy might commit; and, trusting to his personal abilities, he persisted obstinately in his first idea, never reflecting on his bad position, which threatened the army and its leader with total ruin. Instead of giving up some advantages, he hazarded and lost every thing. Napoleon had, notwithstanding, shewn, in several preceding circumstances, how much he feared that Austria would accede to the coalition, which, by her geographical situation, was about to occasion the total ruin of the French army. I am ignorant of the object of the negotiations with which General Bubna was charged at Dresden and Leignitz; but every one remarked that, some days before the conclusion

of the armistice, Napoleon, being at Neumarck, made particular inquiries about the position of the camp at Pirna, where, at the beginning of the seven years' war, the greater part of the Saxon army had been obliged to capitulate. He made the most minute investigation concerning the number, the position of the troops, and the motives that had induced the capitulation; every thing shewed that he relied upon that barrier fortress, in case Austria should declare war against him. Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, was destined to command the camp, which, at all events, was to be formed there, to protect Saxony from an attack directed against that frontier. Indeed, a short time after Napoleon had arrived at Dresden, Soult was commissioned to examine the environs of Koenigstein. But the unfortunate intelligence received from Spain, afterwards determined Napoleon hastily to despatch Soult to the peninsula, and the command of the intrenched camp was confided to Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr.

The marshals and generals of Napoleon, were accustomed to see themselves driven from one place to another, and generally to devote themselves blindly to his will. But a short time before, Soult had caused his best horses to be brought

from the heart of Spain into Saxony. During the armistice, his wife had repaired from Paris to Dresden; and two days after, Napoleon being informed of the retrograde movement of his troops from Vittoria towards the French frontier, unexpectedly directed Soult to resume the command of the army in Spain.

The marshal, obliged to set out the following night, sold all his horses, mules, and equipage, and dismissed his establishment. The officers composing his staff found themselves in the same plight. After a stay of three days, the duchess was constrained to quit the beautiful city of Dresden. The fatigue and labour undergone by the adjutants, the secretaries, the orderly officers, in short, by all who were about Napoleon, from the grand equerry to the meanest of his valets, is beyond conception. Caulincourt deserved the name of indefatigable. The rest as well as he were obliged to hold themselves ever in readiness at a moment's notice, and even dressed in a style of elegance, for the service of Napoleon. In the palace inhabited by the Emperor, every thing was crowded and without subordinate arrangement: besides the apartments which he occupied himself, his cabinet,

his waiting room, the dining rooms for his suite, there was a chamber and a room of business (*cabinet de travail*) allotted to Berthier; consequently, his adjutants were often put to inconvenience. A man of illustrious birth, for instance, General Narbonne, who when ambassador at Vienna kept a splendid establishment, was obliged during the latter period of the campaign to sleep on straw, or on two chairs, in Napoleon's ante-chamber, where he did the duty of adjutant; in that situation he was obliged constantly to be at his post, in order to awaken him, seven or eight times during the night, whenever any despatch or report of consequence arrived which required that he should be immediately acquainted with it. In this ante-chamber all those who were on duty slept upon straw; there were two adjutants, each of whom had an adjutant under him, who was entrusted with messages and who performed the duty alternately; also an equerry, two orderly officers, and two pages. Often, when a forced march or battle was expected, the ante-chamber was filled with all those who were likely to be called for by Napoleon. This apartment frequently resembled the belly of the Trojan horse. Rustan, the celebrated Mameluke

whom Buonaparte brought from Egypt, always slept on the ground, near his chamber, and most commonly at the door. He was indeed but his esquire, who, like Sancho Panza, attended him every where; with this difference alone, that Rustan did not dress his steed, and that he had as many relays of horses as Napoleon himself. When the latter was about to mount, Rustan was behind with the *capote*, the cloak, and the portmanteau of his majesty, and, lastly, an oiled-skin covering for himself. He dressed and undressed Napoleon, and, at times, even waited upon him at table. It would be assigning him too much honour to suppose that he enjoyed a degree of rank, or shared the confidence of his master; Caulincourt, and the oldest officers of Napoleon, familiarly addressed him in the second person singular, and he lived with the most esteemed domestics of the imperial household. This man, who has become completely French, and is married to a Parisian, whose portrait he always wears in his bosom, possesses a physiognomy which bespeaks an open disposition; his large black eyes, express a degree of cordiality and benevolence, which appear to justify the confidence Napoleon judged he might repose in him,

by relying entirely on his fidelity. Nevertheless, Rustan did not follow his master to the isle of Elba, when the latter descended from the summit of his glory. I believe he was apprehensive of the ill humour which that new dwelling might create, or preferred the agreeable residence of Paris. There was besides at head-quarters a sort of Mameluke, a native of Versailles, also destined for the service of Napoleon. He was attired in the same manner as Rustan, without possessing any of his original qualities, and was kept in reserve with some division of the attendants of the Emperor, or the court, whilst Rustan was appropriated to his person. When I speak of Napoleon's cabinet, during the campaign, the largest and most convenient room in the house must be understood, which served as a dwelling and a place of business for him and his secretaries. He attached more importance to it, than to the room which he inhabited himself. When Napoleon bivouacked near his troops, close to his own tent was pitched another, intended for the cabinet, and always arranged with the greatest particularity. In the middle of the room was placed a large table, on which was spread the best

map that could be obtained of the seat of war. Petri's was employed in Saxony, because he prized it highly, and had been used to it in 1806\*. It was indeed the very same copy. This was placed conformably with the points of the compass, before he entered the cabinet; pins with various coloured heads were thrust into it, to point out the situation of the different *corps d'armée* of the French or those of the enemy. This was the business of the director of the *bureau topographique*, (the topographical cabinet,) who constantly laboured with him, and who possessed a perfect knowledge of the different positions. If this map were not ready, it was to be brought immediately on the arrival of Napoleon, for he attached more importance to this than any want of his life. During the night the map was surrounded by twenty or thirty candles, in the midst of which was placed a compass. When the Emperor mounted his horse, Caulincourt, the grand equerry, carried the necessary map, attached to his breast button, for as he was always at his elbow he was obliged to have it in readiness to present to him whenever he exclaimed *la carte* ! “ the map !†”

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\* He, at times, used Blackenberg's.

† One day Buonaparte asked for the map, and it being folded in such a manner that the position which he wanted could not be

At the four corners of the sanctuary were placed, when they could be obtained, small tables, at which the secretaries of Napoleon were employed, and sometimes himself and his director of the *bureau topographique*. He most commonly dictated to them completely dressed in a green uniform, often with his hat upon his head, pacing up and down his apartment. Accustomed to have every thing which he conceived executed with the greatest promptitude, no one could write fast enough for him, and what he dictated was to be written in cipher. It is incredible how fast he dictated, and what a facility his secretaries had acquired in following him with the pen. One of these, a very young man, surpassed them all in rapidity, and the others were alarmed lest Napoleon should require as much from them. It may

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distinctly seen, he flew into a passion; for as he continued his way on horse-back, he had to give orders concerning the position he was in search of. He tried to fold it another way, but unfortunately a gust of wind disturbed it. In a transport of anger, he threw the map at the feet of his Excellency the Duke of Vicenza, who was obliged to alight to pick it up, and with the assistance of a page arranged it properly. Buonaparte was sorry for his passion; for some minutes after, he said in a more moderate tone, "Give me the map." He desired Caulincourt in future to fold it with greater care.



well be conceived that these ciphers were but hieroglyphics. The tail of a dragon often stood for the whole French army, a rod for Davoust's corps, a thorn for the kingdom of England, a sponge for the commercial cities, &c. It is said that the emperor had a particular talent for deciphering these characters, which must necessarily have been easy to him, since their meaning had been established by himself. But all I have detailed was but one-fourth of the business; the secretaries had afterwards to decipher all this confused scrawling (*brouillamini*,) word by word, and to arrange the sentences agreeably to the sense they required. This was no easy task, when orders of an extensive nature were in question, inasmuch as but four secretaries were employed in military expeditions, diplomatic or political affairs, all which emanated immediately from him, as directing the whole of this great machine. They were also obliged to accustom themselves to different sorts of occupations, relating sometimes to military tactics, at others to political affairs. As far as I have been able to learn, there were always two employed in the cabinet near him, and intrusted with the despatch of business. For

example, a report perhaps was received from a marshal who commanded in Silesia, at the same time he took it into his head to answer a despatch coming from Spain, to digest some political tract, or diplomatic remarks; to make some arrangements in judicial matters, or on some other subject, whatever it might be; then a secretary was obliged to submit to write out an alphabet for the King of Rome, or to make a copy of the position of twenty brigades of the different *corps d'armée*, which were all perfectly well known to him. This must have been a painful labour for one who was not so well acquainted with the combination, the origin, and the details, as he who had disposed them; but habit gives a facility even in the most complicated matters.

These secretaries, always living within the sphere of this extraordinary man, whose volcanic genius gave birth at once to a thousand different ideas, were like so many strings attached to the administrative war departments, to that of the Duke of Bassano (Maret,) of the Prince of Neuchatel (Berthier,) as well as to the other authorities of France, to whom the orders of Napoleon were directly issued. It is really astonishing how

he made so small a number of persons suffice for such a load of business, without impeding its regular course. I do not here notice the faults in matters of administration, resulting from the negligence of inferior authorities. Of this nature, for instance, was the scandalous course pursued with regard to the wants of the army, sacrificed to the misconduct and cupidity of certain contractors. I speak but of such affairs as must have passed immediately through the cabinet, and which seemed to require a greater number of assistants. A very few sufficed, owing to the simple and laconic mode to which those about the person of the Emperor were accustomed. A few words, a hint, a single feature, furnished matter for labours minutely detailed, with which others were charged; while in the cabinet itself were transacted only those matters wherein Napoleon was particularly engaged. These related chiefly to policy or military defence. He knew with great precision the position of the armies, the composition of the different masses, their combination and employment, but the orders for the detail belonged to Berthier, who caused them to be executed by his numerous staff. A comprehensive manner of

digesting, and a serious attention to different objects, naturally contributed to their quick despatch. At least the secretaries of Napoleon were accustomed to a rapidity of procedure, that extended even to insignificant matters, which either came, or might come, under his cognizance. When he had heard a report, or determined on any thing, one might be certain of its being executed in a few days.

The progress of business was conducted with such celerity, that, in matters which were to pass through several offices, one might determine the very day on which such or such an affair would be concluded. Doubtless this is a great thing to be said of the head-quarters of an army, when the matter in question is of a secondary nature, and entirely foreign to the orders which direct its manœuvres. This rapidity was the result of the fiery and impetuous character of Napoleon ; there were moments when all about him remained in mute and gloomy expectation, and this mournful silence was the prelude of some storm which the Emperor was brooding, and whose anger evidently foretold a disgrace. Then every one was on the watch for the moment when the bolt should fall,

and sometimes this suspense continued half a day.

The French approve of the extraordinary activity above recited ; few of them value a system of business, wherein each has a post assigned him commensurate with his abilities.

Neither keepers of records, (*archivistes*) nor registrars, nor scribes, were seen in the cabinet of Napoleon ; there was one keeper of the portfolio, (*gardien du porte-feuille*) and he who was chosen for that office was probably the most placid man in France ; in the midst of the alarms of war, the duties of his life were perhaps the simplest, but, at the same time, the most tiresome in the world. The tried fidelity of a long series of years procured him that post ; the *gardien du porte-feuille* was dressed simply as a Swiss porter, with an embroidered collar to his coat, a distinguishing mark of servants of inferior rank, and was classed with the *valets-de-chambre*, but he had the inspection of all the large portfolios of the cabinet, and all the chests and covered carriages of the archives, in which was included the *bureau topographique*. He was the keeper of this sanctuary, like the sphinx before the gardens of the Egyptians, and

he never quitted the door of the cabinet unless he were relieved on account of indisposition. A strong constitution and a mild temper were necessary for this situation ; the person who filled it was constrained to be at his post night and day, and there to hold himself always in readiness, as Napoleon often awoke, and immediately betook himself to business. This petty office was not difficult to fill, but it became very fatiguing, as long as the head-quarters remained in the same place. When they were removed, *monsieur l'archiviste* found himself with the waggons of the cabinet or with the *bureau topographique*. That part of the latter which was actually moveable was contained in two carriages, which always followed the head-quarters.

On the arrival of the army in Saxony the greater part of these effects had been left on the frontier, and among the alterations and retrenchments which were made, was comprehended the great body of geographical charts, which was much diminished ; the greatest loss in this department had been experienced in the Russian campaign, a loss which the officers of Napoleon's household themselves acknowledged as irreparable. Of all the fine

maps and plans which had been collected for this expedition, not the smallest portion was saved. The small number of those officers who had been able to escape the general extermination, had much ado to return with the clothes on their backs. The favourite treasure of Napoleon, his collection of plans, became the prey of an universal calamity. It is to be hoped that these excellent and scarce works, which ought to have been made subservient to the advantage and prosperity of empires, not to their destruction, may have fallen into the hands of persons who know their value, and possess influence enough to turn them to account.

Two chasseurs of the horse-guard were destined to transport the geographical documents of secondary importance; they were styled *chasseurs du porte-feuille*, and were chosen for this honourable post by the officers on duty belonging to the same branch of service as themselves: the *aide-de-camp* on duty delivered to them the sacred portfolio. They followed close on the heels of the adjutant, or the other persons who were nearest to Napoleon, whether he were in his carriage or on horseback; and, never losing sight of the important charge they had to execute,

they overturned in their way every thing which could divert them but an inch aside from their destined post. Those whose duty it was to follow Napoleon, were in the habit of retaining their allotted station with the most obstinate perseverance: this was the effect of the discipline which Caulincourt, the grand equerry, employed in their regulation; his control extended over every branch of the imperial household. After the death of the Grand Marshal Duroc, all orders concerning the march, the halt, the stables, the re-lays, the kitchen, the servants, and particularly the couriers and expresses, came from Caulincourt. To him were intrusted the keys of the mails which the couriers brought; he opened them, and gave Napoleon all that immediately concerned him, whether he were on the march or had taken up his quarters. When he was in his carriage, the whole travelled at a full trot or gallop. Caulincourt hastily alighted from his horse, took the courier aside, opened the mail, galloped after Napoleon, handed him the despatches; after which, a quantity of envelopes were seen flying from each side of his carriage. These papers sometimes fell upon the horse



which surrounded it; for when Napoleon travelled in his carriage, all the papers that he had not had time to read in his cabinet, were thrust into it. He amused himself by looking over them when he was abroad, if the position of the country were well known or immaterial to him. All useless reports were cut up, and thrown out of the carriage window. The pieces were seen flying in the air like a swarm of bees, and were finally ground under the wheels. Probably Berthier was intrusted with destroying them, for some have been seen which were very carefully cut up. Perhaps Napoleon amused himself by doing it, for he was not able to remain still for an instant. When Berthier\* and he had nothing to discuss, and he was tired of playing with the tassel of the carriage window, his majesty fell asleep. To avoid this sort of *ennui*, when there were neither reports, lists, nor statements to submit to him, the pockets of the carriage were filled with journals and other periodical publications from Paris. Scarcely had he time rapidly to skim

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\* When Berthier, who was always his travelling companion, was absent, his place was sometimes filled by Caulincourt, but most commonly by the King of Naples.

them over, when they were seen flying, lighter than the winds which bore them. Some of his suite, eager for novelty, endeavoured to pick them up. Even sometimes advantage might be taken of this circumstance to furnish one's self with a little travelling library; for when there were neither journals, nor periodical publications, the carriage was filled with novels, and even with very voluminous romances, but only sewed together in the sheets: nevertheless, this kind of reading was not much relished by Napoleon, who liked works of a solid description; if the first pages did not please him, the unfortunate books were thrown out of the carriage-window as usual. It sometimes happened that one of his suite, from curiosity, picked up what had fallen, otherwise it became the prize of the soldiers who followed him.

The grand equerry Caulincourt attended with inexpressible zeal to every want of Napoleon. He acquitted himself of that painful task with an unparalleled exactness and attention. A boundless activity was the chief of his qualities; but, what is most astonishing, in spite of the number of political commissions, and other affairs, with which he was intrusted by Buonaparte, he always

found time enough to enter into the most minute details relative to all that concerned the œconomy of the imperial household, and to pay every possible attention to it. Napoleon could never have found a more active or indefatigable servant.

Caulincourt also possessed the talent of expressing every thing in a few words. He had but one secretary ; and when he himself had passed the night in employment with Buonaparte, at break of day he was the first who repaired to his post. No difficulty, however great, was able to discourage him. He was almost always on horseback, and constantly by the side of Napoleon's carriage. When particular business required him elsewhere, he was replaced by one of the two equerries on duty. The order and tranquillity which reigned at all times in the service of the imperial household, of which we shall speak in the sequel, were doubtless the work of Caulincourt. His occupations were considerably increased since the death of Duroc. Rendering full justice to Caulincourt's talents and ability, I believe Buonaparte was more frank, and less reserved with Duroc than with him. Caulincourt was greatly devoted to him, but his manners

were cold, and too consonant with etiquette, which Duroc did not so exactly observe. In one respect Caulincourt spoke freely to Napoleon, and concealed from him no particle of that which others dared not impart for fear of getting themselves into disgrace ; on the other hand, he paid him the most extravagant homage, so exaggerated that it could not fail to deprave him. Of this description were the particular arrangements made to celebrate the arrival of Napoleon in any place ; for example, an illumination, under pretence of enabling the troops who had just marched in, to know the streets better, and find their quarters in the night. Yet Caulincourt had at the same time done much good by expressing himself freely on the danger of Napoleon's undertakings, by pointing out to him the disorders which took place in the army, and the horrid excesses committed by the soldiery. He was the organ of those unfortunate persons who addressed themselves to him, unless the object of their petitions were foreign to his department : he superintended with much rigour every object of œconomy ; he was generally very severe, often, even rude. This fault had begun to be very

common among the French, who had been considered in all former times as a most polished people. Formerly a Frenchman would have been ashamed to allow himself to use vulgar terms and oaths in polite company ; that bad habit was confined to the lower classes of people, with them these coarse expressions became the ordinary means of transition from one sentence to another. But when the chief himself, in a fit of anger, or to express his discontent, indulged in the use of the coarsest terms, could politeness and urbanity be expected from those who surrounded him ?

It is not necessary to give credit to the disgusting scurrilities which are displayed in the book printed under the title of *The Secrets of St. Cloud*, to be shocked to hear Napoleon in a moment of passion, say to one of his equerries, *Vous êtes tous des j—— f—— Je vous ferai f—— tous ! f——*. And all because a *piqueur* or an escort had neglected in the night to direct a postillion, and the way had been mistaken. An Emperor should not sanction such improprieties ; but like the monarch of China or Japan, who when he sneezes, gives permission to all his people to

do the same, the Emperor of the French, allowed all who were in his service to become shockingly coarse ; a license they used indiscriminately, and without measure on every occasion.

Napoleon's head-quarters contained but a small number of those Frenchmen of the old school, distinguished for their politeness, and who united to their natural courage, the urbanity of the courtier ; these were besides reduced to conceal their graceful manners, which in their situation, would have been considered as haughty and unbecoming. General Narbonne was the most amiable of all ; he had at first been ambassador to the court of Austria, latterly governor of the fortress of Torgau. I have already had occasion to speak of him.

After having been employed during the armistice, jointly with the grand equerry Caulincourt, in the negotiations at Prague, he remained at head-quarters with the other adjutants of Buonaparte\*. Generals Flahault, Drouot, Durosnel, and Colonel Bernard distinguished themselves by polite manners as well as by the extent of

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\* After this he was appointed to the government of the fortress of Torgau. He died, during the siege, of a nervous fever, which had become epidemic, at the end of the autumn of 1813.

their knowledge. Remarkable for their attachment to their master, full of activity, they shewed much satisfaction when Napoleon intrusted them with any private affair; the military operations they had to execute were considered by them as so many modes of self-instruction. To give a more complete idea of them, I will cite the following traits. Flahault has a very agreeable appearance, and is exceedingly adroit; he was sent to the frontiers of Bohemia to receive the King of Saxony. He remained at Leignitz during the armistice, to arrange some of the articles, in quality of a commissioner. Drouot, who, as general of artillery, was always charged with distributing and planting the cannon in action, remained with Napoleon, and followed him to the isle of Elba\*.

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\* Drouot always had a Bible with him, the reading of which was his chief pleasure, and he publicly avowed it to the officers on service, (an extraordinary peculiarity at that period, and very remarkable in a French general.) He had perhaps some inclination towards superstition, for as Buonaparte always despatched him to situations where his duties exposed him to the greatest dangers, Drouot took particular care to attire himself in his old uniform of a general of artillery, in which he placed the greatest confidence, because no misfortune had ever happened to him while he had worn it. When he was near the batteries he always alighted; and indeed he was so fortunate

Durosnel was commandant at Dresden from the entry of the French, to the surrender of that city. His affable and humane manners conciliated him the esteem of all the Saxons. Colonel Bernard served as an engineer ; he caused the wooden bridge of Dresden to be constructed agreeably to the orders of Napoleon ; and during the armistice, he superintended the erection of the fortifications of that city.

I remember that Napoleon himself being near the bastion of the arsenal, dictated to him an order concerning some new works, and Bernard minuted it down on his tablets. Near Zittau he had the misfortune to break his leg by falling into a ditch with his horse during the night, at the moment of a very warm engagement. The other duty-adjutants were General Count de Lobau (Mouton) remarkable for his personal bravery, and for the pride and roughness of manner which distinguished his deportment. During the armistice, and after the departure of Soult, he was appointed

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that neither he nor his horses were ever wounded. His modesty also equalled his understanding, and he appeared animated by a sentiment of national honour ; which could not, surely, without pain, allow him to see a great nation reduced to obey a man like Napoleon.



in quality of commandant-general of the guards, to superintend the daily movements of the troops at the *Champ de Mars*, of Fredericstadt, in the wood of Ostra, till that duty was confided to Drouot. When Vandamme was cut off and defeated near Culm, Mouton reorganized the wreck of his *corps d'armée*, completed it with fresh troops, and replaced its artillery. At the head of his troops, he occupied the principal defiles of Bohemia, and at the end of the campaign he was at Dresden, with Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr. After the unfortunate success of the sortie attempted by that general, the Austrians made the Count de Lobau prisoner, with the remainder of the garrison. Corbineau, whose temper was even, although his manners were rough, obtained the command of a division of cavalry in Vandamme's corps; he received a wound in his head at the battle of Culm, and made his escape with the rest of the fugitives in the mountains of Saxony. I am ignorant of his subsequent fortune. I can scarcely tell what should be said of the young Duke of Placentia, except that Paris and its gaieties agreed better with him than this campaign. Dejean, of whom nothing particular can be related,

was sent to meet the new guard of honour organized at Mayence, and was intrusted to bring it to Dresden. But, whatever his knowledge, he was not fit to instruct a corps of cavalry recently organized. Doubtless, Buonaparte was aware of the weakness of these troops, since he dispersed those four regiments, which were very far from complete in numbers, among the cavalry of the guard, that they might accustom themselves to service. It is allowed that these young people, who united themselves merely through a sentiment of honour, could be but of little use, notwithstanding their good will, and the encouragement lavished on them.

General Hogendorp was rarely on service near Napoleon ; he was suffering with the gout. A short time before the conclusion of the armistice he was commandant of Breslau, and afterwards of Hamburgh, under the orders of Davoust. The *aides-de-camp* of Napoleon, between thirty and forty years of age, were for the greater part newly appointed ; the old *aides de camp* had perished in Russia, or had been employed, after the dissolution of the grand army, in organizing the new. Two of these adjutants were charged with the

daily duty, which obliged them to attend night and day in the antechamber of the Emperor. This service was less irksome during the armistice. They announced all those who were called for by him, or wished to speak with him, unless their rank at head-quarters entitled them to enter without being announced. In this case they knocked thrice at the door, which being opened half way, their names were repeated. If Napoleon were pleased to allow any one to come in, the attendant opened the door of the cabinet; otherwise, they were obliged to wait until Colonel Bacler d'Albe, who was employed in the cabinet, called them.

This officer was appointed, on two different accounts, director of the *bureau topographique*; Napoleon conferred the situation on him for his geographical knowledge, and extreme love of labour. Long services had procured him the particular confidence of Buonaparte, but he was at the same time the slave of his will. He had him called oftener and more unexpectedly than any of his *aides-de-camp*. This officer had not a moment at his own command; night and day he was occupied on duty; his life was entirely devoted to a

painful activity, and to the caprices of Napoleon: Happily his manner of living perfectly agreed with such intense application. D'Albe had given proofs of his talent as a painter in the public exhibition of pictures at Paris, and his fine map of Italy had stamped his reputation as a topographer. His perseverance in study had almost rendered him indispensable to Napoleon. He was chiefly engaged in correcting maps, combining and preparing materials, arranging marches, and all very extended lines of operation. Napoleon expressed himself in a few words ; D'Albe conceived and executed in his own independent manner the task which was imposed upon him. The habit of conversing with Napoleon gave him also the privilege of assuming a certain tone, which the former, strange to say, permitted in him, when he contradicted with firmness, and from well-grounded opinion. I know that Napoleon one day made a dreadful stir on account of some report, plan, or other paper, which he thought the colonel had in his possession. At this juncture some reproaches escaped the Emperor, concerning the inattention or forgetfulness of his servants. At last, D'Albe, losing all patience, exclaimed, " I know his Ma-

“ jesty has a perfect knowledge of cipher, an  
“ excellent memory; but, after all, I know what I  
“ know,” &c. At last Napoleon became silent,  
and the paper was found in another place. The  
ardent zeal for his master’s service, and a degree  
of national pride with which this officer was  
animated, degenerated into severity, contempt,  
and coarseness, towards the enemies of France.  
Napoleon was accustomed to see his resolutions  
executed with the greatest punctuality. Entirely  
devoted to his projects, full of profound respect  
for his genius, Colonel d’Albe would have an-  
nihilated the authors of the disasters of France.  
“ They will commit faults,—we shall fall on and  
“ crush them.” Such were the expressions dic-  
tated by his zeal and ardent desire to execute the  
plans of Buonaparte, in spite of that fatigue and  
compulsion which a robust constitution alone  
could undergo. Notwithstanding the impetuous  
temper of Napoleon, which he had to endure in  
Austria, as well as in Russia, in time of peace and  
war, d’Albe, with the greater part of those who  
surrounded Buonaparte, was always voluntarily  
devoted to him. They saw in him the man who  
spread far and wide the splendour of the French

arms. How oft does a nation wink at the injustice of her chief, when his exalted deeds have distinguished the period of his rule as a glorious epocha in her records. Little attention is paid to private wrong, when national vanity is satisfied, and the country raised to immortal glory. D'Albe had been formerly equal in rank with many officers who are become Marshals of France, or at least Generals of Division; he had served as many years as they, yet he never obtained any promotion; one would have thought that Napoleon was determined to keep him in an inferior rank, in order to be able to plague him at his pleasure. He was always the last employed by Buonaparte before his departure, and the first summoned to business on the establishment of fresh head-quarters. During the march, he was more disengaged, and when a battle was fought, Napoleon conversed with him only when some geographical inquiries presented themselves. D'Albe had two fellow-labourers in the topographical cabinet, who were officers of engineers, of whom one was always abroad, whilst the other was in a manner sub-inspector of the chamber of plans.

These three individuals, four confidential secre-

taries, and the first orderly officer \*, Gourgault, *chef de bataillon*, (who was charged with the most important despatches and commissions, particularly respecting the command of the artillery) formed a sort of privy-council, separate from all other branches of the imperial household. As their offices emanated immediately from Napoleon himself, and, consequently, were of a peculiar nature, they always had a separate table at the palace, in order to facilitate their conferences. All the rest of his personal staff dined at two separate tables ; the first was for the chief officers, the second for the other officers on duty. The marshal of the palace, the grand equerry, the marshals who were at head-quarters, Bessieres and Soult, sometimes foreign generals, the adjutants of Napoleon, General Guyot, as commandant of the escorts and guides of the horse-guard ; Count de Turenne, as grand-master of the wardrobe ; and the equerries, who, as barons, enjoyed the rank of colonels, dined at the first table. The second was filled by the orderly officers, the adjutants, the *aides-de-camp* of the Emperor, the officers of

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\* The same who, under the title of General, followed Napoleon to St. Helena.

the guard, of the *gendarmerie*, the pages, the surgeons of the imperial household, and the paymaster.

These two tables were generally served, one after the other, with the greatest exactness, by some inferior servants, before that of Buonaparte. The persons engaged in the cabinet did not dine till after him. During the whole of the campaign, only the Prince of Wagram, Berthier, dined with Napoleon, unless the King of Naples, were at head-quarters. If Berthier was sick, his place was supplied by the grand equerry and a marshal. From twelve to sixteen dishes were served up in the French style, in perfect form; but Napoleon ate and drank frugally. Berthier poured out his drink, and spoke very little during the meal. Rustan, or another *valet-de-chambre*, waited at table. Very often officers who brought him despatches, or other matters, were admitted during the repast, and Buonaparte listened to them while he was hastily eating, like one who had been famished\*.

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\* It is said, that, at Paris, when Napoleon was completely immersed in business, and was reminded of the time for sitting down to table, he often exclaimed, "What, have I not yet dined?"



During the armistice, an actress of the *Theatre Français*, Mademoiselle Bourgoïn, for whom he had a particular inclination, was favoured by an invitation to breakfast with him, in company with Berthier and Caulincourt. It was a rare circumstance to see in Napoleon's antechamber a Parisian lady, elegantly dressed and alone, waiting for the opening of the door. I have heard it remarked, on this occurrence, that the kings of France used formerly to invite men distinguished for their talents to breakfast with them, such as players, singers, men of science, &c. It cannot be said, whether Napoleon invited persons of that description from a passion for imitation, in order to flatter them, through caprice, or from other motives. Although I was, at that time, near enough to the court for observation, (but not in the high circles,) with the exception of the actress I have just named, I never had an opportunity of seeing any amiable or fascinating person there. In fact, extraordinary periods of tranquillity and leisure were necessary to remind the uneasy and turbulent spirit of Napoleon of the charms of pleasure.

The activity of an ever-restless spirit, whose

supreme happiness alone consisted in the various alarms and continual occupations of war, set aside all idea of regularity and stated times of employment. Every thing at head-quarters was done on a sudden, yet each individual was obliged to be ready instantly to fulfil his task. Unexpected intervals of repose, and periods of departure, changes of appointed hours, and often of routes and halting-places, succeeded each other perpetually. Even when the grand equerry had received some intimation of departure, its execution, perhaps, took place very late, and every other person was lost in vain conjecture of what would happen. He who addressed himself to another for information received no other answer than a shrug of the shoulders, followed by "I do not know!" The matters of business, reports, and couriers, which arrived, were the standards by which Napoleon distributed his time. It was formerly erroneously conceived, that he made others labour in his room; on the contrary, in all operations the principal plan emanated from him. Berthier might, perhaps, venture to make some observations, but he was seldom charged with any thing, except the final execution of the

orders of his chief. The march was frequently delayed some hours; even half a day, and to the last word which Napoleon dictated in his cabinet, was attached the sudden order, "The carriage—To horse!" Then all those who were to follow him put themselves in motion as if they had been struck with an electric stroke. Nor did they till that moment know, what road they were to take. The grand equerry, or, if he were otherwise engaged, an equerry, rode on horseback at the right hand-side of the carriage. General Guyot, or some officer who came next to him in rank, was on the left, with the adjutants on duty, equeries, orderly officers, pages, and the chargers for Napoleon and Berthier. Rustan, the *chasseur du porte-feuille*, and another mounted attendant, under the orders of Caulincourt, followed close to the carriage of the Emperor. All this train was succeeded by twenty-four light horse, under the command of an officer. These arrangements, established once for all, were strict, and observed on every occasion with the greatest exactness. All officers who belonged to the suite, or might join it, dared not presume to go before the escort; those of elevated rank:

alone, had the privilege of approaching the sides of the carriage, or following immediately behind it. Thus they hurried on like a tempest, day or night, at a full trot, travelling many leagues; and he who was obliged to follow this whirlwind during the night, found himself very uncomfortable. Where the road happened to be narrow, they ran, as it were, one over the other, with brutal impetuosity. Those who were the least inconvenienced, were the two orderly officers, who rode before the carriage, and the two chasseurs, who were still farther on in front. All the rest ran the risk of breaking their necks, or their limbs: for the servants, who led Napoleon's horses, considered themselves as the head of the train; the *chasseur du porte-feuille*, the orderly officers, and the pages, were not a whit more modest. In fact, every one became of importance who was called for by the Emperor, and all his retinue pressed forward, hurried on, ran one over the other, in the midst of heat, dust, fog, or the darkness of the night. When Napoleon stopped, his saddle horses were to do the same; and four chasseurs in the front of the escort alighted; fixed the bayonets to the muzzles of their car-

bines, presented arms, and formed the corners of a square about him. The same thing was done, when any necessity of nature obliged him to alight from his coach, or carriage; and when he halted to take a turn on foot, in order to observe the enemy, then the square was enlarged, and advanced according to the direction of his steps, leaving him unencumbered, in order that, being within a free space, he might make his observations in all directions. If the objects were distant, the page on duty came forward, and brought the great telescope, which Buonaparte placed upon his or Caulincourt's shoulders.

When circumstances obliged the Emperor, to remain, either early in the morning or at night, for some time in the open air, the chasseurs prepared a large fire for him. This fire was always supplied with an extraordinary quantity of wood: large logs, and, if it were possible, entire beams were burnt, to serve as a sort of signal pointing out the spot where he was.

Berthier was his companion on these occasions, as well as at table; seldom any other person was with him. All the rest kept at a certain distance, forming a semi-circle. The same eager-

ness was displayed to approach the fire of the marshals as to have access to their table. Napoleon walked up and down, either alone, absorbed in thought, or conversing with Berthier, awaiting perhaps the sound of cannon or other signals, from his generals. When he began to be weary, he took snuff, or amused himself with kicking the pebbles about with his foot, or pushing the wood towards the fire. He could not rest a moment without doing something.

Napoleon had attained the extraordinary faculty of judging of the state of things, at decisive moments, even in the midst of the smoke and fire of the artillery. Of course, he only knew where the attack made by his troops should produce some change, and when that took place, he was sure his orders had been executed. He gave proofs of the particular talent mentioned, in the engagements which followed the battle of Lutzen, in that of Bautzen, or Wurchsen, when Ney arrived, and on several other occasions. He was never deceived when he gave an opinion respecting the distance, or the approach of the enemy's fire. He remarked each movement, and perceived the strength of the enemy and his manœuvres, either in flank or in

rear, much quicker and better than his generals. He proved this at Lutzen, at Dresden, and on every occasion when the affair was within the limits of his view. He had nothing to do but to take a glance, assisted by his telescope, in order to conceive, with extraordinary rapidity, the position and strength of a whole army. In this manner, being on the heights, he computed the number of entire corps consisting of fifty or sixty thousand men, according to the space of ground they occupied, and their position\*. He was often obliged to trust to himself and his talents more than to the co-operation of his generals ; for in this campaign

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\* Napoleon said one day to Berthier, with an indifferent air, " All that I see are two corps of about sixty thousand men ; they will take more than a day to form a junction and attack." It had probably been observed to him that he might expect an attack from the side of Bohemia. He had, besides, the faculty of ascertaining his position rapidly, like a skilful engineer, according to the angles and triangles formed by distant points and objects. He figured to himself the situation and all the localities of the country. He was accustomed to place himself once only in the open air, conformably with the points of the compass and the map, and afterwards proceeding onward, he knew every object from the idea he had at first formed to himself, as well as if he had been born in the country. But it is true he judged of the greater part of the movements on a grand scale ; and, without making allowance for unknown difficulties, gave orders for operations which, being executed to the letter by his generals, cost great sacrifices of man.

two principal things were wanting, intelligence from good sources, and a more considerable body of experienced cavalry. The superiority of the Allies in light troops, who took possession of all the neglected or unoccupied intervals, made it impossible for Napoleon to obtain certain intelligence. During the latter part of the campaign, the French were unable to protect themselves by a similar cordon of light cavalry, so proper to annoy the enemy, and procure the necessary intelligence. With respect to the last-mentioned point, all the efforts of Napoleon and his generals were useless, whether it arose from the disinclination of the inhabitants of the seat of war, who had been ill treated, or from the incursions of the Cossacks, who spread themselves in all directions. The little that was learned was chiefly confined to the report of prisoners, who were few in number; and gave very imperfect accounts. Indeed, the French knew nothing but what was passing in the countries that the enemy had abandoned. While the war is offensive, these means may be sufficient; but they amount to a nullity when it is defensive. Another equally deplorable circumstance was, the almost entire abandonment of the ordi-



nary duties; that of the light cavalry, of sentinels, patrols, &c. &c., were neglected by the troops in an unpardonable manner. Every confidence was placed in the genius of Buonaparte, for the direction of the most important operations, but the detail, on which he had no influence, was totally disregarded. A great portion of the officers having neither zeal nor experience enough to instruct and exercise the new levies during the war, the superiors and subalterns, abandoned to themselves, were employed almost exclusively in providing for their own wants, or in procuring themselves enjoyments; even the presence of Napoleon could hardly prevail on the troops to be exact in the performance of their duty. They had lost all confidence in their chief, and all the ties which should subsist between soldiers and their officers, were almost entirely dissolved.

The legion of honour was, notwithstanding, still a powerful incentive. The prerogatives and extraordinary advantages attached in France to the possession of that order, caused it to be sought as a reward of the highest price. Unhappily the most disgusting abuses had crept in to that institution, as well as into many others of a very useful

description. An individual, patronised by his colonel, received the decoration refused to a hundred braver men than he. However, any one who thought he possessed good grounds of claim, and had distinguished himself by his valour, might address himself to Buonaparte, and complain of the wrong he had sustained. When the troops had performed, or were about to perform, any extraordinary enterprise, Napoleon generally decreed a certain number of decorations of the legion of honour to a brigade, a battalion, &c. The candidates arranged themselves in front of the battalion; the commanding officer of the regiment presented them to Napoleon, and the adjutant on duty noted the name and rank of each in his pocket-book, in order to report them to the chancery. The most importunate were commonly Messieurs the officers of health, and the soldiers attached to the service of commandants. It depended, however, on the impartiality and justice of superior officers, to act agreeably to the intention of the founder of the order, or the reverse. I have seen officers, and even private soldiers, address themselves directly to Buonaparte, saying, "Sire, I have merited the cross;" on such occa-

sions he almost always replied, with a smile, "Well, in what manner?" Then the claimant related the battles in which he had been engaged, what he had performed, that he had suffered from injustice, &c., and Napoleon caused his name to be taken down, or the commandant was sent for immediately, to render an account of certain circumstances. If the man had spoken truth, the matter was soon settled. The tone which the officers, and sometimes even the soldiers, assumed towards the head of the government, would have been indecent in any other nation, but it was not so with the French, whose character is naturally vehement. An officer, whom Napoleon had perhaps reproached with the failure of some enterprise, might be seen defending himself from his horse on the parade, in presence of a hundred persons, composed of generals and other officers, with a vivacity and gestures which occasioned some alarm on his account. But Napoleon took no notice of these acts of presumption, and remained silent. From his boundless impetuosity he often gave occasion even to his generals to answer him in a very rude manner. He censured General Sebastiani, one day, by remarking that his cavalry had done less

than General Latour Maubourg's, which had taken, he said, so many cannon, colours, prisoners, &c. ; and he concluded by these strong expressions : " F—— do as much as they ; you command a " mob, not soldiers."

" Sire, I do *not* command a mob," replied Sebastiani, in a cool and firm manner, representing to him at the same time the state of his soldiers, and that in the midst of so many privations, they could not possibly do more. The Duke of Tarentum supported him, and both together succeeded in reducing the Emperor to silence ; while Caulincourt, to avoid the disgrace of the occurrence, begged all those who were present to depart. Then Napoleon, giving vent to his ill humour, censured, with the same violence, the commandants of the regiments of Sebastiani's division, which were filing off before him, and loaded the high deeds of Latour Maubourg's cavalry with praises\*.

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\* I was never personally present at similar scenes, but I have been informed of their occurrence, within a few minutes after they had taken place. At MUGLITZ, near Pirna, Napoleon, transported with a fit of rage, slapped the face of one of his generals. This extravagant propensity to passion was well known ; nevertheless, I have heard some superior officers say, speaking of him, " Believe me, he is not a bad man." Many of his servants were attached to him for the favours he had conferred on them ;

When he had dispensed any favour, the guards commonly expected a warm engagement. The most certain preludes were harangues to the troops, and the restoration of the eagles to battalions. If his expectation were deceived, or if, in spite of these preliminary steps, no bloody scene took place, which happened in regard to many engagements he had projected, by the wisely calculated retreat of the Allies, then Napoleon's rage burst forth; he became irritated, that these theatrical exhibitions should have failed of their intention.

It has more than once happened, that the words of Napoleon have produced the effect of magical influence on the soldiers; but of all the sounding spectacles of war, that of the distribution of the eagles made the greatest impression. Several new battalions had received their colours before they left France. These colours were made in

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and it may be said, that a sense of gratitude arose in him from time to time. For instance, he recollected, after some period, persons from whom he thought he had received useful pieces of service, and endeavoured to reward them, without requiring any farther personal sacrifices. "Have I not conferred a pension?" "Let us give him a pension," he would say, with a sort of cordial feeling; after having by inquiry recalled the circumstances to his memory. Some days after the matter would be in the official train of accomplishment.

such a manner, that below the eagle, which surmounted the top of the banner, there was another flag, resembling the *guidon* of the cavalry. The whole was covered with a leather case, which was never to be taken off but when Buonaparte went in state to return the eagle to the battalion. Till then it remained, as it were, in store. The day being fixed for the solemnity, the Emperor appeared, accompanied by the whole of his staff, and placed himself before the centre of the regiment, which was formed in three close columns, their fronts facing to the centre of a square, the fourth front was occupied by Napoleon's suite. All the officers of the regiment were assembled before him. He appeared, detached from his suite, dressed in his plain green *capote*; commonly on his cream-coloured mare, his favourite charger in this campaign. He was the more easily distinguished by the simplicity of his dress; as all those about him formed a contrast, by their brilliant blue uniforms, richly embroidered with gold \*."

When the Prince of Wagram (as major-ge-

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\* Although etiquette required that on certain occasions none should appear before Napoleon in a great coat, or a cloak, no one about him was troubled concerning his dress during the campaign, when the weather was bad, &c.

neral), and, in his absence, the Duke of Vicenza, (Caulincourt,) as first grand dignitary next to Berthier, had alighted, and caused the colour to be unfurled, which was carried in front of the assembled officers, all the drums of the regiments rolled until Berthier had taken the eagle, and placed himself before the line of officers, at a distance from the rest of the suite. The powerful and respected Berthier displayed on these occasions a venerable appearance.

Buonaparte raised his left hand towards the eagle, holding the reins in his right\*. Then he delivered, for example, the following speech, in a clear solemn tone, but not very loud, which might be distinguished by the musical term, *mezza voce*.

“ Soldiers of the 26th regiment of light infantry, I intrust you with the French eagle—It will be your rallying point—You swear to abandon it but with life? You swear never to suffer an insult to France—you swear to prefer death to dishonour—You swear !” He laid particular stress upon this last word, pronounced in

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\* He was often seen to commit this fault against the rules of horsemanship. When he trotted or galloped his horse, he commonly held the reins in his right hand, incessantly shaking it, letting the left hang negligently down.

a peculiar tone, and with great energy. This was the signal at which all the officers raised their swords; and all the soldiers, filled with enthusiasm, exclaimed with common consent, in a loud voice, accompanied by the ordinary acclamations—"We swear!" Then Berthier committed the eagle to the regiment, and the columns forming a horseshoe, separated at the moment Napoleon departed.

In this manner he distributed, on the 15th of October, those eagles which were displayed together, to three different regiments.

The French are easily intoxicated; I never saw circumstances similar to those above-mentioned, fail of exciting an enthusiasm, which was sometimes spontaneous, sometimes extorted by the commandants and officers, in order to obtain the good graces of the Emperor. Towards the end of the campaign, misery and privations robbed him of the affection of the private soldier, who preferred confronting death on the field of battle to dying of hunger. Yet, a part of the young guard continued to utter the usual acclamations; and even when, abandoned by fortune, he was beaten, and forced to quit Saxony, their



shouts were repeated with incredible energy, as if to console him in adversity. At the time of forced marches, which were made without supplies of food, in the environs of Dresden, Bautzen, and Pirna, the *vivats* of this same corps but feebly resounded, and some of the soldiers were heard to say, "Nobody will shout!"

It was an established custom, when Napoleon came up with his guard on the march, that it should form to the front, or in column, then all the bands played till the imperial train had passed, as they also did when the guard halted during the march. But the rest of the infantry disturbed themselves very little about him. Musicians became scarce, since the greater part of them had been buried in the snows of Russia. While the armies were advancing, the different kinds of force, artillery, cavalry, infantry, pressed on to pass each other. This irregularity and carelessness, which had crept into the French army, was the occasion of their entire ruin on their retreat. Napoleon often found himself obliged to clear a way for himself and his suite, through the midst of that mass of men; and the poor foot soldiers were trampled on by the guard.

behind. Conceive the disorder which an imperial suite must produce, with all its officers, domestics, and led horses, passing through a column of infantry. The French troops were used to this confusion by their generals and other superior officers, who all marched nearly in the same manner, and whose delayed departure must necessarily produce similar confusion. What a difference between these marches and those of the armies belonging to the other powers, who were obliged to march man by man, without a single person daring to pass through a column.

The over-numerous suites were not only prejudicial on the march, but were still more so, nay, occasioned much mischief, in battles; for the enemy, who observed every thing with an attentive eye, directed his artillery towards the spot where the general and his suite appeared. For this reason, when Napoleon penetrated into Silesia, on the 25th of May (having been several times saluted by the enemies' shot near Dresden and Bautzen,) the following regulation of the march appeared at head-quarters, according to which no horseman could follow immediately after the Emperor, except—

The Prince of Neufchâtel (Berthier.)

The grand equerry (Caulincourt.)

The marshal on duty.

General Guyot, as commandant of escorts, or guides of the chasseurs.

Two adjutants.

Two orderly officers.

Two officers, as interpreters of the Russian and German languages.

A page.

A groom attached to Napoleon's person, and Rustan.

All the other individuals of the Emperor's household were obliged, as well as the escort, to remain behind at the distance, I think, of 300 toises. Where there was much danger, Napoleon was in the habit of going forward, with Caulincourt, Berthier, and a page only, either on foot or on horseback, and of sending the horses behind some house or hillock, in order that they might not be observed. The moment when he departed was generally the signal for a cannonade; whether it were that the enemy had descried Napoleon and his suite, or that he himself had caused artillery to be brought up by circuitous ways,

in order to play upon the point he had just reconnoitred.

The duty of the orderly officers was as painful as honourable. These young persons belonged to the first families in France; they were sons of statesmen, generals, senators, and were distinguished for their talents or education; having three sources of pride, as, being members of the great nation, possessing high birth, and filling posts of honour. Their elegant uniform was no small addition to their vanity. It was the same as that of the superior civil officers of Napoleon's household, (the grand master of the ward-robe, or the equerry,) being a light blue coat with rich and elegant silver embroidery, and a hat with black feathers. There were commonly but two on duty. In time of action, Napoleon merely said; "An orderly officer!\*" He whose turn it was, took the orders to a marshal; the bearer was obliged to repeat them to himself as he went along, for these orders often contained an account of all the transactions of the day. Then the other colleague approached Napoleon, as

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\* He sometimes added:— Go for a while to the advanced posts, and see what is passing.

near as possible, or mounted his horse to be ready to march\* off at the first call. They were often sent as couriers with orders for the generals commanding a corps, with whom they remained till a decisive affair had taken place ; after which they were to return to Napoleon, and inform him of it, either by word of mouth, or in writing. At other times they were sent to reconnoitre, to take at a glance the general plan of some tracts of ground at a short distance, which were interesting to Napoleon, either on account of rivers that were to be passed, or intrenchments to be raised. The greater part of these young persons were chosen from the corps of artillery or engineers ; but there were also some individuals taken from the cavalry, who, in gradation, were transferred into a regiment, with the rank of *chef d'escadron* ; two of them were also employed in the newly-established guards of honour. He, who had displayed ability, had the prospect of obtaining, even as orderly

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\* I here designedly employ the expression "march," and not gallop, for I have never seen a French officer ride with that celerity which may be called the true cavalry pace. Their ordinary movement was at a trot or canter. The orderly officers were the best horsemen.

officer, the rank of *chef d'escadron*, and of becoming in rotation, colonel, and aide-de-camp of the Emperor. The number of orderly officers was fixed at twelve, but it was not complete at the beginning of the campaign.

Only one of these, named Beranger, had remained in the environs of Dresden: the rest were Gourgault, first orderly officer; Athalin, Pretet, la Place, Lauriston, Dessaix, (son or nephew of the general of that name,) Paillou, Lamezan, Caraman and Saint Marsan.

During the campaign, Napoleon had four pages with him, all constitutionally able to support fatigue, and who in case of necessity might be sent on messages; two *pages de chasse*, who in turn commonly procured civil employments, or appointments at court; two others who, by custom entered into the army. One of these was intrusted with bringing Buonaparte his horse, carrying the telescope, preparing relays, &c.

Rustan carried his field-bottle; sometimes a *piqueur*, of many year's service, was charged with it. It was but very rarely, and when breakfast had been dispensed with, that Napoleon drank on the road a small quantity of wine or liqueur;

except on such occasions, he took little or nothing between breakfast and dinner, that is, from nine or ten in the morning, till six or seven at night.

During a campaign, Napoleon never spared himself in matters of business, but his restless disposition revolted at the idea of uniform occupation. Nevertheless, he possessed over those who surrounded him, and who seconded him in his operations, the great advantage of being busy when he chose, and of selecting moments of relaxation; while those whom he employed, being always subjected to his caprice, liable to be called on at every moment, day or night, were reduced to snatch as chance might allow them, a few moments of repose. His will put them all in motion, and the general business could not be interrupted, when one of those whom he retained as his instruments, found himself fatigued. The indefatigable activity of Buonaparte himself, kept them all alive from the first to the last; but he alone possessed the consolation, that the execution of the plan which robbed him of his nightly rest, would exalt his personal glory; while that, which served as food for his imagination, supported his bodily powers, by the pleasure he experienced in antici-

pating the enjoyments of his ambition, keeping others amused with its objects.

This disposition of mind is peculiarly applicable to the period of his prosperity ; for if the body became strengthened by the stimulus of imagination, by the cheering prospect of a brilliant succession of fortunate days, it could not, however, be supposed long to resist the impression of obstacles continually springing up, and reverses which, by keeping the faculties of the mind constantly on the stretch, exhaust the physical powers. But the superiority of a bold spirit truly consists in the power of raising itself above the uncertainties and crosses which paralyze weak souls ; in braving dangers, ably bringing back fortune by force or policy, and determining her finally in its favour, by employing new resources.

Napoleon mingled in his labours incredible facility and penetration. Those who surrounded him, spoke with astonishment of the systematic progress, of the abundance of his ideas, in all that he dictated to his secretaries and adjutants. Subjects which filled many pages, were treated with admirable method. Those who wrote from his dictating, especially the secretaries, were to be



ready to answer all sorts of questions and propositions, relative to military or political matters. When he received despatches, he questioned the officers about him, concerning the position of the places which were mentioned in them, before they could ascertain whether they were in Silesia, Spain, or elsewhere. It was not until they had taken a glance at the signature of the person who had transmitted the despatch, that they could guess the Emperor's meaning, and point out on the map the place he required. He very seldom deferred any matter of business: nevertheless he sometimes put off till the morrow affairs which he could not conveniently transact at the moment, then he ordered them to be again brought forward. Frequently, if he met a courier on the road, he would stop; and then either Berthier or Caulincourt sat down upon the ground, to write what he dictated to be addressed to the commandants of different corps. Afterwards all the officers were despatched in various directions, so that at times scarcely any person was left near him. When he expected news from his generals, and it was presumed a battle might take place, he was extremely un-

easy. He caused either one or several of those who were employed in his cabinet to be called up in the middle of the night ; “ Call d’Albe ; let every one awake ! ” he would exclaim. This always happened about one or two o’clock A. M., for during the campaign he went to bed very early, that is to say at eight or nine, as soon as he had dined. His camp-bed followed him every where upon mules, and it was set up in those places where necessary furniture was not to be found. Even when his room was prepared, he very rarely slept for a single hour during the day ; that circumstance never happened but when he had been exhausted by fatigue through having passed a night in bivouac. On returning from Neumarck, and after the conclusion of the armistice, Napoleon slept at Gœrlitz, perhaps for the only time that year, ten hours together ; from nine at night until seven in the morning, without intermission, and without calling any of his people. This was an unprecedented circumstance, as his servants affirmed ; which proves that the above mentioned event had delivered him, at least temporarily, from all anxiety. But the following

day became, in consequence, the more fatiguing. Buonaparte entered his carriage, and having thrown various written papers out at the window, examined with Soult, and other generals, the greater part, or at least the most important points, of the field of battle at Wurchsen; this survey lasted till eight o'clock at night.

The grand equerry was often obliged to labour with him till a very late hour. On one occasion, having begun to dictate at two o'clock in the morning, the Emperor was employed till four, when he again went to bed. The most painful task, that of transcribing fairly what had been written in cipher, remained for the secretaries.

He sometimes laboured during the whole night; Rustan brought him coffee, and he walked up and down his cabinet, which was well lighted, in a *robe de chambre*, having his head wrapped up in a parti-coloured silk handkerchief, which had the appearance of a turban. He talked and dictated incessantly. At these times his officers and generals received their orders; and when he had thus suffered the period for repose to elapse,

towards break of day he took a bath to refresh himself. But this rarely occurred. It was his general custom to labour till four in the morning, then he slept, or at least ruminated for a couple of hours.

His travelling carriage was disposed in such a manner, that he was able to sleep and lie at length in it upon mattresses. Between the seat which he occupied, and that of Berthier, there was this difference, that his companion could not lie down. Dressed in uniform, his head wrapped up in a coloured silk handkerchief, he was able to sleep in his carriage as well as if he had been in his bed. The inside of the vehicle was furnished with a number of drawers with locks; these contained the news from Paris, unopened reports, and books. Opposite Napoleon was a list of places where the relays were ready, and a large lamp fixed behind, illumined the interior, whilst four others diffused their light upon the road. The mattresses, which Rustan arranged, were adroitly rolled up in the carriage, and below the store-place were some spare torches. Rustan alone sat on the box, and six stout Limousin horses, driven by two postilions,

drew the carriage which held two persons, was plain, of a green colour, and well hung\*.

Napoleon's plain and neat mode of dress is so well known by the prints and descriptions which have been published of him, that it would be useless to speak of it; I shall only here take occasion to remark, that it is erroneous to suppose he always wore his grey great coat during a battle, from superstitious motives, or to disguise himself. In the summer, or when it was fine, he was dressed as usual, even in action, in his green uniform, with the decoration of the legion of honour. But when the weather was cold or damp, he wore over it the grey great coat, so well known to every body. I only saw him on one occasion dressed in a blue cloak, the collar of which was embroidered with gold of four colours; it is affirmed that it was the same which he wore at the time he was a general of the republic. During the armistice, he had made for him, at Dresden, another morning dress, blue, plain, and of a modern cut. Napoleon appeared reluctantly

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\* The whole of this description of Napoleon's carriage tallies very well with the construction of that, which was exhibited in London as his, captured at the battle of Waterloo. The latter was of a blue colour. ED.

to make use of either. The day on which he himself had fixed as that of his nativity, he appeared on the grand parade in the uniform of his guard, blue turned up with red, and embroidered with gold ; with these exceptions, he was always dressed in the same manner, and when the fire at Rosnig had consumed the few clothes that he had with him, he had not even enough for a change, and was obliged to get some breeches made, on the emergency, at Breslau. It may by this be seen, that the master of his wardrobe had not much occupation.

Napoleon was not mounted as an emperor should have been ; he had some eight or nine horses for his own use, of which the best and handsomest was a bay of Arabian breed, with a black mane and tail. Many officers would have been ashamed to mount the others, which were small, without external appearance, but convenient and sure-footed ; almost all stallions, with long tails. Besides the bay horse he had often with him two sorrel and two white \*. As he was not a

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\* One of the latter, of which the King of Saxony had made him a present, had fortunately returned from the Russian campaign, in 1812. The French highly prized the horses which had

good horseman, all those who approached him mounted upon a mare, were obliged to be cautious that they were not thrown out of the saddle, by the capers of his horse. A short period before he quitted Dresden, for the last time, a very odd accident happened to him: he had set out on horseback to take an airing, or make a *reconnoissance*, when his horse fell in the street of Pirna, although it was going at a walk, in such a manner that it remained prostrate for some minutes on the ground, till Caulincourt, and others, came up and assisted it to rise. The Emperor remained calm and undisturbed, on foot, until one of his led horses, which were in rear of the escort, was brought to him. Some persons regarded this singular accident as a striking presage of his fall.

He allowed his horse to proceed negligently, at a walk, or jog trot, and thus suffered himself to be carried on, absorbed in his reflections. His horse was accustomed to follow the two chasseurs, or orderly officers, who went before. Na-

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survived that dreadful catastrophe, as there were but few of them in the army. The title of a Moscow horse was the highest eulogium which could be conferred on one of those animals. The "*Moscow horses*" bore a great price. The loss which the generals experienced in the above retreat was immense.

napoleon was passionately fond of going across the fields, without letting any person know whither he bent his course. The chasseurs of the guard were so accustomed to this habit, that by the first direction which he took, they became perfectly well acquainted with the place towards which he was going. He was so fond of bye-ways and paths, that finding himself, on several occasions, in craggy places, or impracticable roads, he was obliged to alight : it was always a disagreeable thing to him to hear of difficulties or impossibilities—*On ne peut pas !* “ It cannot be done ! ” he would exclaim, with an ironical smile ; and he seldom abandoned his intention till he was himself convinced of the impossibility of proceeding. When the way was marshy, or inconvenient, the grand equerry went forward some paces, to examine the way by which the Emperor was to follow. When he came to any place which had been rendered disagreeable or odious to him, on account of some loss, he passed it at a full gallop. I observed this particular circumstance, especially, during the retreat on Hainau, where the two battalions, under Ney, were annihilated ; at Markersdorf, where Duroc was killed ; at



Reichenbach ; and later, at the place called the Saxon Cavalier, between Bischofswerda and Bautzen. At the latter place, a French convoy of ammunition, consisting of seventy carriages, (which was then of the greatest importance to the army) was surprised by the Cossacks, who blew them up. The ill-humour of Napoleon was easily perceived, when passing, the following day, by the same road, he heard the report of the officer, who brought him the particulars of this unfortunate event. At sight of the first vestiges of the convoy, which he encountered at the outlet of the wood, he spurred his horse, and put him in a full gallop ; in turning out of the road, a little dog, which took to barking at his horse, so enraged him, that he pulled out one of his pistols, and would have killed it. The pistol missed fire, and he threw it away in the height of his passion. Rustan ran, picked it up, and replaced it ; then all set off again at a gallop, and passed on in the most profound silence.

It may be seen by these trifles, that passion was always predominant with Napoleon, and that, impelled by the heat of his southern constitution, he could not belie his origin. Sometimes he ap-

peared with a serene countenance, and on the road sang, or recited some Italian words, after the manner of recitative ; he would also amuse himself with the Prince of Neufchatel, the King of Naples, or one of his marshals. He spoke to his generals in a confidential and affable manner, when he was easy, and in good humour. Sometimes he would exclaim, in a friendly tone, *Berthier*, or, *long Mortier*, (Mortier was very tall, and might have stood at the right-hand file of his guard ;) but in matters of duty he assumed another style, for then he would say, “ the *Prince of Neufchatel*,” “ the *Duke of Treviso*,” &c.

He expressed himself laconically ; sometimes he was unintelligible, because he cut short certain words. When a soldier presented a petition, or had been recommended to him, the question which he asked, in either case, was commonly, “ What length of service ?” When he wished to ascertain his position in a vast plain, or to know the extent and importance of some place connected with his enterprises, his question was, “ How far from here to N——— ? What population ?” Unfortunately, it often happened that the reply, frequently incorrect, served as a rule for deter-

mining the quarters of the military, requisitions, supplies, garrisons, &c. He always rivetted his eyes on the person who was speaking to him, as if he would have looked into the very bottom of his soul. It was impossible to answer him quickly enough; he must therefore necessarily have become impatient at being obliged to have every thing, which was neither French nor Italian, translated to him. A great number of persons have erroneously imagined that he understood German, and even spoke it a little, but I never perceived it; on the contrary, I believe that it was no such thing. Were but some trifling answer in question, even to his interrogatories to the common people, he wished to guess the sense of it immediately, and interrupted the interpreter, in a tone bespeaking impatience, with, "What does he say?" Nevertheless, he preferred the delay occasioned by interpretation (which Caulincourt often undertook, because he spoke German tolerably well,) rather than allow himself to be teased, if the expression be admissible, by those who addressed him in mangled French. These ignorant persons were almost always interrupted by the order to speak German. The most singular and droll circum-

stance was the manner in which he pronounced the names of places, which were conceived to be in the neighbourhood, from local circumstances or position, rather than from actual knowledge. For example, he said Siss for Zeitz, Oghirsch for Hochkirch, like all the French, who would think it beneath their dignity to learn to pronounce according to the native mode. He who has surmounted the difficulties of his mother tongue, has no idea how much pains it costs foreigners to overcome them ; but it is certainly true, that the Frenchman, from an excessive predilection for his own language, and an immoderate contempt for other idioms and nations, takes too little pains to acquire the former, and finds an excuse through prejudice and design in the obstacles which his willing application would otherwise surmount. An officer of superior rank, who could speak German fluently, was rarely to be found, the great majority understood it but little, or even not at all.

When Napoleon passed the night in a town, Berthier always lodged in the same house, and the grand equerry close at hand. The prefect of the palace, or a purveyor of the court, went forward to make all the necessary arrangements. Before

the arrival of the Emperor, a list was affixed in the waiting-room, pointing out the quarters of all persons attached to the court. It generally contained :

The Prince of Neufchatel,	} at the palace.
The grand marshal,	
The grand equerry,	

The Duke of Dalmatia.

Count Lobau.

Count Narbonne.

The Duke of Placentia.

General Drouot.

General Flahault.

General Corbineau.

General Dejean.

General Durosnel.

General Hogendorp.

General Pac.

General Korsakousky.

General Guyot, commandant of guides.

Count de Beausset, marshal of the palace.

Baron de Canouville, prefect of the palace.

Count de Turenne, chamberlain, grand master of the wardrobe.

Barons Mesgrigny and Lennep, equerries of the Emperor.

M. Yvan, physician to the household.

Baron d'Albe.

Lamotte, Duvivier, two officers of the *bureau topographique*.

Baron Fain, first secretary of the Emperor's cabinet.

M. Mounier, M. Jouanne, secretaries of the cabinet.

M. Lorgne d'Ideville, interpreting secretary to the Emperor.

Baron Gourgault, *chef d'escadron*, first orderly officer.

The orderly officers.

M. Vasowitz (a Polish officer,) interpreter.

Two Saxon officers.

Colonel Mecquenem, commandant of the *gendarmes d'élite*.

Pages, Devienne, Saint Pern, Mortarieu, Fé-réri.

Two purveyors of the palace.

Four physicians of the court.

The paymaster of the crown.

A commissary generally went forward, to purchase all the necessary provisions for the Emperor's household, meat, vegetables, fowl, eggs,

wine, &c. He supplied the table by contract; and in every place where Napoléon stopped, even in Silesia, all the articles of consumption were paid for in ready money. On the other hand, several of the marshals, although very well able to pay, caused their tables to be supplied by requisition, which excited murmurs even from the French officers themselves. Only fourteen carriages were necessary to transport all the provisions of the Emperor's household; and as the means of conveyance were very scarce, and in certain places none were to be found, the table of the marshals, which was for the officers, was supplied only with the bad wine of the country, bought upon the spot, and often with beer or water. As to dishes, they always endeavoured to have the same number; but if, at times, potatoes or *vinaigrette* chanced to fail, even the suite of the Emperor would experience the torments of hunger, for bread was often the scarcest article, and could not be obtained for the servants. In places, therefore, where any thing could be procured, some provision was attempted to be made, and they endeavoured to fill the panniers with which the mules were laden, in order to be pre-

pared for the stay of the court in a village, or for a bivouac.

In the latter case, five tents were prepared, on the spot which the Emperor had himself pointed out, near or in the midst of his guard. These tents were of canvass, with blue and white stripes, or of a sort of ticking. Two were attached to each other, one of which was the residence of Napoleon, the other his cabinet for business. The great officers ate and slept in the third, in the order which has been enumerated when speaking of the distribution of the tables; the fourth was destined to officers of inferior rank; those who had no right to a place at any of these remained near the fire of the bivouac. Lastly, the fifth, was allotted to the Prince of Wagram, as a lodging and room for business. He, next to Napoleon, enjoyed the greatest privileges and every honour. Every one spoke of him with regard: in spite of his advanced age, his activity and vivacity were extraordinary; but it appears in this campaign that the officers composing his staff, were not so able and experienced, as those by whom he had been formerly surrounded; although General Monthion who was the chief of



them, enjoyed a great reputation. On the whole, the army at this period was a machine too complicated and imperfect, to allow of the establishment of a general combination. The creation of places, alterations, the renewal of supplies, in a word, the multiplicity of movements that supervened, gave birth to difficulties which even the authority of Napoleon could not, in all instances, overcome. Berthier did all in his power to maintain order, but it appears that he was not sufficiently supported. The number of his officers, among which were many Poles, was more considerable than that of Napoleon's adjutants; but they were almost all constantly employed on some mission. Buonaparte had granted him as a special distinction a select guard of soldiers, natives of the principality of Neufchatel; they were distinguished by the bad taste of their uniform, for surely never again will be seen a body of light infantry with short jackets, of a crab-colour faced with red. The old general in many instances seemed to delight in singularities which every one observed; his officers always wore, as a distinguishing mark, scarlet waistcoats and pantaloons; the Prince himself appeared to wish to imitate his

master, by the choice of a small plain hat, which he wore after Napoleon's manner; so that he was often taken for the Emperor himself, whom he resembled in appearance, particularly when in his carriage. Always sprightly, he rode at a swift pace, and was constantly well mounted, which perfectly agreed with his office of grand huntsman. He was passionately fond of the chase, to such a degree that when an old crow flew over his head, he would let fall the reins, even in a gallop, and perform the motions of firing at it\*.

In spite of all his zeal for the service, and the serious tone in which Berthier spoke to his inferiors, I never saw him deficient in politeness, or coarse, as were other great French lords, and indeed the Emperor himself. His manner, towards the latter, approached to a certain familiarity; but

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\* This anecdote will appear rather ludicrous to those who are not acquainted with the French acceptation of the term "*La Chasse*," (the chase) so widely different from ours. Thus "*la Chasse au Renard*," consists of nothing more than putting up the animal and shooting it. When the French saw in their own country the English officers, and often the victorious Wellington (himself a lover of the chase) riding thirty miles or more at a stretch in pursuit of the fox, they were confounded, and exclaimed— "*Mais c'est étonnant !*" Ed.

when Napoleon caused him to be summoned, he assumed a very respectful air, and when he was receiving the Emperor's orders he walked for some time with his hat in his hand. To conclude, he was Napoleon's inseparable companion in his carriage, at table, in excursions on horseback, and in battles.

One might judge of the awe which Napoleon inspired in those who surrounded him, by his deportment towards his nearest relations. He had rendered them great and powerful; but he was not the less formidable to them, unless, as his brother Lucien, they opposed him with firmness and independence. Buonaparte paid no respect to Jerome, the *ci-devant* King of Westphalia; he only figured as a courtier during his short stay at Dresden, when during the armistice he came to pay his homage to the potent head of his family.

Napoleon testified more esteem for the King of Naples, whose worth he fully appreciated as commandant of a corps, particularly of cavalry. Prince Murat, in spite of his theatrical dress, borrowed from all ages, and which ill accorded with the dignity of a monarch, was, as a general

of cavalry, perhaps the first in the whole French army\*. His penetrating glance, his ability in judging of the positions and strength of the enemy, his calm intrepidity in the greatest dangers and on the most exposed points, his warlike visage, his stout and regular form, his noble and firm demeanour on fine and vigorous chargers, all contributed to give him the air of a hero. At the head of his cavalry he feared no danger, and threw himself into the midst of his enemies, in the fullest sense of the expression. I shall elsewhere relate an example of his heroic bravery at the memorable battle of Leipsic. Napoleon knew, as we have observed, the distinguished talents of Murat; it was he whom he employed, jointly with Ney, in the most critical circumstances. Called, for the second time, from the finest country of civilized Europe, Murat was to assist in finishing a war, the interests of which were totally foreign to him, and which, with a more favourable issue, could have procured him no aggrandizement, but, on the contrary, might

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\* When Napoleon commanded the army of Italy in the year 1796, Citizen Murat was his adjutant; he contributed greatly to the success of the battles of Millesimo and Montenotte, as was acknowledged by Napoleon himself.

exhaust the strength of his kingdom, by alienating his subjects from him, who had always had to congratulate themselves on his humanity, and in the midst of whom he had till then lived contented.

Napoleon appeared highly to esteem the opinion of the King of Naples, when he came to ground which had already been inspected by him. I have remarked this myself, having often had occasion to witness their confidential discourse.

The frank and resolute tone of the King, his ever serene deportment sometimes degenerated into a sort of insensibility in danger. The zeal and precision with which he acquitted himself of all his missions, were very agreeable to the Emperor, who appeared to take great pleasure in his conversation. The good temper of Murat never forsook him; in the midst of the most serious engagements, he had always a ready jest: but he appeared to be considered by Buonaparte in a military light alone. As soon as politics were in question, and Napoleon was engaged in them with his diplomatists, the Duke of Bassano, or Caulincourt, Murat withdrew; and it was easily perceived that he would not meddle with them,

either through modesty or aversion; nevertheless, he seemed to concur with Caulincourt in blaming several of Napoleon's measures. In action, or on the march, the Emperor and he were generally together, and formed, with respect to external appearance, so striking a contrast, that it was difficult to refrain from laughter. To dwell upon particulars of human life, of so little importance as the minutiae of dress, appears a task little worthy of an enlightened reader or author; however, as I write rather for amusement than instruction, and as the dress of all celebrated leaders, from Saul to Charles XII. is known, either by portrait or description, some mention shall here be made of Napoleon, with his little three-cornered hat, his grey surtout, his small stature, his big belly, his horses of no figure, his awkward deportment when mounted; comparing him, at the same time, with his brother-in-law, who, riding at his left, attracted and arrested the eyes of the curious, by his form, his splendid dress, the rich trappings of his horse, &c. His countenance, his fine blue eyes, his large whiskers, his dark curling hair, which fell over the collar of his *kurtka*, a Polish dress, the narrow

sleeves of which were open below the shoulder, excited attention. The collar of his coat was richly embroidered with gold; the coat itself was confined with a golden belt, to which was suspended a light sword, with a straight and narrow blade, made after the antient Roman fashion, without hilt or guard; the handle was beautifully worked, and ornamented with brilliants; and also, as I have been told, with the portraits of his family. This prince commonly wore full pantaloons, of a purple or blood colour, the seams of which were trimmed with gold, and boots of nankeen or yellow leather. The splendour of this dress was still further increased by a huge cocked hat, edged with white ostrich feathers, having a broad gold border, and an immense plume, composed of four large ostrich feathers, diverging towards the cardinal points of the compass; from the centre of which arose a magnificent heron's plume.

The trappings of his horse, with the fine gilt stirrups, were made in the Hungarian or Turkish fashion: the horse was covered with a trailing blue or purple housing, richly embroidered with gold; the bridle was magnificent. It must be

owned, that this mixture of Swedish, Spanish, Roman, Turkish, and Neapolitan fashions, notwithstanding all its splendour, exhibited no taste.

This jumble of antient and modern costume will never, surely, find an imitator, even on the stage. Over the clothes we have mentioned, the King of Naples wore, when it was cold, a superb velvet pelisse, of a deep green colour, trimmed with sables. The livery of his equerries, pages, and servants, was of a deep red, or sky-blue. He appeared to prefer, before every other colour, that of the beautiful sky of his kingdom. When he came within reach of the enemies' guns, the batteries were sure to be directed at him. At least, a striking instance of this was seen in an engagement near the banks of the Unstrut, when the enemy's batteries, placed on a steep eminence, directed a well-sustained fire towards the spot where the King of Naples was stationed by the side of Napoleon.

It was said that the latter, in spite of his taste for simplicity in his own person, was desirous enough that his suite should appear with a splendour which might strike all eyes, at parades, and when every thing was in a state of tranquillity.



His adjutants and staff were well paid; his orderly officers received gratuities to reimburse their expenses, at the end of every campaign or journey; nevertheless, during the war, many worn-out uniforms were seen at head-quarters, and such neglect was neither remarked nor reprimanded.

Maret, Duke of Bassano, as minister for foreign affairs, was the first, and almost the only, civil officer, who accompanied Napoleon during the whole of the campaign. When the army was on a march, or when he came to meet the Emperor, he appeared on horseback. Although the French pay no respect to difference of occupations, he never assisted at any battle. His air bespoke the courtier and the statesman, who joined to the most artful turns of policy, the flexibility and amiable character of a Frenchman of the old school. His agreeable exterior appearance, full of dignity, was much in his favour. The physiognomy and manners of Fouché, Duke of Otranto, bespoke deceit and finesse. He stopped but a short time at Dresden, during the armistice, and quitted that city for the Illyrian provinces.

Besides the two last-named, Count Daru was among those who may be ranked with the

civil officers, and who, as intendant of the kingdom of Saxony, was the most frequently occupied with the Emperor\*. The grand portfolio which followed him, contained more than one scourge for the unfortunate country.

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\* A wiser system of economy should have been employed, in order to take advantage of the resources of so rich a country, which the industry of the inhabitants rendered still more considerable. Also, during the armistice, the soldiers should have been employed in getting in the harvest, and its produce ought to have been distributed with greater care. But the stores of Saxony were shamefully wasted. The soldiers considered the hard-working peasant as a slave, who could not be sufficiently ground by those who ravaged his property. The produce and loss of the country, in this destructive campaign, are incalculable. To form any idea of these, it must first be allowed that Saxony (wonderful as it may appear,) supported half a million of troops during six months; that an immense quantity of provisions had been destroyed; and that, after the abandonment of the armistice, all those parts of the country which were traversed by the armies, or had become the actual theatre of war, were so much exhausted, that the inhabitants were constrained to buy, in the neighbouring countries of Silesia, Franconia, and Bohemia, not only the grain necessary for their support, but also seed for their fields. On the other hand, it must be allowed that the harvest, particularly in certain places, in spite of the dampness of the season, surpassed general expectation. In the neighbourhood of Dresden, and several other places, the wheat-harvest was very plentiful; fodder was no less so; the crop of potatoes was so superabundant, that the provinces which had suffered the least during the war, found themselves in a condition to supply seed to other less fortunate districts. The fruit trees furnished daily

The army of Napoleon was almost entirely divided in the different provinces of Saxony, the old and young guard at Dresden, and in the environs on the right bank of the Elbe, from Lusatia to the neighbourhood of Muhlberg and Torgau.

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nourishment to thousands of the French, who are very fond of fruit. Towards the end of autumn, when commerce began to revive, and the high roads were covered with carriages, a prodigious quantity of different fruits was seen at the market of Freyberg, and other places in the direction of the mountain countries. It might be remarked on this, as on all other occasions, that Providence never sends a scourge, which is not accompanied, or followed, by some comfort and alleviation, as well for individuals as the people at large. This truth was demonstrated in the present instance, and contributed much to console the unhappy victims of an unjust war; whilst thousands of land-owners, who, under other circumstances, had sacrificed the interests of humanity to the thirst of gold, lost in a few days their stores, and even part of their estates. Several of them were seen reduced to that beggary which had long been the portion of their unfortunate neighbours. But neither the just punishment of the former, nor the relief of the latter, can form any excuse for those ambitious persons, who fear not to entail upon nations all the scourges produced by war. The reflecting observer finds in these events a proof of the melancholy truth, exemplified by history, that each generation requires some convulsion, in order to learn, in the school of adversity, how to appreciate the season of happiness. For five and twenty years past almost all the nations of Europe have undergone this ordeal. Saxony, whose prosperity had been boasted, was the last country which drained the bitter cup. She suffered more than the neighbouring countries, doubtless, because she was in a superior state of riches and cultivation.

A great portion of the army was in Silesia, on the frontier of that country and Saxony, in very confined cantonments\*.

The Poles were near Zittau, the 7th *corps d'armée* at Goerlitz, and in the neighbourhood; Marmont's corps, and General Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, round Sagen and Freystadt. Although this distribution underwent but few changes, I never was acquainted with the particulars of them. It was a very difficult thing for a stranger to collect the smallest information at head-quarters, respecting the dispersion and cantonment of the troops, or procure any idea on the subject, but that which he might form to himself. The officers of the general staff themselves, with a few exceptions, possessed but very partial information on the subject; the combined arrangement was unknown to them.

During the armistice, Napoleon lived at Dresden, in such a manner as to be able to apply himself freely to business, and at the same time to enjoy the pleasures afforded by his palace,

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\* The corps of Prince Poniatowski had crossed Galicia, entered Bohemia, by the permission of the Austrian court, and had fortunately arrived in Upper Lusatia, by the Gabel road.

which overlooked an extensive garden. In general, his mode of life was rather simple than ostentatious ; for, with the exception of the daily reviews of the newly arrived troops, of a part of his guard, and the amusement of the play, there was no other diversion. The day being exclusively devoted to the labours of the cabinet, the greatest tranquillity reigned in the palace ; indeed, but for the imperial guard, which indicated the residence of a monarch, one would hardly have supposed it to be the dwelling of a rich private person. Those who were of indispensable use in his labours, were the persons who approached him the nearest. Berthier, Caulincourt, two secretaries, and Colonel d'Albe, with his maps, had their apartments in the palace ; and the Emperor needed, as it were, but beckon to them, in order to bring them to his elbow. He resided and transacted business in the right-wing, the left was occupied by Berthier, and other great officers. The saloon, with two rooms in the centre, were devoted to the use and reception of all those who presented themselves at court.

The day was passed in the following manner : Till eight o'clock all was quiet, unless some adju-

tant had been unexpectedly called, or courier had arrived ; at nine, there was a levee, at which all who enjoyed the rank of colonel might appear\*. The French civil and military authorities, as well as those of the country, were there, and Napoleon's countenance was observed as the barometer of the political atmosphere. The brothers and nephews of the King of Saxony, the Dukes of Weimar and Anhalt Dessau, sometimes appeared at the levee. Napoleon breakfasted alone about half an hour after it broke up, or deferred his breakfast until the parade was over. But this seldom happened. The place called *Ostra-gehäze* (Ostra-park,) is so well calculated for this military amusement, and its extent is such that, at the grand parade of the 10th of August, from 15 to 18,000 men appeared on that spot. Napoleon had but a hundred yards to go, in order to repair thither on horseback ; he might, indeed, traverse a walk and passage of the garden, belonging to Count Walwitz, opposite his palace, where Marshal Soult resided.

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\* Nevertheless, those orderly officers who had served in the Spanish war, even of the rank of captain, were admitted to the levee. This prerogative, styled *droit du lever*, was considered as a peculiar privilege, and shewed the price which the Emperor attached to service in that dangerous contest.

When the Emperor arrived on the parade, he alighted, and the troops, who defiled before him, saluted him three times with the usual acclamations.

To complete the army, fresh troops, detachments of light and heavy cavalry, immense columns of the train, carriages of a new form, draught horses, harness, quantities of clothes, arrived daily from the interior of France; but the whole was in an incomplete state, although nothing had been spared relating to equipment.

New pieces of artillery and regiments of infantry were successively arriving, from the 16th June, during a whole month. It clearly appeared that neither efforts nor expense had been spared to procure these reinforcements, and the infantry alone shewed how little time was necessary for acquiring a certain military cast. A newly-raised regiment was seen, among others, passing in review with extraordinary alacrity and confidence. This regiment had only been formed and assembled since the 27th of May. Its commandant was appointed colonel on the spot. The Emperor conferred on it grades of promotion for eight or nine persons. On these occasions, the individuals

were presented to him by the commandant ; he inquired of them the length of their service, the campaigns they had performed, and immediately granted their promotion, he himself often selecting those whom he chose to advance. Then the commandant harangued his regiment, presented to it, " by order of his Majesty the Emperor and " King," its officers in their new rank, and concluded by embracing them ; after which every one repaired to his post, and the accustomed acclamations resounded. The " old guard," which was very complete, with its band of Turkish music, presented on all occasions the finest spectacle. It consisted of nearly 8,000 men, forming two regiments of grenadiers, and two of chasseurs. It has been matter of complaint, that this chosen body, under the title of " the Emperor's guard," arrogated to themselves arbitrary pretensions, particularly with respect to quarters. Nothing was good enough for them ; and they are accused of having abandoned themselves to plundering, when they had no inquiry to apprehend.

Nevertheless, it would have been impossible to find elsewhere troops who braved death with so much intrepidity and courage ; and who, in the



midst of every difficulty and danger, shewed themselves more devoted to their chief and their duty. By my own knowledge, during the dreadful bombardment of a redoubt at the attack of Dresden, when the greater part of the garrison had been killed or wounded, seven men of the imperial guard, who were summoned, rushed upon the parapet, and walked up and down on it, in order to inspire others with courage, without paying the least attention to the shower of balls which fell upon the redoubt. Two or three of these rash heroes fell victims to their valour ; this redoubt was so battered by the artillery, that the parapet was reduced to the height of eighteen inches. How many thousands of these brave men perished in the course of the two last campaigns ! This guard was, moreover, almost the only corps of French troops which distinguished itself by its appearance, and the precision of its manœuvres ; for, even when the other corps exhibited a degree of ability in their evolutions, they did not equal the German troops, in address and facility ; for their marchings, wheelings, and manœuvres were less measured and regular. Some reinforcements of the Germans forming the contingent of the Con-

federation of the Rhine, passed through Dresden, and Napoleon was exceedingly pleased with them. The cavalry of the French guard of honour came up rather late, and was dispersed among the other regiments of the guard. Every parade was concluded by a review of several corps of the cavalry belonging to the guard, which defiled at a trot or gallop, under the orders of General Guyot, commandant of the imperial escorts. Buonaparte exhibited his impatience, even on these occasions: instead of staying for the approach of some divisions, he hastened to meet them. Count Lobau received the orders from him for those evolutions, which he directed when mounted.

As soon as the cavalry had begun to file off, Napoleon returned home to his labours, or made the circuit of the city on horseback. These excursions had for their object the fortification of Dresden, and the erection of several new redoubts in the environs.

He several times visited the camp of the young guard, which extended in a semicircle, at a quarter of a league distant from the new town, from Königsbruck to the Bautzen road. Substantial and regular barracks had been built on

that spot, which circumstance had occasioned much damage to the wood. In front of the camp a small obelisk had been erected, supporting a bust of Napoleon.

When the Emperor, on similar occasions, visited the soldiers by surprise, they continued their occupations, in their camp dress, without taking notice of his presence. When he crossed the Elbe, he generally passed over one of the two bridges of boats, which were constructed above and below the great bridge. Perhaps he preferred them, because they were wider than the last, especially when compared with the part that been temporarily repaired, to replace that which had been demolished by the explosion.

When he returned to his palace, all was quiet till the evening; then he went out, sooner or later, as his occupations would allow, and returned to dinner, or the play. It is well known that dinner was not served up till very late, about seven or eight o'clock. He dined very often, as during the campaign, alone with Berthier, unless some guests of the Saxon royal family were present. After ten o'clock tranquillity was restored, and every one appeared at liberty, and free from

constraint. Perhaps the Emperor was then employed with one of his secretaries.

It was at first conceived that there would be no more entertainments at the French headquarters; but dramatic performances took place; for which purpose Fleury, Mesdemoiselles Mars and Bourgoin, &c., were sent for from Paris. French comedies were performed at the little theatre, which had been hastily fitted up in the orangery of the Marcolini garden, contiguous to the palace. These representations produced but little effect in consequence of the smallness of the place. Lest the heat should be oppressive, not more than a hundred persons belonging to the city were invited, who, with Buonaparte's household, and the royal family, composed the whole of the audience. A short time after, Napoleon desired to see tragedies. Mademoiselle Georges returned from Russia; Talma also arrived, and some pieces of Racine and Voltaire were performed at the opera-house of the city, where the French actors displayed those great talents, which are commonly deteriorated by extravagance of manner. But that inflated style, which is thought suitable to an extensive theatre, and

before a numerous audience, failed in its effect, on a stage so confined. A vast inequality was likewise observable in the performance of the actors; their deficiency in number obliging tragic and comic performers to appear in the same piece. Some short Italian operas, which were played at the little theatre of the orangery, a few days after the arrival of Napoleon, did not suit his taste, and were discontinued. The size of the place, the selection of pieces from curtailed operas, and, in fine, the accompaniment, were very unfavourable to that species of performance.

Napoleon did not wish to have a large orchestra; he had sent for a small number of instrumental players, as if the performance of some *quartettos* had been in question. Nevertheless, Madame Sandrini, and other distinguished professors, received deserved applause. The French performers having arrived, they exclusively played, sometimes at the little theatre, sometimes at the other. When the performance was at the latter, the admission tickets were issued by the Count de Turenne, provisional master of the revels. The spectators at the little theatre were often

selected by Buonaparte himself, from a list which was ordered to be presented to him. Between the acts refreshments were distributed from the office of the imperial butler. In general, the administration of the Emperor's household was not confounded with that of the King of Saxony. Napoleon accepted the services of those gentlemen and chamberlains only of the Saxon court, who were absolutely necessary to the dignity of his own. These took the duty alternately.

The play then was the only amusement which took place during the stay of the Emperor. A partiality to long walks on foot, perhaps for the sake of his health, was formerly ascribed to him. His corpulency and the embarrassment of his affairs, might latterly prevent that diversion. He was only seen in that part of the garden contiguous to his apartments. Sometimes he took an airing in his carriage, but as every thing was systematic with him, and as he never went out without an object, his excursions were for the purpose of military or topographical observations, as must have been evident to those who accompanied him. In order to become more particularly acquainted with the environs of Dresden

he traversed all the ways diverging from it, all the high roads in every direction, with that celerity and indefatigable activity which are his characteristics. He began by the high road leading to Bohemia, visited the neighbourhood of the camp at Pirna so celebrated in history. This camp, placed in communication with the fort of Lilienstein, was about to serve as a bulwark against the armies of Bohemia, and as the centre of the movements of the troops which covered the eastern part of Saxony. With this intention, bridges of boats were established above and below the little town of Koenigstein, and new roads were constructed for the purpose of keeping open the communications between the banks of the Elbe, particularly those of the two roads to Silesia and Bohemia through Stolpen, Lilienstein, and Koenigstein.

The last-mentioned place was already so strong, through its natural position, and the works lately added to the fortifications, that nothing remained to be done, excepting to form an abattis of the trees of the little wood which was within cannon shot. When Napoleon approached this fortress for the first time, having arrived at the lower draw-bridge,

he was astonished at the sight of the stupendous rock which reared itself perpendicularly above his head. The garrison, who were on the battlements, looking down, might be taken from below for a troop of puppets. "Ha!" he exclaimed, surveying that immense height with a smile. He appeared apprehensive of the trouble of going up, and wished to retrace his steps\*. But when he heard that the fortress would afford him a very interesting prospect, and that he had but two hundred steps to take to acquire it, he took courage and reconnoitred with the greatest interest, according to the plan of the environs which he held in his hand, the country round about, and especially that unfortunate position where, at the beginning of the seven years' war, the Saxon army yielded through famine.

When Buonaparte had examined the most interesting points of the fortress, and the well, which is of the most curious description, it was

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\* In fact, he was not fond of climbing, and I cannot admit the truth of what the author of the pamphlet entitled, *Dresden and its Environs*, asserts, that Buonaparte ascended the church of Saint Sophia, to judge if the weather would clear. He repaired, as will be seen, early in the morning, when it was very fine, to the field of battle.



proposed to him to descend in a sedan chair. He declined, smiling, took leave of the commandant and officers in an affable manner, and immediately granted thirty days' additional pay to the whole garrison, under the title of a gratuity. I do not recollect ever to have seen him so cheerful.

The works and fortifications which Napoleon had caused to be constructed beneath Lilienstein, (on a precipitous rock opposite to Koenigstein,) as well as near the little fortress of Stolpen, placed on the top of a mountain, had the appearance of a mere demonstration, rather founded upon the impression which the report of such a camp would make, than upon the possibility of its really becoming a line of defence. Such measures could be regarded at most but as the means of preserving, as we have before observed, the communication between the two banks of the Elbe, in that part of Saxony which was exposed to the incursions of the enemy. Intrenchments at the foot of Lilienstein, between heaps of rocks, and in the midst of woods of fir, could contain but a few thousands of men, who, without depôts of provisions, would have soon been destitute of support, and constrained, for want of wells, to

fetch that principal necessary of life, water, as far as from the river, the bed of which in that place is situated in a deep hollow; the artillery itself could only repel the attack of an enemy, without being able to sweep the banks of the Elbe and its vicinity, by reason of the steepness of the declivities. Finally, it will easily be perceived that the camp at Lilienstein was but a farce intended to be played off in the pages of the *Moniteur*, and to change the intentions of the Allies, if it be considered that the troops in that fortress were necessitated to present a front in all directions, that they were deprived of the necessary communications placed on intersected ground, and that nothing could be more easy than to blockade and constrain them to capitulate. In fact, on intersected ground already occupied by infantry, it is impossible to advance without great precaution, as the dispositions of the enemy cannot be known; but the allied commanders were too able and clear-sighted not to perceive that, as all the environs of Lilienstein were insulated, they would be lost to the French as soon as Dresden, attacked on the other side, should be obliged to capitulate. In such a position a small body could not strike any

decisive blow, a numerous one would have been in want of provisions. I never estimated the troops which I saw there, at more than 2,000 men. The ground near the castle of Stolpen, which is able to contain some hundreds of men also presented difficulties. The antient well, cut in a basaltic rock, had long been filled up; the city itself can only receive the necessary supply of water by a long chain of pipes which may be easily cut off. Formerly, there was an aqueduct, which no longer exists. These, doubtless, were the inconveniences which determined the French to abandon this boasted fortress, before it had even been seriously threatened. The Prussians made an attempt upon Lilienstein, but, certainly, with the intention of destroying the bridge of boats in that place. Napoleon's dispositions of defence on the points bordering upon Bohemia were symptomatic of the embarrassment in which he found himself. If he had not obstinately taken it into his head to maintain, at all hazards, the line of the Elbe, immense works would have been spared, and a great number of men preserved, which was a matter of more consequence to him than to the powers of Germany. But, buoyed up with the

illusory hope of beating his enemies in detail, he regarded Saxony as the pivot of his operations, and the Elbe as his first line of defence. Nevertheless, with this line he did not accomplish his end; the true base of the operations was intersected at a right angle by the last-mentioned river, and took a direction diametrically contrary to the plans of Buonaparte. If the Elbe had run in the same direction as the Saale or the Weser, &c., a thought might have been entertained of establishing points of defence on it, even after the declaration of war with Austria; but what general, possessed of common sense, and who had not blindly abandoned himself to chance, would have undertaken, like Napoleon, to defend the Elbe, at the same time exposing his rear to the powerful Austrian dominions. At least, the Saale might have served as his principal line, until it had been practicable to attempt an incursion into Bohemia or Brandebourg. Napoleon, nevertheless, neglected no point of which he could take advantage for his defence, or the passage of his army. *Têtes de pont*, furnished simply with parapets and palisades, were erected along the Elbe. The former fort of Sonnenstein (the castle of Pirna,) which had lately been

prepared at a great expense as an hospital for lunatics, was put in a state of defence. The buildings, walls, and roofs which interfered with the plan, were thrown down. The patients were quickly sent off, and the goods and provisions seized. Nevertheless, an essential point was overlooked, for the fort of Sonnenstein is commanded, at a moderate distance from both sides of the Elbe, in such a manner that it might be destroyed by a bombardment, as no resistance to it would be possible from Koenigstein or any other point\*. The rest of Napoleon's excursions, directed with a degree of regularity, extended on the right bank of the Elbe, proceeding up that river into the mountainous country between the Elbe and the road to Bautzen, afterwards towards Stolpen and Hohenstein, Radeberg, Koenigsbruck,

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\* It appears that, from time to time, works, even of an useless nature, were erected on those points which Napoleon had marked out according to the map; these works were ill-conceived and executed, owing to the hurry occasioned by apprehension or blind obedience. I remember a bridge of boats, with its *tête de pont*, established above Pilsnitz, which could be commanded by the artillery on the neighbouring hills, an inconvenience, however, which might have been obviated. I also recollect a redoubt before the barrier of Dippoldiswald, which, after Napoleon had examined, he caused to be demolished and reconstructed, at some hundred paces distant, on a more eligible spot.

Meissen, and Tharand. They were commonly made in the afternoon, and without any one knowing their direction, except the grand equerry, who superintended the relays. Even the latter did not set off till some minutes before, or at the instant of the Emperor's departure, and stopped when he had gone half-way ; for no one was admitted to a knowledge of Napoleon's projects, the time of his departure, &c. When he was busy, his setting out was delayed from one hour to another.

He one day set off at half-past five, from his residence in the Garden, for Königsbruck ; he alighted from his carriage beyond that small town, three leagues from Dresden. He placed himself according to the map, inquired about some roads, ordered his carriage to turn round, and by ten o'clock had returned to his palace. To form an idea of his celerity, it is sufficient to say, that, in the space of four hours, he went to Meissen, and returned thence, after having spent some time in making his observations. The aim of his excursions was, as we have observed, to acquaint himself as intimately as possible with all the local positions. But he often inquired concerning other

points, which had some relation to his design ; for instance, he asked how many boats are annually built at Schandau, Pirna, &c. ? What they cost ? If the Elbe froze, and at what time ? Berthier always accompanied him. On one occasion only, Berthier, Soult, and Caulincourt were in the same coach with him. His eagerness to acquaint himself with the country, and obstinate determination to explore in every direction, especially when he was on horseback, could not fail of making him pass by the relays, or come to impracticable places, where the carriage could not readily turn round. He was then obliged to alight, and when his saddle horses were not at hand, he would take one belonging to an equerry. The rest managed as they could. Caulincourt was generally on horseback, with the adjutant on duty. The Emperor's long excursions were performed in his carriage. In one of these he went, in a single afternoon, about seventeen leagues, passing through Stolpen, Hohenstein, Lilienstein, and Koenigstein, taking care to examine every thing remarkable by the way, and that at a time when the roads were very bad. Buonaparte, on these occasions, was sometimes on foot, on horseback, or in his car-

riage. At another time, the relays being ready, were countermanded, because a marshal or ambassador, had had an audience, and occasioned him some fresh business. Even when long journeys were in question, Napoleon's rapidity was the same, and his determinations as unexpected. At the beginning of July, he went in haste from Dresden to Luckau, where he slept; the next day he reviewed Oudinot's corps, and came to Lubben, where another review took place; immediately after, setting off, and travelling the rest of the day, and a part of the night, he returned to Hoierswerda. On another occasion, he went through Torgau to Wittemberg, fourteen leagues from Dresden, examined at both places the fortifications and works newly begun, and passed the troops who were there in review. The following day he went through Dessau to Magdebourg, whence some days after he returned to Dresden, by the the Leipsic road.

In this manner Napoleon in person rendered himself familiar with the situation, with all the peculiarities of Saxony, and all the points of defence that country could afford him. He gave orders for all changes, as well as advancement of officers belong-



ing to each corps. Thus, having arrived at Wittenberg, where there were a great number of Polish officers, who, since the dissolution of the army at the end of the last campaign, had remained unemployed, he dispersed them among those French regiments in which there were vacancies. However, this new destination but ill accorded with their taste or their wishes.

I here remark, by the way, that Napoleon, during the whole time of his stay at Dresden, caused a priest to come every Sunday, to his palace in the garden, to say mass to him; apparently in order to pass for a good Christian in the eyes of observers, or of those whose good opinion was of some importance to him.

He had traversed the greater part of the neighbourhood of Dresden, and the persons of his suite were still ignorant of his intentions. The uncertainty of his situation, with respect to Austria, made him determine on measures of defence in the environs of Kœnigstein, and to fortify Dresden, as well as the passages over the Elbe. The days on which Napoleon went out on horseback only he examined the interior and exterior fortifications of the capital. It will be re-

membered, that its old fortifications were, for the greater part, demolished after the peace of Vienna, in 1809, consequently, that it was impossible to convert it, in a short time, into a regular fortress; the most defective parts were, therefore, hastily repaired; the ditches, which had been partly filled up, were replenished with water; and the town, suburbs, and ravelins adjacent to the latter, were surrounded by palisades.

Dresden is not calculated for a fortress; the city lies too low on either bank of the Elbe; besides, the wood on the right bank, and other local circumstances, injure its defence; it was, notwithstanding, capable of being put in a state to hold out for some time against a body unprovided with a battering train, especially, by means of the out-works, which supported each other. On each of the principal roads, which lead to the city, or on elevated points, redoubts were constructed, to which names had been given, agreeably to the French custom; for instance, on the side of Neustadt, were the redoubts of Berlin; of Königsbruck; of the outlets of Priestnitz; of Bautzen, or Marcolini, so called by reason of the

neighbouring cow-yard and plantations belonging to the count of that title; the great fortification, close to the black gate, was called the Imperial Redoubt. As there were in this quarter eight fortifications, defended partly by abattis and palisades, so likewise there were some at the principal outlets of the old town. Napoleon himself, either on horseback or on foot, had marked the site for them all, as well as every particular of their defence; he also shewed himself every where, even in places most difficult of access. These dispositions justly alarmed the poor inhabitants of Dresden. It was, nevertheless, hoped that the negotiations with Austria would succeed in dissipating the storm. It was asserted at the French head-quarters, that assiduous endeavours were making for peace.

Since the end of June a courier had been despatched to London; Prince Metternich, on the 26th and 30th of June, had had audiences with Buonaparte, which lasted several hours. Well-informed persons, about him, asserted, that Austria, even after a war, terminating most favourably for her, could not have reaped such advantages as were then proffered. But the Allies were too

sensible of the weight in their favour, which the adherence of Austria threw into the scale, not to set up great pretensions. It was thought, from an expression which fell from Berthier, that if Austria should reinforce the opposing power by an army of 200,000 men, France could bring as large an addition to her forces into the field. The most enlightened men were prepossessed on this head with an idea of the inexhaustible resources of France; they reckoned with certainty, that at the expiration of the armistice, the theatre of war, on the right bank of the Rhine, would present, on the part of the French, 500,000 fighting men, and 1,300 pieces of cannon: the chastisement they received in the sequel, alone could subdue such pride and presumption.

When it was believed the negotiations would take a serious turn, Napoleon appointed Caulincourt, the grand equerry, his plenipotentiary at the Congress of Prague. The departure of the latter was delayed from time to time; at last, towards the end of July, it took place. Napoleon, who exerted every means to maintain peace with Austria, resolved to have an interview, at Mayence, with his consort; not from personal affection, but

political motives. The time of his departure remained enveloped in the most profound mystery, no preparation indicated the day; it was not until the night of the 24th, or 25th of July, that two relays set off, and some couriers, to order horses on the Leipsic road. Napoleon arrived on the 25th, at five o'clock in the morning, at the ferry boat, near Meissen. The bridge having been destroyed, this conveyance was necessarily used for passing the river. He was obliged to wait about half an hour for the return of the boat.

Until that moment no one was aware of his intention, and none of those left behind knew whither he was gone. He had but one carriage, was accompanied only by two adjutants, an equerry, a secretary, some orderly officers and pages. Berthier was seated by his side, Rustan on the box. While he crossed the Elbe in the ferry-boat, the mattresses were replaced, upon which Napoleon had slept, his head wrapped up as usual in his handkerchief, and he continued travelling without stopping. He was eight days absent; this gave as many of relaxation to those who had remained at Dresden. He returned by way of

Bamberg and Plauen. On his road he had reviewed some detachments.

Much was said about the prolongation of the armistice; in the mean time the result of Caulincourt and the Count of Narbonne's negotiations at Prague was unknown; the steps taken to re-establish peace, (to which Napoleon doubtless attached a great value, at so critical a juncture, appeared uncertain.) The pretended sacrifices he seemed disposed to make were very different to those which the Allies were authorized to require of him. Indeed, no positive overtures were made, and the time that Caulincourt remained at Prague was spent in vain formalities. Buonaparte, perhaps, foresaw that the 15th of August, a day till then destined for the celebration of his festival, would call him away to more important occupations. He anticipated the celebration of his birth-day \*, by fixing it for the 10th. All the

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\* The day, generally known as Napoleon's birth-day, is the 15th of August, 1769; but, according to M. Salgue's account, quoted in the "*Mélanges de 1814*," that day was only so designated, in order to give Napoleon a right to call himself a Frenchman. M. Salgue's account says, he was born on the 5th of February, 1768. It can hardly be credited, that a man like Napoleon, who believed himself chosen by fate, could take the pains to flatter such prejudices.

troops who were quartered in the environs of Dresden and on the Elbe, almost the whole of the imperial guard, were assembled, and appeared in fine order, on the grand enclosure of Ostra, to be reviewed. The whole of the foreign and native military were collected on that spot; and all the citizens, who sought, on this occasion, if not pleasure, at least a diversion from their cares, with the exception of those persons kept away by feelings arising from the vexatious obligation of providing quarters for the soldiers,

If the French troops did not appear with the same *eclat* which distinguished them in 1812, at the time of their departure for Russia, it must at least be allowed, that the imperial guard, with its different detachments of cavalry, Polish lancers, Tartars, Mamelukes, chasseurs, dragoons, and grenadiers, exhibited a magnificent spectacle. Nearly 14,000 infantry were seen composed of grenadiers, chasseurs, voltigeurs, flankers, &c., forming two very extended lines. Napoleon rode at a gallop, followed by the King of Saxony, all the princes of the royal family, and an immense retinue. After having passed along the ranks, he made all his troops file off before him,

divided into very strong columns. At noon, the guard had a dinner in the new town, at tables purposely prepared. The remainder of the day was passed in this tumultuous manner. But Napoleon himself was employed at his palace, and did not re-appear till night. He dined with the royal family at a state table. After dinner he was present at the fire-works, which were given in the French style, and produced but little effect. This spectacle appeared to be made for the amusement of the soldiers and the public, rather than to celebrate the festival of a great monarch's nativity. During the whole day Napoleon was extremely grave and thoughtful, every thing appeared rather to tire than to please him. The suspension of arms was approaching by degrees to its termination. It was not till the latter days of the armistice, that some whispers were heard at head-quarters of its abandonment by the Allies. No boasting predictions were heard, no means for elevating the mind of the soldier, as had been the former practice, were taken. Almost every one apprehended that Austria had acceded to the coalition; but, at last, a hope seemed to be entertained that it would be other-



wise. This was not the effect of fear; the French soldier, accustomed to war, looked at the future with an eye of indifference, and could not renounce that military mode of life, so consonant with his turbulent and restless character. It was rather the result of the *ennui* experienced after many painful campaigns, which were continually becoming less productive of victories and personal enjoyments. It was felt that this dangerous game must one day have an end. It was feared that the great Colossus of national glory might totter, if Austria entered the lists with her imposing masses. Some reposed an unshaken confidence in the genius of Napoleon; they flattered themselves to see him triumph, as he had several times already done, over all difficulties, and profit by the faults of his enemies. But the unimpassioned observer could not fail of remarking, that Buonaparte was tactically beaten, (although he advanced, according to his usual manner, with the centre), since he had exposed his two wings to the most formidable attacks of his adversaries. If Austria had not joined the Allies, the right wing of the French would, at least, have been covered, or might have had a *point d'appui*, and

the whole operation would have changed its front; although, in order to take the offensive part and advance, powerful obstacles must have been encountered in the combined forces of the Russians and Prussians, and in the spirit by which they were animated; it was, besides, impossible to secure the means of subsistence. On all sides, every possible preparation was exhausted. France had drained all her resources; Napoleon had even renounced his conquests in Spain, to procure, with the troops he withdrew from that country, a more solid basis for the grand army, while Soult was, with the young soldiers, destined to guard the frontiers of France. The Allies had, on their side, made the greatest exertion to attain their end. Warriors called from almost every country in Europe, thousands of fiery spirits, the most celebrated captains of the conciliated nations, dispositions combined with the greatest prudence, and mature consideration, for the direction and security of an immense mass; all was ready.

Napoleon, it appears, had, to the last moment conceived a hope of gaining over Austria, or at least of succeeding so far, that she should not act offensively against him. Although he had

prepared every thing that could tend to his defence, in case of a rupture, he nevertheless awaited with impatience decisive information from his ministers at Prague.

On the 15th of August, the pretended anniversary of his birth, his departure was decreed; some days before, a number of saddle horses and relays had taken the road to Silesia, the horses had been put to his carriage at two o'clock in the afternoon, and all was ready for departure; the hours passed on, and the cause of his delay could not be divined. Napoleon was walking with hasty strides in the Marcolini garden, accompanied by the King of Naples, who had arrived eight or ten days before. It was announced to him, that General Narbonne had just come from Prague, and that he would immediately wait on his Majesty. "Let him approach," said Buonaparte in his usual cool and dry manner; a few minutes after, Narbonne presented himself. The King of Naples withdrew. The duke of B—— was summoned; and then, Napoleon entered into a conversation with these two persons, which lasted nearly an hour.

What interests were compared and weighed

in these important moments! If Napoleon had said at this time, as any man in a similar situation would have done, who loved his fellow-creatures. "I will make my birth-day, a day of perpetual celebration; I will give peace to the world, and display at the same time an example of magnanimity. I will retire beyond the Rhine, and take an inoffensive part," — What a sequel of events had been attached to such a determination!

The Duke of B — received his orders by word of mouth, and withdrew with his portfolio; Napoleon still remained speaking for some moments with the amiable N —, whose physiognomy bespoke mildness and benevolence. Then the King of Naples returned. With him Napoleon entered his carriage, and set out to commence another scene of carnage.

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### CHAPTER III.

*Napoleon's march into Silesia, his rapid return to the relief of Dresden.—Battle of Dresden; death of Moreau.—Napoleon's fruitless attempt to enter Bohemia; his retreat upon Leipsic.*

WHILE I relate the events of the period which comprises the most important part of the campaign in Saxony, and the primary causes of the result induced by the grand struggle of nations at the beginning of the nineteenth century, I regret to have mislaid the papers which would have enabled me to write more in detail. In the mean time the reader will find the principal facts recorded with as scrupulous a fidelity, as the preceding events have been; mature consideration and authentic documents having almost wholly repaired the loss. I make no mention of any thing which I have not personally seen or examined.

Enlightened by the reports of General Narbonne with respect to his situation with Austria, Napoleon, leaving Dresden, turned his first attention to the camp at Lilienstein. It has been

pretended\* that he took the road to Bohemia in order to deceive the spies, whom he supposed were in Dresden; but that is not probable, for his journey agreed exceedingly well with the arrival of General Narbonne, who had returned from Prague in the greatest haste. The fear of spies could not have disturbed him in the execution of his plans; he might have set out silently in the night. Indeed the particularity with which Napoleon visited the fortifications about Lilienstein at nine o'clock the same night, lighted only by the fires of the bivouac, proves clearly enough that the circuit which was made by passing over the bridge of boats at Koenigstein, related to some great military object, rather than to the position of Lilienstein itself, which could form but a secondary one. The French had constructed a new road upon the height called Ziegenruck, or, speaking more correctly, they had repaired the old. Napoleon took this road to go from Stolpen to Bischofswerda. Chance ordained that the alterations made in the road, and the heaps of rubbish, should cause the equerry belonging to the escort to mistake his way; the half hour lost

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\* See *Dresden and its Walls* in 1813.

by this deviation, provoked the Emperor, and his ill humour increased so much, that he became furious, and vented his passion in abuse and menaces. At two o'clock in the morning he arrived at Bautzen, where the dinner prepared for the preceding day, was still on table ; he stopped in that town till the seventeenth at night, when he set out for Reichenbach. Here his active concern for the plan of operations began ; he laboured incessantly, couriers and officers were despatched to all points. The rupture with Austria became certain ; Caulincourt had not yet returned, but General Narbonne, and the couriers who had set out after him, probably had brought some accounts respecting the certainty of the declaration of war which appeared on the 10th of August. The grand equerry did not join Buonaparte till the following day : he met him at Gœrlitz, when the corps of Prince Poniatowski was on the point of penetrating into Bohemia by way of Zittau.

During the march from Reichenbach to Gœrlitz, Napoleon stopped when he came to Markersdorf, and pointed out to the King of Naples the spot where Duroc had fallen. He sent for the owner

of the neighbouring farm-house, where the Grand Marshal breathed his last, and assigned to him the sum of 20,000 francs\*, of which 4,000 were to be appropriated for a monument in honour of the deceased, and 16,000 for the master of the house and his wife. The donation was fulfilled the same night, in presence of the curate and magistrate of Markersdorf; the money was paid down before them, and they themselves were charged with seeing the monument erected.

This secondary matter was expedited with all possible haste and punctuality, by one of the adjutants and some individuals of the Emperor's household, in the midst of the embarrassment and movements at head-quarters.

Although the war which was about to break out with Austria was hardly mentioned at head-quarters, it was, notwithstanding, known that the Russian and Prussian allied army had quitted Silesia, taking the direction of Bohemia, and that it was already in the neighbourhood of Munchengröetz. This movement sufficiently indicated their intention of penetrating into Saxony, by the defiles of Upper Lusatia, or other points. Napoleon,

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\* About £830 sterling.



probably wishing to procure himself certain information on that head, directed his march upon Bohemia, on the side of Rombourg, Gabel, and Kratzau. He came in person, on the morning of the 19th August, from Gœrlitz to Zittau, took a general view of the country, and passed in review a part of the 8th corps, commanded by Prince Poniatowski. This prince, an excellent cavalry officer, presented to him the newly-organized Polish Cossacks, and expressed himself in his presence with that simplicity and frankness, which so advantageously distinguished him from many other generals. To an intrepid courage and extreme benignity, he added a great complacency, even towards his inferiors, which never forsook him. The noble carriage and military talents of this prince, appeared to have made a deep and favourable impression on Napoleon himself, for he assumed a sort of open manner towards him, and addressed him in a very different style, than he had been ever heard to use towards his other generals. "How do you support your right?" said he, eyeing the Prince attentively, who, in explaining the nature of his position, had shewn that it was well chosen.

It was rather late when Napoleon, who was not

at all expected on that day, followed, I may almost say involuntarily, the division of troops which had entered Bohemia by way of Gabel. The French met with little resistance, and it became very easy for them to advance beyond Gabel, to obtain such information, concerning the allied armies, as the common inhabitants and ignorant peasants could afford.

Napoleon did not return to Zittau till midnight, after having made this little excursion, which had every appearance of an examination of the defile, or of a mere feint. At the same time, the two corps, which were marching on the flanks, advanced no farther than Romburg and Kratzau, and dared not expose themselves farther. In this place, as well as on almost all the other points of her semicircular frontier, northern Bohemia has fortunately boundaries formed by nature, which an enemy, without a decided superiority, could not attempt, with impunity, to force, in order to penetrate into the interior of the country. Notwithstanding, according to the statement of the French journals, the light troops had carried their incursions to the neighbourhood of Prague; at least they were made in that direction.

Napoleon, as it has been remarked, appeared to consider the attack of his enemy, not according to any particular plan, or agreeably to tactical principles, but rather according to a self-confidence in his own ability, to overcome him by taking advantage of his errors. He was uncertain where to expect the principal attack. He appeared to wait at Zittau and Goerlitz, to ascertain on which side he had most to apprehend. Formerly accustomed to take the offensive part, and to deceive his enemies by manœuvres which astonished them, he now changed his character, and was obliged to wait in order to discover where he himself was to receive the most serious blow, ready at the same time to parry it, and on whatever point it might fall to assure himself of the victory. Still he was obliged to concentrate his chosen troops. He could not, therefore, reckon on pursuing a well-grounded and invariable plan of operation, because on the position in which he would be placed by the offensive attitude of his enemies, depended all the measures he would have to take in the sequel. On the morning of the 20th, the movements suddenly began; Napoleon hastened to quit Zittau; a portion of the guard, which was marching on that

side, was obliged to turn towards Ostritz, and direct itself towards Görlitz and Lauban. A part of the suite was despatched thither in a direct line, by way of Schönberg, and it was clearly perceived that this sudden change was the consequence of the loss in the violent attacks by which the French, posted near Löhn, had been repulsed the preceding day upon the Bober. Napoleon, supposing that the principal strength of the enemy was there united, conceived his presence to be very necessary upon that point. All the troops who were in Görlitz and the neighbourhood, particularly his guards, marched hastily to Lauban. Between Zittau and Görlitz he learned from the public journals that his enemy, General Moreau, had arrived at Berlin. Napoleon had already, at Dresden, heard the appearance of this experienced rival on the theatre of war mentioned; he appeared, however, little surprised at the news, when the grand equerry informed him on the road of the article contained in the Gazette concerning Moreau. Another disagreeable circumstance obliged Napoleon to stop, in order to despatch several officers from the very spot where he happened then to be. The key for the ciphers of a despatch, sent to

one of his marshals, I believe the Duke of Treviso, had been lost; the officer who was the bearer of it was taken prisoner. It became necessary directly to remedy this matter by immediate orders. The *bureau de la guerre* was established in the open air in a small copse; it consisted of Napoleon, Berthier, and Caulincourt. Napoleon dictated, walking backwards and forwards; Caulincourt was seated on the ground, and wrote. Indeed, when Napoleon arrived at Gœrlitz, he had scarcely any officers about him to whom he could confide any mission. At Gœrlitz, as well as Lauban, an indefatigable activity appeared to be employed during the whole of the day. The corps of Lauriston and Marmont, the 5th and 11th, which were encamped near Lauban, received orders to advance; and Napoleon expected an important engagement the next day, in which he reckoned completely to defeat the army of Silesia. He remained that night at Lauban, and was extremely uneasy on being informed that he had to deal with three generals full of energy and experience: Blucher, Kleist, and Langeron; who possibly might prevent his junction with his marshals.

On the 21st of August before day-break, he hastily repaired to his troops, who were rushing like a torrent along the road to Lœwenberg. At some leagues distant from the town he distributed the eagles to two regiments; the mode of animating them on the eve of a battle; then, having united the 5th, 6th, and 11th corps, as well as his guards, he advanced against the generals I have just named, near Lœwenberg. The cavalry of Latour-Maubourg did not arrive until the end of the action. His plan was to fight a general battle; a pleasure, of which the bare idea transported him. The Allies waited for him, advantageously posted behind the Bober, which runs near Lœwenberg. Napoleon at the head of the centre column, was able to penetrate into that small town without much difficulty; he advanced with few attendants to the farthest houses of the suburb, where the bridge over the Bober had been destroyed; he observed the situation, and soon caused the sappers and soldiers to bring materials to construct new bridges.

Scarcely had the enemy time to perceive this movement, when the principal sentinels were

struck down by the bolts of his artillery. Napoleon ascended the heights on this side of the river, and advanced his great masses in good order; but hardly had they appeared, when the general of the Allies refused to accept a decisive battle in that position. It may now be considered as certain, that the retreat had been prudently determined on beforehand, in the expectation that Napoleon would fall upon that particular army in person.

The defence of the heights on the other side of the river was continued, as long as the artillery advantageously posted could annoy the French. Then the retreat which occasioned the loss only of some hundreds of men, began with the greatest order and coolness, nor could the French boast of having made many prisoners, or of having taken any pieces of cannon. The cool and tranquil spectator might already see through the plan of the Allies without any information concerning it; for every step which Napoleon took to advance became very hazardous, when such a man as Field-Marshal Blucher was avoiding every uncertain chance to draw his enemy into a situation where he might be en-

dangered ; and while the latter, by extending his line, was at the same time exposing his flanks to the great armies which were debouching from Bohemia and Brandebourg. Doubtless, if the great struggle of nations had not been terminated by memorable and decisive battles, reckoning from that moment, Napoleon, harassed and fatigued on all sides, could not long have maintained himself in exhausted Saxony, the very situation of which was besides unfavourable to him. Deprived at length of all communication with France, he could not have resisted so many obstacles, and must have beheld himself constrained to retreat to the Rhine. In the mean time the decisive defeats of the French which induced the desired result were more glorious for the Allies, and put a limit to the sufferings of the exhausted districts. Napoleon appeared to have no suspicion of a plan of operation conceived with so much sagacity and executed with such perseverance. He felt his vanity too much flattered when he was able (if the expression may be allowed) to drive the enemy before him. He also experienced the most lively satisfaction at having that day, in person, repulsed the Allies and opened the cam-



paign with a piece of success, without sustaining much loss.

He had great difficulty in concealing his joy when he learned by the reports of the following day, that the rear-guard of the Prussians and Russians were pursued to Katzbach, near Goldberg, after the battle which took place between Lauter-Seiffen and Pilgramsdorf. He himself went half way to Goldberg, made his observations upon the environs, and the enemies' soldiers who remained on the field of battle, and spoke with the peasants who had had sufficient courage not to quit their homes, conversing affably on indifferent subjects\*.

His mind being rendered easy with respect

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\* I remember a strange question which could only arise from his indifference for all religions, or from the little knowledge he possessed of the fundamental principles of divers sects. In a village of Silesia, Napoleon seeing a cross, a common thing in catholic countries, asked several questions about the church and district; among other things he said, "Of what faith are they; Are they good Christians or Lutherans?" As if good Lutherans were Pagans. Perhaps indeed he made some error in expressing himself; for in his speech to the protestant clergy of the Low Countries he displayed very liberal sentiments.

This note, without the supposition subjoined, would be most puerile: it cannot be supposed that a man like Napoleon could be so ignorant as to confound the followers of Luther with Pagans.

Ed.

to the success of his arms, which had made him gain ground on that side, he returned to Lœwenberg where he passed the night.

In the mean time the news brought from Dresden gave him uneasiness. The grand army of the Allies, commanded by the Prince of Schwartzenberg, was advancing towards Saxony; and Napoleon perceived that he could not quit Dresden, which was the pivot on which all his forces turned, and the capital of his ally, to whom he had promised the most energetic protection.

On the 23rd of August he resigned to Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum, the command of the army remaining in Silesia, (which comprised the 4th, 5th, and 11th corps, as well as the cavalry of General Sebastiani;) and returned from Lœwenberg to Görlitz.

This march from Silesia to Dresden, which he gave the troops, more especially his guards, was undoubtedly one of the most fatiguing of the whole campaign. The artillery, infantry, and cavalry, set out on the 23rd from Lœwenberg, and the greater part had arrived on the 26th in the afternoon on the field of battle near Dresden.

These troops had marched nearly 20 German leagues in thrice four-and-twenty hours, without regular subsistence, and after the fatigues of preceding marches and battles.

At Gœrlitz, Napoleon wished to procure some refreshment, at least for his guards, and made a requisition for twenty thousand bottles of wine, the price of which was to be paid, but there could hardly be found enough to satisfy a tenth part of his demand; the guard was obliged to be contented with what they could get.

The King of Naples was sent the same evening to Dresden to make the necessary dispositions beforehand, for repulsing the grand army of the Allies. Prince Berthier displayed much gaiety, and said, with an air of the greatest confidence, "Well! we shall gain a famous battle; we shall advance on Prague ——— on Vienna!" If that were actually the plan of Buonaparte, it was changed after the battle of Dresden, as may be judged from the conversation held on other occasions, and to which we are about to advert.

Napoleon continued his march towards Dresden, in the midst of his troops; he proceeded on the 24th from Gœrlitz to Bautzen; he arrived on the

25th, at one in the morning, at Stolpen, where he passed the whole of the day, and shewed himself very little.

Hardly had the morning of the 26th begun to dawn, the day of the real attack on Dresden, when the report of cannon was heard in the villages nearest to the city on the Pirna road. The army of the Allies had already advanced upon this point, its right wing, under the orders of General Count Wittgenstein, had dislodged Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr from Gieshubel. Napoleon had been very uneasy the day before; and all along the Bautzen road he inquired concerning the cannonade that was heard more and more distinctly towards the frontiers of Bohemia. He set off early in the morning, for it appears that the news he had received gave him much disturbance relative to the situation of Dresden. He proceeded as far as the place called Mordgrund, where the two roads from Dresden to Bautzen and Pilsnitz divide. This was a favourable point for observing the plain situated in front on the left bank of the Elbe; Napoleon quickly alighted from his horse, threw a glance at the plain where the enemy's artillery extended from

Blasewitz to Striessen; afterwards he advanced, crouching on his belly along the high road, while the balls flew on one side, and the Marcolini redoubt, raised on the high road to Bautzen, threw shells on the other. The Prussian light infantry was already in the great garden. At this moment Napoleon suddenly appeared before the royal palace, followed by his army, which advanced with the rapidity of a torrent.. His arrival excited the greatest astonishment at the court and in the city; he was thought to be with his principal forces in Silesia. They were on the point of submitting to the mandates of the allied powers, and of seeing the fate of the city decided, perhaps within her walls, if the French garrison had made any resistance. On the contrary, at this critical moment an immense army was seen filing over the bridges of the Elbe, and appeared coming to preserve the overpowered city; but it could only render her fate for some time longer doubtful!

Napoleon sent notice of his arrival to the King; and afterwards paid him a short visit. After having directed the troops on their arrival to the square before the bridge, towards Frederichstadt,

as well as towards the suburb of Pirna, he made a *reconnaissance* at the outskirts of the suburbs from the barrier of Pilnitz to that of Freyberg, occasionally on foot or on horseback, accompanied by the grand equerry and a single page; the rest of the suite remained within the barrier, in order that he might make his observations undisturbed and unnoticed. On this occasion, the page who followed him was struck by a spent ball, from one of the enemy's tirailleurs, for the light troops (as I think of Wittgenstein's corps,) had already advanced from the side of Pirna, into the environs of the suburbs, and occupied the bushes in the great garden; the other corps of the Allies coming from Dippoldiswalde, were not yet so far advanced, and their number could not be reckoned, on account of the inclined plane which the ground formed in their rear. After this important *reconnaissance*, on which the plan of that and the following day depended, Napoleon returned to the palace. The expectation of the event disturbed all hearts; in the mean time, the French troops kept defiling towards the suburbs, and took up their ground in close columns at each outlet.

At the end of about three hours a smart cannon-

ade began on the heights which surround Dresden in the form of a semicircle, from Recknitz and Zschernitz, towards Dippoldiswalde. General Wittgenstein's force was too weak to enable him to take possession alone of such an important point. He conceived he ought to await the arrival of the grand army, which was commanded by the Prince of Schwartzberg, and in which were the Allied Sovereigns and Moreau, in order to take Dresden by assault. If the city had been seriously attacked a day, or but half a day, sooner, it must have fallen, and the war would have taken another turn. Yet Providence often allows of difficulties and faults, in order to mature the grand catastrophe which the welfare of nations requires. The bad ways and other untoward accidents, prevented the numerous allied armies from approaching the environs of Dresden, before Napoleon had arrived there with the chosen troops of his army.

Huge masses of fighting men deployed upon the heights, and an almost innumerable artillery perpetually continued to advance in awful thunder. From Plauen to Recknitz were seen, perhaps, a hundred pieces of ordnance, ranged in the first line, which kept up a continual fire on the city; a

number of shells fell in the streets and squares. Dresden was surrounded on all sides of the old town. The Russians, since noon, had even possessed themselves of Lœbdau and Kotta, and the buildings, called "the shoemaker's houses," near Priessnitz; and that very evening the grand operation was to have been consummated. About six o'clock, the Allies, by favour of the ground, advanced with determined courage, from the quarter of the great garden, and against the great redoubt thrown up before the garden of Moesinsky, while the bombardment of the city still continued. This redoubt was twice carried by the brave Austrian light infantry, but the French, issuing from the garden, as often retook it. In the meantime, almost the whole garrison of another redoubt, which was near the Falcon barrier, were sacrificed to the murderous fire of several batteries and tirailleurs, who were posted in the little country chateau \*. The balls fell like hail upon all the outlets of the suburbs and heights on the

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\* As nearly as I could learn, there were in this redoubt a garrison of 136 men, with Ulrich, a captain of Saxon engineers; of these about forty survived unhurt. In the redoubt, near the garden of Mocsinski, or Georges, the dead were heaped one upon the other.



road leading to Freyberg: the villages were assailed with the same vigour, and the suburbs from which the French were about to attack.

The scene was changed at night-fall, by the arrival of the immense masses which Buonaparte had drawn since five o'clock, from Frederickstadt and the barriers of Ramm, Pilnitz, and Pirna, to attack the flanks of the Allies. This formidable resistance, actuated by the genius and dispositions of Napoleon, was unexpected; and, as, on like occasions, disappointment acts upon the mind, augmenting the difficulty of the attempt, in proportion to its expected facility, so the resistance of Napoleon, which was conceived to be invincible, combined with a sentiment of pity for the poor city of Dresden (which would have been sacrificed to the fury of the soldiers, and consigned to a total destruction, unproductive of any decisive result,) determined the resolution of abandoning the struggle.

Napoleon had mounted his horse three hours and a half before, when the attack on Dresden had been announced to him, to repair to the place which he had just chosen, near the bridge before the royal palace, for all depended on distributing

the columns judiciously as they came up. Some of the troops defiled at the same time over the bridge of boats, but all the principal corps passed before him, with their artillery. By help of the observations he had made, and the happy talent he possessed of calculating, at a single glance, the strength of large armies, as well as the time and space necessary for their manœuvres, he had been prepared, since the morning, for the attack with which he was threatened. From the point where he was, and according to the few reports he had received, he directed the necessary means for repulsing the enemy. About six o'clock, the right wing had possessed itself of the villages of Kottau and Lœbdau. Napoleon, full of uneasiness, sent several times to inquire if the artillery of the reserve had arrived upon that point. At last he was informed of the progress his troops had just made, and exclaimed, in a tone of satisfaction, "The village is ours—they retreat;" and this nearly at the same time when the attack against the two redoubts we have mentioned was repulsed. Nevertheless, an obstinate cannonade was kept up. The French gained ground but by degrees, and the approach of night alone prevented still more

sanguinary scenes. The position of the heights afforded great advantage to the Allies. On the left wing, towards Pirna, the bivouac of the French was the following night established close to the city, but they had occupied the great garden. The right wing had advanced, little as it might be, towards the Freyberg road. The King of Naples had posted his cavalry in columns, well closed up, near Frederickstadt. The centre had taken a position before the barriers of the suburbs towards Dippoldiswalde.

Thick clouds veiled the horizon, torrents of rain fell during the night, and the following day. Napoleon traversed on horseback, by the light of the watch-fires, the points of attack on the left wing, from the Elbe to the barrier of Dohna, and arrived at the palace very late.

The horror inspired by the past, and anxiety concerning events momentarily expected, agitated the minds of the unfortunate inhabitants, and the most melancholy prospects presented themselves to their imaginations. The night elapsed in dreadful clamour, the streets were filled with powder waggon: a tutelary genius preserved the city from the fate of Eisenach.

On the 27th of August, at six in the morning, Napoleon mounted his horse, and proceeded to the Falcon barrier, near the redoubt, which had been attacked the day before with so much violence. From the newly-turned earth were protruded the legs and arms of the dead, who had been hastily interred. A large fire was lighted, and Napoleon remained by it, till after eleven o'clock, making his observations, and conversing with Berthier, as usual. The greater part of the guard was formed in column to the right and left in his rear. The cavalry soldiers were near their horses. He seemed waiting for the motions of the enemy. In the interval the cannonade began about seven o'clock, proceeding from the centre, and was feebly maintained, advancing by degrees. Nor could much progress be made, for the Allies were masters of the commanding eminences, from Plauen to Strehla. Nevertheless, the right wing advanced towards the Freyberg road; it had set out from Frederickstadt after eight o'clock, passing slowly through Kotta and Löbdau. The rain, which fell in torrents, prevented the Allies from perceiving this dangerous diversion, which cut off their com-

munication with the troops intended to cover the Freyberg road; among which Metzko's division of Austrians was taken. When Napoleon was convinced, by the brisk cannonade, that his right wing was successfully advancing, he repaired, in person, to the left wing, in order to direct the attack on that side; but first he thought fit to clear his way, by advancing on the Strehla side; crossing the grove of the great garden, which was occupied by a brigade of infantry, he proceeded towards a small eminence, just behind the village of Strehla\*. This height was completely within reach of the enemies' guns, planted near Zchernitz: the movement took place after noon. It appeared that the Allies had entertained the design of retaking that post, and advancing; for hardly had Napoleon quitted it, and withdrawn from the great garden reinforcements of artillery and infantry, when the enemy's balls reached the plain between Strehla and the meadow: two regiments of cavalry were sent thither. Napoleon could not rashly hazard his

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\* At the time when Napoleon stopped, for some minutes, near a barricade of waggons, a cannon ball fell close by him, and entered the ground without occasioning any remarkable damage.

fortune on the left wing ; the nature of the ground presented great advantages to the enemy's cavalry, which had formed in considerable numbers. Marshal Mortier was, therefore, still enabled to advance on the Pirna road, only by taking advantage of the cover afforded him by these villages, and at that moment he was at Seitnitz.

Whoever is acquainted with the art of war, knows how difficult it must have been to deploy so large a mass, the strength of which was not superior in proportion to the enemy, successively, in form of a fan, and to bear upon his flanks. Nevertheless, according to a superficial calculation, as accurate as the circumstances would allow, I do not believe that Napoleon's army was stronger than that of the Allies. He had about 200,000 men in this battle ; I was unacquainted with the strength of the enemy. But if, in the aggregate, it exceeded that of the French army, it must not be forgotten, first, that the whole plan of the Allies was destroyed by the arrival of Napoleon's grand army ; and that the boldness with which he executed his *sortie*, reduced them from the offensive to the defensive ; it then became necessary to form another plan, in order to act with

concentrated forces on a very extended and intersected ground. This plan was attended with a cloud of difficulties, even if reinforcements could have been sent in all directions, taken from the centre.

Secondly, when an attack is made after a fixed plan, and when the manœuvres relating to it are from different centres, stormy and rainy weather is an important advantage ; it is, however, very disadvantageous to the party attacked, by depriving him of the means of making correct observations. Columns or batteries may more easily cover the movements and the march of the assailants. The body attacked is surprised, which happened in this action.

In the third place, the Allies could not, at the moment, ascertain the extent of Napoleon's disposeable force, nor know if he had altogether given up Silesia, and if the whole of his army were on the march. If they repulsed him, themselves sustaining considerable loss, then Dresden would be left him as a *point d'appui*, as a source whence he might derive supplies and provisions, whilst the badness of the roads made the transportation of their supplies impossible;

thus the provisioning of so large an army became impracticable.

Lastly, I take no notice of the death of Moreau, the tardy arrival of Klenau, (it is asserted that this last circumstance turned the scale.) If a leader like Moreau, had so great an influence as has been believed, on the projected enterprises, one need not be surprised that his death, at the moment in question, induced a change in the original plan, which emanated from him.

Considering all these important circumstances, it will be seen that courage alone could not decide the fortune of the day, nor must we be surprised, if the clear-sighted Prince of Schwartzemberg advised the Allied Monarchs to retreat, as the undertaking against Dresden had failed.

The division of Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Metzko, which had formed the advanced guard of Klenau's corps, was attacked between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, near Rossthal, by the cavalry of the King of Naples, and particularly by the Saxon cuirassiers, and the French light cavalry, who succeeded in breaking and dispersing the enemy's squares; the French infantry also captured some battalions. The success of



this action is principally attributed to the Saxon cuirassiers of Zastrow. The Austrians were exhausted; their communications were cut off with the rest of the army, and the rain had rendered their muskets unserviceable.

This was one of the principal consequences of the battle, for the French army made 16 or 20,000 prisoners, almost all Austrians, took ten pieces of cannon, and some colours. A secondary result was, the retreat of the whole allied army, which re-entered Bohemia. Napoleon expected it, and was informed of both these advantages about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the cannonade of the centre had ceased, and the King of Naples had apprized him of the success of his corps. Napoleon, at this moment, exhibited as perfect a calm as if he had been playing a game at chess, near the fire of his bivouac; but he sent, without delay, an order to General Vandamme to advance from the environs of Kœnigstein, towards Bohemia. Nothing, indeed, can be conceived more easy than the manner in which Napoleon gained this battle, as its success depended but on the combination of the movements, the effect of the cannon, and of some untoward accidents. He

experienced no inconvenience but from the rain, which drenched him and all his people; and, except during his excursion towards Pirna, through Strehla, he did not quit the place, where he remained much at his ease, near the fire of the bivouac. He was taking his breakfast, with Berthier, and appeared to be doing every thing with a negligent air. When Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Metzko, who was wounded, was brought to him, he immediately ordered him to be seated, and that his wounds should be dressed. Looking on the operations of the day as finished, he called for his horse; the rain was dripping from the sleeves of his grey *capote*, and the flap of his hat was hanging down upon the nape of his neck. Thus marched the hero of the battle, who spread terror in his steps, accompanied by his staff, in the midst of the acclamations and plaudits of the troops, who pressed around him on all sides. Thus jogging along like a butcher, as was his custom, he entered the castle about six o'clock; there he found, to satisfy his wants, several things which his own troops and those of the enemy, who had both suffered so much, were obliged to dispense with. What must have been the state of the prisoners and wounded?

The loss of the French may be estimated at 8 or 10,000 men killed and wounded \*.

The next morning, Napoleon repaired early to the same spot on which he had past the greater part of the preceding day. The allied army continued its retreat by the road over the mountains, during the night, in the direction of Bohemia, through Dippoldiswalde and Altenberg. Nothing of it could be descried but the cavalry of the rear-guard, on the heights between Recknitz and Plauen. Napoleon followed it in the same direction, stopped during some time, and made very attentive observations from a small height near Recknitz; he directed one of his orderly officers, who was an engineer, to calculate, at a glance, the distance from that spot to

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\* I have designedly refrained from entering into the particulars concerning the disposition of the troops in this battle, of which very long, and nearly faithful, descriptions have been published. These pages being intended only as authentic materials, I have confined myself to those principal, or even collateral circumstances, which others had not an opportunity of knowing with the same precision as myself, without recurring to relations already allowed to be accurate. Necessity alone, and the corresponding relation of some circumstances, have obliged me, in some instances, to depart from my intention, which is to relate what I have seen with my own eyes, allowing myself occasionally some digressions, which are more properly the province of a complete historian.

the garden of Mocsinsky. It was about 3,000 feet. This was the spot which had most probably been pointed out to him as that where Moreau had been struck by a ball, fired from the redoubt near the garden. A peasant, who had brought to Dresden the dog whose collar was inscribed with the name of Moreau, received some pieces of gold.

From that spot, Buonaparte followed his advanced guard as far as the height towards Kaiditz; and when several prisoners were brought him, who complained of the privations they had endured during the latter days, he said to his generals, in an ironical manner, that after so many preparations made against him, the last thing thought of had been the establishment of magazines, and similar arrangements; that, in the mean time, the enemy's troops had found nothing for their support. He gave up to his cavalry the task of continuing the pursuit of the enemy, mounted his horse, returned back across the plain, which was covered with dead horses, breakfasted sparingly near the fire of the bivouac, and went towards Leubnitz. Having concentrated the cavalry of his guard, he threatened the rear-guard of the enemy, near Nickern, as well as near Prohlis and Nieder-Sedlitz;

but the Allies followed their main army with much coolness and precaution by different ways, along the route to Maxen. The Cossacks still covered the heights of Luga and Gross-Sedlitz, when Napoleon arrived between one and two o'clock, on the great road near Sporwitz and Mugeln. He went as far as the environs of the town of Pirna, seated himself on a camp-stool, which was brought him, and caused a relation to be given him, by some inhabitants of the city and its environs, concerning all he had himself learned, respecting the different occurrences. The Prince of Wirtemberg had engaged in the morning with General Vandamme, and made an able retreat, probably taking the direction of Tœplitz, by the lower road, over the mountain, Geyersberg.

Napoleon then thought all was over. Vandamme penetrated into Bohemia, on the side of Peterswalde; the King of Naples did the same by Freyberg and Frauenstein; other corps followed the Allies on the road to Dippoldiswalde; as the whole of the allied troops had retired towards the central bye roads, in the direction of Maxen, &c., while their *corps d'armée* covered all the main roads. Napoleon, quite composed, after

having stopped an hour, and received divers reports, said to Count Lobau, " Well, I see nothing more ; " order the old guard to return to Dresden ; the " young guard will remain here in bivouac."

He called for his carriage, got in, and returned to Dresden, very gaily, and with the greatest tranquillity, without dreaming that that very confidence would furnish his adversaries with the means of annihilating one of the principal French armies. If Napoleon had continued his march on that day, he doubtless would have arrived by the next at the principal defile, near Peterswalde and Nollendorf, and have found himself in the rear of Kleist's corps. But this general turned off by the lower road which crosses Geyersberg, debouching by Breitenau and Furstenwalde, descending by the high road of Peterswalde, and completely cut off Vandamme's corps from Saxony ; this body was almost entirely destroyed in the actions of the 29th and 30th of August, in the neighbourhood of Culm, by the valeur and combined efforts of all the allied armies, which had united in Bohemia. More than seventy pieces of cannon were lost ; and of an army, consisting of 30,000 men, hardly a third part, at the end of four or five days, suc-

ceeded in joining the troops on the frontier of Bohemia. The corps of Kleist cut off their retreat, so that they were obliged to escape as stragglers in the woods and mountains.

The sudden resolution taken by Napoleon to return to Dresden was attended with incalculable consequences, at least with regard to the events which immediately succeeded. The loss which the army had just experienced was kept, in the usual way, as secret as possible at the headquarters. But when the first news of the destruction of Vandamme's corps were received, those about Napoleon could not conceal their embarrassment, and the profound impression made at the same time by the accounts received from Silesia. The cabinet of Napoleon immediately laid the blame upon Vandamme, who, through an excessive desire to distinguish himself, had advanced imprudently into Bohemia. It was maintained that he should only have occupied the defiles, without hazarding himself too far. On this occasion it was understood that as soon as Vandamme should have covered Saxony on that side, and while the Duke of Tarentum was watching Silesia, it was the intention of Napoleon

to have assembled the chosen body of his troops, and to have advanced upon Berlin. This plan conceived for the destruction of the Prussian monarchy was not badly calculated; for by these means the very confined line of operations might have been extended, and Davoust, who was at Hamburg, might have advanced to join the other divisions of the French army. These projects were defeated by the overthrow of both generals. Field Marshal Blucher, reaped, on the 26th of August, the most glorious of his laurels at Wahlstadt near Katzbach, and so completely defeated Marshal Macdonald, that pressed by the enemy and bad weather, he was obliged to retreat towards Lusatia after having lost more than a hundred guns. On all sides prompt assistance became necessary. Instead of marching upon Berlin, Napoleon now confided to Ney, one of the most determined and valiant of his generals, the command of the army, which was advancing against the Crown Prince of Sweden. Ney hastily marched towards Wittenberg; but he was frustrated, as is well known, on the 6th of September near Dennewitz, by the valour of Bulow and the Crown Prince. Napoleon himself was



obliged to employ all his force to prevent the army of Silesia from advancing, but before he began that enterprise, he occupied himself from the 29th of August to the 2nd of September in the re-organization of a new *corps d'armée* by uniting the remainder of Vandamme, and St. Cyr's corps. This new corps was intended to penetrate again on the side of Peterswalde under the orders of Count Lobau, in order to secure the entrance into Bohemia. He several times passed in review the wrecks of the discomfited corps, and applied himself to giving them consistency. He furnished Lobau's with a new train of artillery, taken from the other corps, and even formed some new regiments of those Poles who were found among the Austrian prisoners. The works about Dresden were prosecuted with the greatest activity.

In the mean time Blucher's army continued to advance with confidence. The soldiers of Macdonald's, scattered in every direction, were creeping, dispirited, famished, disarmed, wounded and in rags, into the environs of Dresden, where they arrived by circuitous ways. It was time that Napoleon should enter upon some undertaking

which might put an end to the disorder. He quitted Dresden on the 3rd of September at night, but he went no farther than Hartha and Bischofswerda; the next morning he proceeded to Bautzen. A number of foot soldiers with pallid looks, belonging to divers disarmed corps and regiments, came to meet him. He concealed his vexation. The troops were immediately drawn up near the road: waggons laden with chests arrived: the soldiers thought they were filled with biscuit, but instead of giving refreshment to these famished men, fresh muskets were distributed among them. Farther on, Napoleon saw the wrecks of a grand convoy of ammunition which the Cossacks had blown up on the preceding day. He fell into a deep reverie, and quitted Bautzen in the space of half an hour. He repaired on horseback to the Lobau road, accompanied by Marshal Macdonald, advanced as far as Hochkirch near Steindœrfel, where he determined on his plan. On this spot and on one of the neighbouring heights, Sebastiani and a division of his cavalry met with such a disagreeable reception. I have already mentioned the circumstance. The two mountains called Strom-

berg and Vohlaerberg, situated beyond Hochkirch, known by the battle of that name in the seven years' war, were occupied by the Allies. A strong column of their troops made a feint on the Goerlitz road, to penetrate as far as Bautzen. The King of Naples advanced to meet them, and obliged them to retreat. The Prussians must have perceived that the force of the French had augmented; they could not, moreover, be ignorant that Napoleon in person had returned to the army. They contented themselves with abandoning the mountain of Vohlaerberg, at the approach of night; after a powerful resistance, and after their artillery, advantageously posted, had occasioned the French some loss, who penetrated with their columns on the Lobau road. The Prussians made their retreat on the two roads towards Goerlitz, principally in the direction of Lobau and Herrnhut. The mountains, covered with woods situated along the Bohemian frontier, enabled the light troops of the Allies to prevent the French from advancing but with the greatest precaution.

It was useless to have regained any ground, and from that day Napoleon seemed to entertain

a suspicion of a combined plan on the part of the Allies, seeing that they withdrew whenever he wished to come to a decisive action, and abandoned the most advantageous positions to him. On the following day he exhibited a great deal of ill humour. His suspicions increased, in proportion as his advance led to nothing but vexatious results. He had passed the night in the parish of Hochkirch, where some burning farms afforded light for the depredations of the soldiers, who were running to the fires of the bivouac, with the crosses taken from the church-yard. Buonaparte, overwhelmed with fatigue, came, on his way, to a deserted farm, sat down upon some straw, and abandoned himself to a most melancholy and profound reverie. No noise of cannon, no movement indicated an approaching battle, all was quiet around him. His numerous troops continued to advance without end or design; at most, they were only engaged with some regiments of Cossacks, which, scattered through the environs to cover the retreat of their army, had destroyed all the small bridges over the rivulets. Field-marshal Blücher had shunned him as at Lœwenberg. The illusion, which had made him

believe in the flight of the enemy, vanished by degrees, to give place to the reflection, that their conduct, with respect to him, was but a system adopted to harass him, inasmuch as it was in their power to lead him where they chose.

When Napoleon set off from Hochkirch, on the morning of the 5th of September, he first ascended the Vohlaerberg, and observed the position that the Russian and Prussian troops had occupied on the preceding day; he caused his troops to advance by way of Glossen towards Reichenbach, while another column marched for Lobau. That place was occupied by the enemy till the afternoon. Nothing serious occurred but a charge of cavalry, near Reichenbach, in which some prisoners were made. According to the account given by these, the army of Blucher, about 60,000 strong, was commanded by Generals Sacken, Yorck, and Langeron.

Although Napoleon's army were superior, rather than inferior, in strength, it was risking too much to advance to any farther distance from Dresden. Field-Marshal Blucher appeared to avoid him designedly, whilst the grand army, under the orders of Schwartzenberg, again threat-

ened the capital of Saxony. Moreover, every day gave birth to new difficulties in Upper Lusatia; that province was entirely exhausted, having been treated in a more hostile manner than even in the last retreat of the Allies, who had consumed almost every thing, and carried off or destroyed the rest. The cavalry above all found not the smallest resources in that quarter. Buonaparte had no better step to take, than to withdraw in all haste, after having advanced some troops as far as Gœrlitz. This retreat took place, as usual, without previous notice, and in the middle of the night.

In retiring to Dresden, Napôleon received, on the morning of the 7th, at Stolpen, some account of the fruitless attempt of Ney to advance upon Berlin; this was the fore-runner of the bad news, which informed him that the triumvirate of his marshals had been beaten. How many misfortunes in so short a space of time! all the sides of his tactical defence were battered in breach. In so critical a situation, the smallest *point d'appui* was of great importance. He again attentively observed the castle and environs of Stolpen, the defence of which, combining with

Lilienstein, and the roads which lead to Bohemia, then appeared to him of some consequence. Nevertheless, other circumstances prevented the French from maintaining themselves in that position, and he returned the same day to Dresden.

The allied army, which was in Bohemia, and had pushed Wittgenstein's corps on the road to Dresden, had lately, for some days, taken possession of the defiles of Giesshubel, and advanced by way of Zehist and Dohna.

From the steeples of Dresden the smoke of the artillery might be seen in that direction; nevertheless, the city was tolerably quiet, some were wavering with uncertainty, others had become in some degree insensible, since the alarm with which the late events had inspired them. On the 8th, at noon, Napoleon appeared on horseback, on the Pirna road, near the inn, called *de Luga*, and proceeded at a slow pace, as if he were going to make a *reconnaissance*. The enemy had occupied the heights of Gross Sedlitz, and the little town of Dohna. The engagement had already begun; Napoleon halted near the alley of poplars, at Gamig; he caused Dohna to be carried, sent forward some columns to attack the summits

of the neighbouring heights, and the brow of the hill, near Klein-Sedlitz. At the moment when the most elevated point had been carried by the French, the Russian artillery and cavalry beat a retreat; the village of Mugeln, and a part of the town of Dohna, were in flames, and the last houses in the latter were still warmly contested. The Russians were driven from Gross Sedlitz, but they drew up again near Zehist and Pirna, and on the bye road, which leads to Bohemia, near Borna, where that to Pirna comes out. The darkness of the night put an end to the action. Napoleon bivouacked his troops, and transported his head-quarters to Dohna.

The engagement, the alternate march of the troops, the fire which had broken out in the bosom of that little town, had made that day one of terror for the inhabitants. The troops, who withdrew, had also devastated the neighbourhood, the horrors of war exhausted the country more and more; the continual march of the army was the signal for utter ruin: for it might be seen, even at this place, that the army of the Allies avoided all decisive engagements, and the



gradual rise of the opposite mountain afforded it excellent opportunities for skilfully defending each step during the retreat, and for observing the motions of the enemy that pursued them.

The camp of the advanced guard of the enemy was, on the morning of the 9th of September, between Zehist and Cotta. This corps, of about 8 or 10,000 men, appeared to remain there, in order to draw Napoleon into Bohemia. The smaller corps, which withdrew by Bornä, to Gœppersdorf and Bergersdorf, had also the appearance of being placed there to tempt him to the undertaking. Buonaparte stopped for a long time on the height of Bornä, to observe their direction; and as the enemy would not engage, repaired, about five o'clock, to the castle of Lippstadt, to pass the night. This antient building, seated on a steep rock which commands a narrow valley, interspersed with little homely dwellings, received, in its small and fantastic chambers, the grand military household of Napoleon, as well as Berthier, and all the rest of the retinue. Buonaparte, indeed, there displayed great generosity; he distributed considerable sums to

some peasants of the environs; who, having lost every thing, had solicited the relief of his munificence.

Uncertainty relative to the steps which he ought to take, rendered him very uneasy. His conduct, the next day, bespoke an irresolution ill agreeing with his character. Buonaparte was unacquainted with the road which leads into Bohemia on that side. He would have done well if he had made some of his excursions on horseback, during the armistice, in that direction. He could not be convinced of the obstacles which oppose the entrance of an army into Bohemia; he could not bear to hear of difficult circumstances, of insurmountable impediments; and from the map, by which he often regulated his operations, he could not learn all the difficulties arising from local circumstances, or accidental occurrences, such as rain, &c.

To retrace his steps was not consistent with his character; and, doubtless, he flattered himself that at last he should be able to accomplish an incursion into Bohemia. All remonstrances would have been useless; perhaps, some had been unsuccessfully made. On the 10th, when every one

was in expectation concerning the measures he would adopt, and on which side he would turn, he took the road which leads to Breitenau, and to the Geyersberg; that is to say, the lower road to Toplitz. He had, indeed, a tolerably considerable corps, the strength of which I cannot enumerate. These troops pursued their march, traversing barren mountains and abandoned villages. *Reconnoissances* were made on the right towards Altenberg, and on the left towards Peterswalde. When Napoleon had arrived near Nattelberg, which he had remarked from Dresden as a very distinct frontier point, he exclaimed, in a tone of satisfaction—"There is our mountain." He immediately sent intelligence to the King of Saxony, that the enemy had been repulsed into Bohemia. In the mean time, he employed great circumspection in all his measures. His ordinary foresight was changed into astonishment, when, on his arrival at the first village on the frontier, called Ebersdorf, the immense valley of the Bohemian territory, so fatal for him, presented itself to his view. From the point on which he was, he had a clear view of the mountain, and the neighbourhood of the place

where his general had been defeated. In the opposite valley, between Culm and Tesplitz, appeared a powerful army, drawn up in two lines; and from the airy summit of Milles-chauer, the highest of these mountains, arose a column of smoke, the signal of the arrival of the Gauls. Between the French army and that of the Allies, was the steep declivity of Geyersberg, covered with wood, as were the surrounding mountains to the right and left. The boldest leader would have rushed on destruction in this gulf. On the road the Russians and Prussians had broken down many waggons and pieces of artillery; thus the way became still more dangerous, for a single broken wheel would have arrested the march of a whole army. Napoleon abandoned his plan with the greatest regret; he observed for a long time the position of the enemy, and the noble environs of Tesplitz. He ordered General Drouot to alight and advance, in order to examine the road: but he presently returned, with the vexatious report, that it was quite impracticable.

If Napoleon had really wished to enter into Bohemia, he should have proceeded by way of

Peterswalde, or Erzeberg, across Saxony, passing through Mariensberg and Sebastiansberg; but this direction was inconvenient, because longer and farther distant from Dresden. All the other intermediate ways had become impracticable, owing to the continual rain, which fell during the retreat of the Allies.

Napoleon returned from the point where he had made his observations, with symptoms of trouble and vexation on his brow. The greater part of his troops, and the whole of his guard, were obliged to face to the right about, and to encamp in a desert country, which had just been pillaged, where, consequently, no provisions could be obtained. Buonaparte experienced a thousand difficulties in all his dispositions: he at first, wished to stop at Ebersdorf, afterwards at Furstenwalde; at last he retired to Breitenau. In that poor, and nearly ruined, village, he with difficulty found a lodging; the curate's house was obliged to be cleaned before it could accommodate Napoleon and Berthier. The troops were in want of food; they were obliged to lie, during the cold nights of autumn, on the damp ground of the mountains. There was no forage for the

horses, the villages on the frontier were entirely destroyed, and all the houses, which were not built of stone, were pulled to pieces for fuel, to supply the fires of the bivouac; the whole neighbourhood displayed traces of the horrors of war.

Such was the fate of this wretched country, as well as of Peterswalde and all the surrounding neighbourhood along the frontier, which had been alternately laid waste by the French and Russians. The ground, which had been ten times turned over, was again dug up in search of a few potatoes; and those who were not lucky enough to find any, had no other consolation than the hope of better fortune. The ill humour created by this perfect reverse of paradise was increased at head-quarters through a more circumstantial report, brought by an adjutant of Marshal Ney, who had been an eye-witness of that general's defeat; but confidence was still placed in the genius of Napoleon.

He having experienced the impossibility of penetrating into Bohemia by way of Fürstenwalde, set out from Breitenau, and passing through Oelse, arrived, on the 11th in the morning on the main road towards Hollendorf, by a parallel and

somewhat difficult way. A numerous body of the enemy's cavalry waited for him between that village and Peterswalde. Overpowered by the superior number of the troops which advanced, it could not avoid a disadvantageous combat, and Colonel Blucher, the son of the marshal, having exposed himself with the boldest intrepidity to the attack of the French, was wounded and taken prisoner by the Polish lancers in the neighbourhood of Peterswalde.

Napoleon took advantage of this circumstance to boast of a triumph in the French bulletins, with a stress the more disgusting, inasmuch as the affected display of success, but ill accorded with the misfortunes which were continually succeeding each other.

Buonaparte addressed but few words to the colonel, for he was in great haste, and redoubled his efforts to gain the hill of Nollendorf; but he reached it very late, the forest in his way had required precautionary measures. The thunder of the cannon resounded in the valley towards Culm and Aussig; and the corps, under command of General Lobau, halted on the hill of Nollendorf to occupy that important pass. Buonaparte must

really have supposed the enemy who stopped him on the frontier much stronger than he really was, for while marching with such considerable masses the light troops alone opposed his progress. At night he lodged in the parsonage-house at Peterswalde; the inhabitants of the village had fled.

Satisfied with having once more taken possession of the Bohemian defiles, Napoleon employed the two following days in returning to Pirna, where he directed the construction of a palisadoed *tête de pont*, and a fresh distribution of the young guard in the neighbourhood. The circle of his operations had been greatly narrowed. He was obliged to wait in expectation of the place where he might be attacked, uncertain on what point his presence would be first required. The army which had been directed towards Berlin had been repulsed as far as the Elbe. Marshal Macdonald could no longer maintain himself between Bautzen and Görlitz; and the enemy had made serious menaces towards Saxony, into which he had penetrated, passing beyond Sebastiansberg.

Buonaparte himself was not less disturbed at



Dresden ; Count Lobau was attacked on the 14th, and driven back to the rear of Giesshübel. Napoleon went the next day to his assistance : he set off at seven in the morning, and came to Muggeln on the Pirna road where he received various reports. He reprimanded a general of the guard in the severest manner, giving as it were vent to the vexation which rankled in his bosom. The soldiers, wounded on the day before, poured in upon his way ; within a short time I saw about 4 or 500 who were hastening to Dresden. Buonaparte, passing through Pirna, repaired to Langen-Hennersdorf, there to direct the march of a column, which by cross ways was to come through Markersbach to Hollendorf, while Count Lobau advanced in the same direction through Giesshubel ; his superior force enabled him to attain his end, but the enemy also succeeded in his plan of harassing him, of taking advantage of the weakness of Lobau, and enervating the numerous reinforcements led by Napoleon in person, by drawing them into a ruined and exhausted country. Lobau was able to penetrate as far as the mountain of Nollendorf : the Allies had doubtless diminished their strength

on that side after they had executed their plan.

On the 16th of September, Buonaparte in person went through Peterswalde to Nollendorf; but the hazy weather and fog which enveloped the valley hindered him from perceiving what was passing in it. He therefore resolved to make a strong reconnoissance, or, if possible, a serious attack the next morning. He repaired early in the morning to the chapel of Nollendorf; after having considered the environs for some moments, although the weather was almost as unfavourable as it had been the day before, he caused some battalions to descend along the road, while others extended themselves in the woods by its side. The Russian light infantry still occupied all the wood bordering upon the high road, which inclined slopingly; a brisk fire of musketry ensued, sustained by the artillery posted on the hills covered with wood; the engagement began; the troops continually increased; the road was disputed for some time with the French; at last, several brigades, followed by the artillery and cavalry of the guard, reached the plain which extends itself towards Culin. Napoleon himself advanced to the first village, Doelnitz, situated on

the declivity of the hill. The atmosphere had become a little clearer; nevertheless the force of the Allies could not be sufficiently distinguished. The chapel of Culm was enveloped in mists, which one might have supposed to be raised by the guardian genius of Bohemia, who stood a frowning sentinel to guard the pass-key of his kingdom.

After a short pause, at the time when the French perceived the obstinacy of the resistance to diminish, and Buonaparte was expecting news from his advanced guard, a dreadful cannonade opened from several quarters, as if the enemy had been then first discovered: from the same heights, whence death and destruction had been hurled on Vandamme's corps, a shower of shot and shells was now poured on the rash men who had dared to appear a second time on the soil of Bohemia. Although the greater part of the French army was still out of cannon-shot, the random balls fired from the heights, covered with wood, and masked by the fog, had a very sufficient effect; the noise resounded wonderfully in the valley, and the echo, which repeated itself four times, prolonged the rolling thunder of the artillery. Napoleon was then informed that a strong column

of the enemy approached the village of Knienitz, which was in his rear.

The plan of the Allies was similar to their first ; they wished to cut off his retreat over Nollenberg. This was the manœuvre employed against Vandamme. Napoleon quickly re-ascended the height, while his troops endeavoured to contend in the valley ; a division, which had remained in reserve upon the mountain, was directed to occupy, with a sufficient force, the village of Knienitz, upon the left flank, through which the shortest road to Aussig passes. The French took possession of it, and arrived before Culm. Their loss would have been still more considerable, if the heavens had not taken a part in the engagement. A pouring rain, about five o'clock, put an end to it. The atmosphere was obscured ; the enemy could not be distinguished. The flashes of the guns, which fired at random, were still gleaming through the veil of darkness. The rain, although less violent, lasted to an advanced period of the night. Napoleon apprehended some diversion on his left flank, upon ground which was also unfavourable to him. His first intention was to pass the night in the chapel of Nollendorf. But as those

quarters were dismal and incommodious, and as all his household was still in the miserable village of Peterswalde, he resolved, though very late, to return thither. The night was passed in tolerable tranquillity; I imagine that the French, alarmed by the ill success of their enterprise, took advantage of the darkness to gain the summit of the mountain; for the next day they again occupied the little village of Döelnitz, situated at the foot of a mountain on the Bohemian side.

There can be no doubt but this affair cost many lives, the enemy not having shewn the superiority of his force till the French had already descended into the valley; but nothing certain could be learnt on that head. Napoleon regarded the business as a mere *reconnaissance*. In the evening, towards the end of the battle, he sent word to the King of Saxony that the grand army of the Allies was posted near Töplitz.

In the meantime, in order to gain more particular information, he advanced once more, on the 18th, towards the same point of the mountain of Nollendorf, and repaired on horseback to Knienitz. This village, and the neighbouring wood, were but weakly occupied, or rather were filled only

with French stragglers, who were plundering. When Napoleon came to the outlet of this wood, he encountered, at a short distance, a troop of the enemy's cavalry, coming from Schebritz and Zugmantel. He immediately turned his horse, for the attack soon became more serious.

The inconsiderate levity of the French had caused them to neglect to occupy that point at an earlier period, and there was hardly time to bring up the necessary pieces to keep the enemies' batteries in check. As long as Napoleon remained there, the French maintained possession of Knienitz, and the contest was confined to a somewhat feeble cannonade. The Allies again withdrew.

Napoleon repaired to one of the principal eminences, as much to make his dispositions, as to observe the force of the enemy. By means of the telescope he descried two armies; and the observation escaped from him, of which I have already spoken, that the enemy would take two days in making the necessary arrangements for a combined attack.

Buonaparte resigned the command to Count Lobau, and returned to Pirna, convinced that his exhausted army was not strong enough to main-

tain itself in such a dangerous country; at all events, it was too late to undertake an incursion into Bohemia. The hope of beating the enemy in detail vanished daily; where Napoleon had superior force the contest was avoided; and when head could be made against him, nature and art mutually combined for the ruin of the French. If Napoleon could even have succeeded in penetrating upon one point, it could only have been by exposing himself on others. Had he attained his end on this occasion, he would, nevertheless, have been constrained to retrace his steps. For, when he was at Pirna, he was informed that the Prince Royal of Sweden had proceeded to the left bank of the Elbe, in the neighbourhood of Dessau. This news appeared to cause some consternation. Buonaparte laboured incessantly; he issued all the orders for the useless fortification of Sonnenstein, whence the hospital of lunatics had been transported into the church of the town. He caused the banks of the Wesnitz, which falls into the Elbe below Pirna, to be minutely examined. A dismal silence reigned at the French headquarters. The greater part of the army was harassed by useless marches and countermarches;

a painful expectation continually prevailed. The blinds of Napoleon's cabinet remained drawn, as was the case during all emergent business. The Emperor felt reluctance to return to Dresden, but he had no alternative. He arrived there on the 21st.

One more excursion (and it was the last,) took place on the following day, probably to repulse Field-Marshal Blucher, who had penetrated beyond Bautzen. Buonaparte got into his carriage about noon, went as far as Fischbach, passed some battalions of the 2d *corps d'armée* in review, distributed some decorations (of the legion of honour,) and restored, with the accustomed solemnity, the eagle to the 49th regiment; he afterwards mounted his horse, and ascended Capellenberg near Schmiedefeld. The French had once more occupied Hartha. The Russians, posted by the side of the villages, upon the heights, and behind them, were attacked by the columns which advanced upon the road, and retired through Goldbach, which was in flames. Napoleon, constant to his predilection for artillery, caused his twelve-pounders to play upon the small body of the rear-guard. Prince Poniatowski was in the



neighbourhood with his corps, which extended towards Hohenstein, and the Allies retired on the approach of night beyond Bischofswerda. Napoleon halted during this affair near his guard fire, which the cold of the season had rendered very necessary, and went to pass the night at Hartha, one of those miserable places the situation of which alone was an inducement for establishing the headquarters there. This time Napoleon was followed only by a part of his guards, and it appears that he did not feel himself strong enough to risk a battle.

He actually passed all the morning of the 23d at Hartha, vacillating between the measures he had to take, and deciding on none; at last, about four o'clock in the afternoon, he hastily proceeded towards Neustadt, whence a fire of musketry was heard to proceed. General Neuperg had been attacked by Lauriston, and withdrew into Bohemia with his Austrians and Russians. Some troops appeared on the heights of Tœplitz; so little could the line of the French advanced posts be descried, that when Napoleon himself came out of the wood, he was doubtful whether it were not the enemy posted in that situation. But, having more nearly exa-

mined the matter, he was informed that it was General Rochambeau's division, which had advanced in pursuit of the Austrians to that point. Tranquillized by each insignificant progress, he sent a message to Dresden in this style, "We are at Bautzen," (this was untrue, because a smart action took place on the afternoon of the same day, near Roth Nauslitz.) "The enemy retreats into Bohemia, by way of Neustadt and the other road ;—he is going to the devil !"

One would have sometimes thought that Napoleon, accustomed to victory, abandoned himself to illusions of his own creation ; and wished to inspire his partizans with the same courage and confidence, by representing insignificant circumstances to them as results of the highest importance.

Buonaparte again passed the night at Hartha ; the following day there was a storm, accompanied with dreadful peals of thunder. This was an extraordinary phenomenon at such a season, and with the cold which had been just experienced.

The intention of Napoleon could not, at that moment, be precisely determined. Did he wish to confine himself merely to reconnoitring ; to

make a feint, or attack Field-Marshal Blucher? At half-past one, the Duke of Tarentum sent word that the whole allied army, in considerable force, was ranged in order of battle near Burka; that General Sacken, who was advancing on the great road of Kamentz, had afterwards turned off towards Pohla; that general was then posted near the convent of Marienstern, and Field-Marshal Blucher near Bautzen. The march of the latter seriously threatened the French army on its flank. I have no doubt but considerable loss might have been occasioned him; nevertheless, a mere demonstration was made. Napoleon mounted his horse, and proceeded towards Bischofswerda. He had the appearance of expecting an attack; but that not taking place, and he not thinking fit to become himself the assailant, as the night was approaching, also quitted that point, carried off with him a great part of his troops, and came to Dresden in the course of the same night. The sequel proved that, by that retreat, made in a moment of ill-humour, he had renounced the provinces beyond the Elbe.

Napoleon would have willingly cleared his way on one side or other, when he was still in that

position ; but it may be observed by the course of the events which have been detailed, that all his movements depended on those of the Allies. He would have, doubtless, attacked the Crown Prince of Sweden in person, upon the Lower Elbe, if his absence would not have abandoned Dresden to the mercy of the armies of Schwartzenberg or Blucher. He therefore remained for some time confined to that point, until driven back by a fresh operation of the Allies, which could not have been better conceived and executed.

The eastern part of Saxony had been delivered from the French by means of the attack, with which the Allies had (to use the expression) tortured them. A similar attack, prudently combined and executed on their flank and rear, necessarily determined them to quit the country and draw near the Rhine, no point being tenable between the Elbe and the French frontier. The grand army, under the orders of the Prince of Schwartzenberg, coming from Bohemia, put itself in motion towards the road leading to Saxony, through Sebastienberg ; while the army of Blucher, marching rapidly along the right bank of the Elbe, fell by the shortest way upon the rear of the

French army. This plan, maturely conceived, will always make a distinguished figure in the annals of the art of war. Napoleon, experienced as he was in that art, must have been surprised that the numerous armies of his enemies were directed and supported with so much ability and confidence.

He was watching at Dresden the manœuvres of his opponents, hoping always to discover some weak place and to take advantage of it. He sometimes occupied himself with the business of his cabinet, sometimes with the fortifications of Dresden, which he had extended and improved; so that the days elapsed in weariness and care, while the inhabitants of the city, who dreaded the horrors of a siege, were overpowered with grief and anxiety.

Towards the middle of September, the King of Naples had covered the environs of Grossenhain with a *corps d'armée* of moderate strength. The French cavalry sustained several reverses in the neighbourhood of Muhlberg and Liebenwerda; it had been repulsed beyond the canal of Elsterwerde, and dislodged from Ortrand, in such a manner that Blucher was enabled to begin his

grand march from Kamentz towards Wittenberg, without the smallest difficulty. Before this occurrence, Napoleon had abandoned the right bank of the Elbe; for, on the 26th and 27th of September, the corps of the King of Naples passed over to the left bank, near Meissen, having first completed the demonstration in the direction of Bischofswerda. The inhuman orders given by Buonaparte to the commandants of that corps were not executed, at least, by the greater part of the generals, who thought better than himself. According to these directions, all the cattle should have been carried off, the woods burnt, the fruit-trees, and every thing besides which could afford sustenance, destroyed; so that the part of Saxony situated on the right bank of the Elbe would have become a frightful desert. Almost every thing had been consigned to total destruction; and the march of the Allies, who were rapidly advancing, alone prevented the French, who still occupied the environs of Dresden, from completing the ruin of eastern Saxony. Napoleon was then apprized of the march of Blucher, the certainty of which became the signal to him of an enterprise which he thought to execute on the left bank of

the Elbe. If the Saale had afforded any tenable point, he would have willingly taken advantage of it as a new line of defence, but he had no time to think of it. When Blucher had retired from his front, the most pressing necessity was that of opposing a competent force to the grand army of Schwartzemberg, which was advancing.

The King of Naples enjoyed the particular confidence of Napoleon; he was, therefore, constrained to take the command of the army posted at Erzgebirg, near Chemnitz and Oederan. At that time the cavalry of the French guard had been worsted in several affairs with Generals Thielmann and Lichtenstein.

Napoleon could stay no longer at Dresden. He had been suffered to remain in that city, in order that the net in which he had been enclosed might be drawn closer about him. Nevertheless, his confidence in a return of fortune prevented him from abandoning the line of the Elbe; a single battle gained would have restored him to it, and he would still have possessed the important points of Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden. He resolved, therefore, to go in search of the enemy, and to beat their armies, one after the other, with the *élite* of his

troops, although they were enfeebled by losses in the field, disease, and desertion. Two *corps d'armée*, of 28 or 30,000 men, were left behind for the defence of Dresden, under the orders of Marshal Gouvion Saint Cyr, and the general of division, Count Lobau\*.

The prospects of this unfortunate city became every day more gloomy; a new apprehension attended the expectation of a siege; it was conceived that the King would adhere to the schemes of him who had, till then, been his constant protector; and who, unfortunately, had shewn as much perseverance in maintaining himself in the country. In a word, it was feared that he would follow Napoleon. A great portion of his subjects, who had been oppressed by the disorders of the French, groaned under the system of policy which the King had been forced to adopt by imperious circumstances; for every impartial person

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\* Independently of those troops in a fighting condition, of which, however, about a third had arrived in a state of total exhaustion, there were already about 12 or 15,000 men in the hospitals, or attached to different establishments; for, in spite of the mortality among the soldiers, the number which quitted Dresden, by the capitulation of November, was from 36 to 38,000.



perceived, that this Prince, being overwhelmed, had no liberty of choice, and that the will of Buonaparte suppressed every attempt to deliver himself from the yoke. Indeed, while the greater part of the country was covered with French troops, (who, when they are on the retreat, act hostilely, and recognise no law dictated by humanity,) the King was restrained by cogent considerations, such as the fear of endangering the wreck of our fortunes. His Majesty was ignorant of the extent of our misery, and the horrors which surrounded us; or, probably, he considered them as the inseparable consequences of war. Perhaps Napoleon cherished in him the illusion, that the first victory would remove the enemy from Saxony, and would restore the country and its sovereign to security.

How could he dare oppose that powerful man, whom united Europe had not yet been able to subdue. What dreadful vengeance would Napoleon have wrecked on his desertion! The nation, overwhelmed with the weight of her misfortunes, had lost a portion of her energy; so many losses, experienced by the inhabitants, had produced a kind of insensibility. The return of hope, the

voice of a respected Sovereign, alone could re-animate their courage ; but the King could not explain himself while he was in the power of Buonaparte, and while the latter endeavoured to persuade him, that affairs were still in a good state, that he would deliver Saxony, and that he was still rich in resources.

Led by these assurances, and inevitable misfortune, the unfortunate Monarch followed Napoleon to Leipsic ; perhaps, the intention of the latter was to give his marshals an opportunity of acting more at liberty, and to spare the former the sight of the destruction, with which his beloved native city was threatened. In short, Buonaparte, or Fate, commanded, and the Royal victim obeyed.

His departure was kept as secret as possible, in order not to afflict the people, or, perhaps, to avoid giving occasion to any commotion. Some travelling carriages were prepared on the preceding day, scarcely any mention of this circumstance was made at the castle. I am convinced that the King himself was uncertain of the day of his departure ; far from suffering his personal interest to direct his steps, this pious

monarch thought he ought to obey the will of Providence, of whom Buonaparte was but an instrument, made up of good and evil\*.

On the evening of the 6th of October, Buonaparte again caused his desire to be intimated to the King, that he should not set out before six o'clock, the time fixed by himself for quitting Dresden. The most important business delayed the departure of Napoleon from that city, and from those very same apartments where, during the summer of 1812, he had laboured on the most gigantic plans against Russia.

He had been occupied all night in his cabinet. He sent an officer to the King of Naples, who was posted in the neighbourhood of Oederan, to instruct him to repair to Leipsic, by way of Rochlitz; he sent for the Governor of Dresden, and two marshals; in short, he laboured incessantly till the morning of the 7th of October. He once more took a bath, and set off after six o'clock; in a few minutes he was followed by the King of Saxony.

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\* Madame de Staël Holstein says, in her work upon Germany, written in 1808 and 1810, speaking of the German people in general, that "their respect for power arises more from its resemblance to destiny, than from any interested motive."

All the French troops had passed over to the left bank of the Elbe; they occupied only the nearest environs of Dresden, and Meissen, where the bridge of boats above the town was defended by a *tête de pont*. The light troops of the Allies made incursions along the bank of the Elbe, in every place where it was not protected. Buonaparte was therefore obliged to go by way of Wilsdruf; nothing but necessity could have determined an army on its march to take such difficult roads. During his short stay at Meissen, Napoleon once more passed over the bridge of boats, without imagining that, by that farewell visit, he bade an eternal adieu to the eastern part of Saxony, so long the victim of calamity: he then hastened to begin his march, still uncertain whether he should direct his steps. Nevertheless, he then perhaps conceived the scheme of rushing with the rapidity of lightning, towards the Mulde, in order to encounter Field-Marshal Blucher, who had passed the Elbe near Wartenbourg, between Presch and Wittenberg. He at length established his head-quarters at the castle of Seerhausen; the King of Saxony had stopped at Meissen, and was following Buonaparte by easy journies on the

ordinary road to Leipsic. The King was escorted by a strong detachment of the imperial guard, who shared that duty with a battalion of grenadiers belonging to the Saxon guard.

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## NOTES


SUBJOINED TO THE FRENCH EDITION OF

# THE CAMPAIGN IN SAXONY;

BY M. AUBERT DE VITRY,

THE EDITOR.

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## NOTES.

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IT has been the intention of the author of the *Campaign in 1813*, to exhibit Buonaparte with impartiality; consequently, his work has a twofold object. In the first place, to draw a portrait of Buonaparte, whom he has endeavoured to characterize by a minute detail of numerous circumstances of his public and private life; secondly, to enumerate the military events.

If Baron Odeleben have done full justice to the talents and activity of this Chief, he has not, at the same time, neglected to shew how useless and hurtful those talents were rendered by the operation of his passions. He has pointed out his measureless ambition,—his obstinacy.

There is always something disgusting in the exercise of severity, with respect to a living character, fallen from the very summit of grandeur, to the depth of abasement, whatever right of accusation may exist against him. Contemporaries, who have trembled at his power, cannot, consistently, load him with reproaches. Such conduct always assumes the appearance of striking a fallen man, and justice herself wears the appearance of revenge.



The sentiment, therefore, which has induced the author to speak of Buonaparte with moderation only, does honour to the character of an historian. But he appears to us not to have sufficiently foreseen the judgment which posterity will pass upon a man, who, having had in his hands the happiness of his country and of Europe, has plunged them in an abyss of calamity. Avoiding at once abuse and declamation, it is nevertheless impossible to be blind to the evils which he has occasioned, and not to attribute them to an ambition devoid of pity, and a levity which sported with every thing most sacred in the world.

Vain would be the endeavour to exculpate him by representing him as impelled by necessity to sustain a dreadful contest with the enemies of the French Revolution, and the ambition of a rival power. History will say that that necessity was oftener with him a pretext, than a real motive; and that he saw in the struggle an excellent mean of devoting himself to all the schemes of a boundless ambition. History will not acknowledge the necessity of overturning Europe, in order to secure the independence of France; she will say that, at the period of the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, the moderation of the French Government might have disarmed Europe, and secured to France advantageous alliances. The boundaries which France had gained by conquest, should have been observed, and Europe should have been convinced that no desire existed of extending them farther. What necessity was there, in fact, for

annexing Piedmont and Lombardy to France? If treaties had deprived Austria and Sardinia of those provinces, they should have been united under an independent government, in alliance with France. The amicable relations of France with Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and the minor German states, might have been re-established and fixed. France, by evidently renouncing all spirit of conquest, would doubtless have ensured the esteem of those powers which stood in need of her support. She probably might have tranquillized England herself. France might also certainly have contracted an useful alliance with Russia, who, on seeing her re-enter into her boundaries, and confine herself to them, would have had no farther cause of quarrel with her. Nothing would have remained for her vigilance, but the resentment of Austria, if that power should still have aspired to recover her Belgian and Milanese territories. If new enemies had presented themselves, allies would not have been wanting, and France, wisely governed, rendered happy, defended by armies accustomed to conquest, by a warlike people, more than ever attached to their country, would doubtless have been strong enough to repulse any new aggression.

The pretended necessity of propagating the revolution in all other parts, in order to maintain its consequences in France, was therefore but a cloak for the ambition of the French leader. As if history did not continually present us with instances of alliance between states governed by differ-

ent principles,—as if she did not instruct us, that the community of interests, and not the conformity of governments, unite nations. It would have, therefore, been sufficient to prove to the states disposed to enter into alliance with us, that they no longer should be alarmed by a system of conversion, or a mania of conquest, both equally menacing. The assumed necessity of converting every state, in order to have nothing more to apprehend, supposed a right of invading all nations. This was the principle of the Romans, of Mahomet, of the Arabs, of the Ottomans; it is the political weapon of all turbulent warriors, who wish to extend their sway universally, and who, whatever their power, always conceive it too confined.

Sound policy, which has no other aim than the happiness and independence of nations, does not recognise the necessity of crimes. Such necessity exists but for the policy of passions. The true motive of the leader of the French armies, was the boundless love of glory. He aspired to surpass all preceding conquerors and illustrious potentates. He wished to eclipse their reputation, and believed himself called to settle and command the world.

He desired still more ; in his ungovernable ardour, he thought no obstacle of any consideration ; he pretended to execute, in a month, schemes, the accomplishment of which required years. Whatever his panegyrists may say of him, he is certainly responsible for the dreadful evils entailed by his ambition, pride, and impatience : history and posterity

will justly lay them to his charge, and will bear testimony to his extraordinary talents, only to find him more culpable.

They will see no good excuse for his refusal of peace at Dresden. France still would have enjoyed her boundaries of the Alps, the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Pyrenees. The Confederation of the Rhine was suffered to subsist. It only remained to renounce the usurpation of Spain, Holland, Italy, and the Hanseatic towns.

Would not the French Empire still have been sufficiently extensive and powerful? Two years of peace and good government would have sufficed to restore France, and place her in a state to resist any attack, and to make her enemies repent it. The disasters occasioned by the refusal of peace at Dresden, recoil, then, with all their weight, upon him, whose pride would not make any concession.

As for the German account of the military events of 1813, it often stands in need of being rectified; impartial justice with respect to us, was too difficult a task for a foreigner.

It has been impossible for us to follow Baron Odeleben, step by step, to remove every inaccuracy, and supply all his omissions. But, by help of the documents with which we have been favoured, we have been able to re-establish some facts, the misrepresentation of which, had a tendency to compromise the honour of the French, of which we ought all, at this time, to shew ourselves more jealous than ever.

A French officer to whom we have communicated our translation has furnished us with the following remarks, and

as we believe that our readers will peruse them with interest, we insert them among the Notes which are subjoined.

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*The War with Russia, &c. Vol. I. page 3.*

Baron Odeleben believes that Buonaparte, by making war with Russia, wished only to constrain her to facilitate the conquest of the Indies. This report was certainly spread in France. At the period of the expedition, I have, myself, travelled with military men who believed it.

The author of the last history of the Russian campaign appears to think, that the war was the work of the Russian cabinet itself, impatient to shake off the yoke of the treaty of Tilsit, and the continental system.

Others have pretended that the leader of the French, having no other power but Russia to fear upon the continent of Europe, determined to attack her, in order to get rid of her rivalry by banishing her to Asia.

The project of an invasion of India, through the Russian dominions, is so extravagant, that, notwithstanding the temerity of the French leader, it will always be difficult to believe that it may be seriously attributed to him.

The necessity Russia had for commerce with England, determined her sovereign to renew his relations with that power. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, doubtless, could not bear, without impatience, the dispossession of the Duke of Oldenburg, and the occupation of Prussia by the French

troops. But perhaps a serious rupture would not have supervened if the sovereign of the French had not sought an opportunity which he thought favourable for annihilating the Russian power.

*His presence inspired the troops with enthusiasm, &c. Page 49.*

One is astonished at the silence preserved by the historian with respect to the 6th corps, commanded by Marshal the Duke of Ragusa, and composed for the greater part of the old bombardiers of the marine artillery. These troops behaved in the engagement with so much courage, took such a decisive part in it, that it becomes our duty to supply the extraordinary omission of Baron Odeleben. This corps formed into several square battalions in *echelon* on the right of Kaia, in an immense plain, and attacked by 40,000 cavalry, sustained seven charges throughout, and constantly formed for itself a rampart with the carcasses of the enemy. If one or two of these battalions were broken, it was only by means of the light artillery unmasked by the Russian and Prussian squadrons when they came up with the French. These attacks lasted more than two hours, and the heroic resistance of these veteran troops alone prevented the enemy from breaking the line, and gave time for the artillery of the young guard to come up to the same point. It should be added, that this artillery was almost wholly served by those cannoneers belonging to the marine.

*The Russians carried Bischofswerda by assault. Page 84.*

Baron Odeleben neither consulted the position of Bischofswerda, nor that of the army, when he wrote this page. The Russians had no occasion to take this town by assault. It was placed on the road which they took in their retreat. Commanded by high hills on all sides, it could serve as an intrenchment to neither party. The French advanced-guard arrived at the heights before Bischofswerda, and the enemy's rear-guard, which disputed the ground inch by inch, had placed its artillery on the opposite heights. The town was at the bottom of the ravine. It was burnt through the fire of the enemy's howitzers upon the soldiers of the 22d light infantry, who advanced as tirailleurs upon this insignificant town. The enemy's tirailleurs defended themselves there at every corner of the streets, in the midst of the flames, issuing from all quarters, and of the affrighted inhabitants, who sought to save some remnant of their goods. The French had no interest in burning towns; every consideration, on the contrary, prompted them to spare them. The Russian artillery must therefore be blamed, if, in less than one morning the town became a heap of smoking ruins. All that Odeleben says upon that head is therefore a tissue of errors, and Caulincourt could not, as he supposes, have convinced Buonaparte that this calamity was the effect of the bad discipline and excesses of the French army, as he was not present at that affair of outposts, and

the lowest officer could disprove such an imputation by the testimony of his own eyes.

*They abandoned it, &c. Page 93.*

The town of Bautzen was carried at two o'clock in the afternoon, and the principal height of the field of battle, which commanded the plain in front of Bautzen, and on which the victory depended, was won by the division of Lieutenant-General Bonnet, who had some four and eight-pounders to oppose the heavy artillery with which the hill was bristled.

*The enemy preserved the greatest composure. Page 98.*

Baron Odeleben cannot be ignorant that the allied army was superior in number, and that its formidable position gave it a third more force than it actually possessed in point of numbers.

*Considering all these important circumstances. Page 283.*

Never has the Saxon historian shewn greater partiality than in the relation of a battle which reflects the highest honour on the French soldiers. Two hundred thousand of the Allies, protected by the finest military positions, were repulsed by 53,000 of our warriors ; the intrenchments of Dresden were only traced out, and there were so few persons to defend them, that on the 26th the enemy's columns entered the city exclaiming " Victory," and shouting with all



their might, "to Paris, to Paris!" At two hundred paces from the great square, the columns encountered the first platoon of the old guard, coming up in haste from Silesia; this was like the appearance of Medusa's head. In an instant the enemy's battalions were thrown one upon the other, and the space of ground between the suburb and the foot of the hills was covered with the dead. The redoubt of the great garden was carried by two regiments of the young guard, which were then, for the first time, under fire. The officers placed themselves at the head of their companies, and themselves mounted first upon the parapet. The *debut* of these young conscripts was a glorious action. The guard supported the contest almost singly in that first engagement. The corps of the Duke of Ragusa was not able to enter the line till the 27th, about one *p. m.* at the moment when the advanced posts were upon the nearest hills. The French troops bivouacked at the foot of those heights, which they ardently desired to carry the following day; but the King of Naples had, by a bold manœuvre, turned these formidable positions, and the Allies resumed, on the 28th, in the morning, the high road to Bohemia. During the four following days, the French drove them from hill to hill, as far as the defiles of Tœplitz. At every step prisoners were made. The Austrians yielded in whole bodies; the number taken has been estimated at 28,000. They were taken in the woods and villages. They cheer-

fully threw away their arms, asking at the same time for bread, and exclaiming, *Vivat! Vivat!* Not so the Russians, few of whom were taken prisoners. As soon as these perceived they had no resource left, they crouched at the foot of some tree or hillock, covering their faces with their hands, and seemed to await the fatal blow. They were overwhelmed with surprise, when they found themselves treated with mildness and commiseration. It was not Kleist's ability which lost us the fruits of this battle. If Vandamme had remained in the position in which he was ordered to pass the night, if he had not left an interval of two leagues between the corps which flanked him, by advancing thus much farther during the day, he would neither have given General Kleist the idea of cutting him off, nor the Allied Sovereigns the means of beating him—still the enemy did not know how to make use of this advantage. Not a single soldier of Vandamme's corps should have escaped, surrounded by the whole army of the confederates, and having but from 25 to 30,000 men, he defended himself with rare intrepidity. I am ignorant of Napoleon's plan. I do not attempt to divine it; but whatever Baron Odeleben may say, whatever promise Napoleon might have made to the King of Saxony, I think the latter had every thing to gain by the war being transferred into Bohemia, a new territory. I am well assured that, but for the error of Vandamme, the defiles of Tœplitz would have been assaulted

on the following day ; that we should have carried them, as we had all the different hills and passes attacked four days before ; and that, in the first week of September, the walls of Prague would have been in our power. There were troops enough left in Saxony, and the different fortresses, to amuse Blucher and Bernadotte ; and Marshals Ney and Macdonald were not so beaten as to be incapable of taking a signal revenge.

*He shook the general by the ears.* Page 72.

This perhaps would have been more properly expressed by " he shook the general by the ear." This was a habitual mode with Napoleon of expressing his satisfaction, perhaps also his displeasure. When Buonaparte was informed by Captain Batty, of the marines, on board the Northumberland, that he had served against him at Acre, he seized the captain by the ear, and exclaimed in a jocular tone, " Ah, you rogue, you rogue, were you there?" On his passage from Elba to Frejus, he jested with his old grenadiers, pulled their ears and their whiskers, and inspired them by his conversation. *Warden's Letters from the Northumberland. Fleury de Chaboudon.*—TR.

*Afterwards he advanced, crouching, &c.* Page 272.

The Editor supposes that the import of this passage is, that he was leaning forward on his horse, in the act of pro-

ceeding at a full gallop, and would have so rendered it, but that it is just before stated Napoleon *had alighted*. He suspects that the words, " he mounted," have been omitted in the original.—Tr.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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VOL. I.—ERRATA.

- Page 3, line 3, for *Phe* read *The*.  
35, line 7, *Duromel* read *Durosnel*.  
56, line 15, for *it chose* read *they chose*.  
91, line 11 of the note, for *Særigia* read *Sarigen*.  
99, line 11, for *right* read *night*.  
165, line 25, for *dutants* read *adjutants*.  
180, line 16, for *chief* read *chiefs*.  
203, line 16, for *way* read *road*.  
288, line 10, for *city* read *town*.

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